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General Introduction
For many households the decision to purchase a house is one of most impor-
tant and difficult decisions in their lifetime. As with any durable good, the
decision to buy a house does not only entail a consumption dimension, but
at the same time is an investment choice. In fact, equity in owner-occupied
homes is the dominant form of wealth for most American and European
households. It has been documented that changes in housing wealth can
have protrusive effects on household consumption (Case et al., 2005) and
that developments in housing markets are not just a reflection of economic
activity, but are among the driving forces of business cycles (Iacoviello &
Neri, 2010). It is perhaps not surprising that the 2001-2006 US housing
bubble and its subsequent collapse in 2007, which is generally considered
as one of the main causes of the global financial crisis, have renewed aca-
demic interest in housing markets and prices and their relation with the rest
of the economy. While the studies by Case et al. (2005) and Iacoviello &
Neri (2010) show that there interactions between developments in housing
markets and developments in other markets, the current dissertation focuses
mainly on the interactions between different geographical housing markets
and interactions between agents in these markets.
Housing is characterized by a peculiar combination of features, which in-
clude durability, multidimensional heterogeneity and quality differentiation,
indivisibility in consumption, a mix of consumption and investment mo-
tives, and the importance of transaction costs and asymmetric information
(Quigley, 1979; Arnott, 2013). It is no wonder then that these character-
istics have a profound impact on the workings of housing and real estate
brokerage markets and play a central role in this dissertation. The afore-
mentioned properties lead Duncan Maclennan (1982) to conclude that: “the
housing market is really not a neoclassical exchange market, but is rather
a set of overlapping submarkets differentiated by tenure, location, size and
quality.” Since each house is unique, it can even be argued that every prop-
1
General Introduction
erty that is put up for sale constitutes a single market, where a single seller
potentially faces zero, one or multiple buyers. Despite that no two proper-
ties are exactly alike, they are however substitutable up to a certain degree.
Future buyers are likely to visit multiple housing units before they decide
to purchase a property. As this process is costly both in terms of money
and time, a stable equilibrium might only be achieved over a certain period
of time.1 Since it is also costly for sellers to search for an eligible buyer,
due to for example holding- and promotional costs, real estate agents have
traditionally acted as intermediaries between sellers and buyers to speed up
the matching process. In recent decades, however, the rise of modern infor-
mation and communication technologies has had a profound impact upon
the real estate brokerage industry.
In this dissertation we focus on some of the characteristics that define the
housing commodity and their effects on market outcomes. In the next few
paragraphs a short summary of each of the chapters presented in this dis-
sertation is provided. In the first chapter we focus on spatial and temporal
diffusion of housing prices in Belgium and are especially interested in the
role of the linguistic border. In the second chapter we investigate whether
housing prices close to the Flemish-Dutch border are higher as a result of
spatial arbitrage. In the third chapter, we examine the effects of the housing
stock composition at the neighborhood level on housing prices. In the fourth
chapter, finally, we start from the observation that high search costs as a
result of heterogeneity and spatial fixity of the housing good cause (buyers
and) sellers to hire a real estate agent. In this chapter, we focus on the
optimal market structure and market efficiency of the real estate brokerage
industry.
1In Flash Boys: a Wall Street Revolt (2014), Michael Lewis, an American non-fiction
author and financial journalist who also worked as a bond salesman in the past, focuses on
the rise of high-frequency trading in the US equity market. Lewis states that this market
“is rigged” by high frequency traders who front run (front running is the unethical practice
of a stockbroker executing orders on a security for its own account while taking advantage
of advance knowledge of pending orders from its customers.) orders placed by investors.
In the first chapter of the book, Lewis describes how Spread Networks’ secretive new
827-mile cable running as straight as possible, through mountains and under rivers, from
Chicago to New Jersey reduces the journey time for data from 17 to 13 milliseconds.
This $ 300 million project was designed to connect the financial markets of Chicago and
New York City where one could think front running might happen with a few millisecond
advantage. This rather absurd anecdote suggests that arbitrage between geographically
differentiated equity markets in the US, unlike housing markets, is instantaneous and
without any frictions.
2
General Introduction
As was already argued, the unique combination of features that underpin
the housing commodity and result in substantial search costs, might cause
that housing prices in different regions only slowly adjust to a shock. In
the UK, but also in other countries, a large academic literature has emerged
that investigates regional convergence of - and spatial and temporal diffu-
sion patterns in - housing prices. In the UK, many authors have found that
house prices exhibit a distinct spatial pattern over time, rising first in a cycli-
cal upswing in the south-east and then spreading out over the rest of the
country (Meen, 1999). This pattern is often referred to as the ripple effect
hypothesis. Although the statistical evidence is overwhelming and convinc-
ing, there are few studies that provide convincing economic explanations.
In the first chapter, which is joint work with Erik Buyst, we contribute to
this literature by examining to what extent the linguistic border that splits
Belgium into two distinct regions plays a role in the convergence and spatial
and temporal diffusion of housing prices using aggregated data from 22 a
priori defined Belgian local markets. We believe that this is an interest-
ing exercise since migration, equity transfer and spatial arbitrage, which are
potential explanations for the observed ripple effect, are likely to be influ-
enced by the presence of a linguistic border. Methodologically, we contribute
to an expanding literature on spatial (macro) panels (e.g. Breitung & Pe-
saran, 2008). The results presented in this chapter suggest that, similar to
the UK, a ripple effect is observed in Belgium, where prices along the axis
Antwerp-Brussels-Namur rise first after an initial shock to the dominant re-
gion, Antwerp. Subsequently, prices in the peripherally located districts in
the east and west of Belgium follow their more centrally located counter-
parts. Our findings suggest that the linguistic border plays an ambiguous
role. While the districts located along the centrally located north-south axis
Antwerp-Brussels-Namur are highly integrated despite the linguistic border,
districts on both sides of this border in the eastern and western parts of
Belgium show few signs of integration.
In the first chapter we show that housing markets and prices within a sin-
gle country can move relatively independently because of a different lan-
guage/culture. In the second chapter, we investigate whether there are
interactions between housing markets that are located on the opposite side
of a national border. While the literature on “border effects” in the con-
text of international trade patterns has flourished ever since the seminal
contributions of McCallum (1995) and Engel & Rogers (1996) in the Amer-
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ican Economic Review, there are few studies investigating border effects in
housing markets. Due to the fact that mortgage and housing markets are
mostly organized on a national level, large differences in housing prices may
nonetheless occur along national border. A recent study by Micheli et al.
(2014), for example, shows that the ask prices of comparable houses drop
by about 16% when crossing the Dutch-German border. Despite that we
know from administrative data, anecdotal evidence and popular media that
housing prices in the Netherlands were generally much higher than in Bel-
gium in recent decades, there are no studies investigating to what extent the
higher Dutch housing prices spilled over onto the prices of Belgian proper-
ties near the Dutch-Belgian border. Using detailed individual transaction
and employing the hedonic pricing method (Rosen, 1974) I examine to what
extent “proximity to the border” affects housing prices in Belgium.2 The
results from various (spatial) hedonic models reveal that the prices of Bel-
gian properties closer to the border are, ceteris paribus, higher as a result
of spatial arbitrage. The estimated arbitrage effect, however, is decreasing
over time as a result of the housing price bust in the Netherlands in the
aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. I also show that the
arbitrage effect is not constant across space. Using information concerning
the previous of buyers for a sub-sample of all transactions, it is furthermore
shown that housing markets are not necessarily efficient as Dutch buyers,
on average, pay a premium relative to their Belgian counterparts. The re-
sults in this chapter, in some sense, are opposed to those presented in the
previous chapter as they show that interactions between housing markets do
not necessarily stop at national borders. I believe that this apparent con-
tradiction shows that it is crucial to take into account the nature of a border.
Where the first two chapters of this dissertation focus on spatial spillovers
between different housing markets on a regional level, the third chapter
zooms in and examines spillover effects at the neighborhood level. Housing
economists have acknowledged that housing is a (highly) heterogeneous good
and have developed methods, such as the hedonic pricing method (Rosen,
1974), to deal with this inherent heterogeneity. While the view that the
housing commodity can characterized as a “bundle of attributes” has been
generally accepted, at a slightly more aggregate level, neighborhoods can
be viewed as “bundles of properties”. Despite that countless studies have
2Due to data limitations, it is unfortunately not possible to calculate the “gap” at
the border.
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shown that different bundles of housing characteristics are valued differently,
there are virtually no studies that investigate whether different bundles of
properties in an otherwise equivalent neighborhood are valued differently.
In order to fill the void in the literature, in the third chapter, we combine
a large and detailed dataset of approximately 6,100 dwellings that were sold
between 2003 and 2015 in the Flemish part of the Brussels Metropolitan
Area with administrative and geospatial data concerning the composition of
the housing stock at the neighborhood level. We examine whether the prices
of sold properties are affected by the average values and diversity measures
of several property characteristics of neighboring properties. In a sense we
thus look at spatial spillover effects at the neighborhood level. The results
of various (spatial) hedonic models indicate that the price of a property is
increasing in the average size and year of construction of neighboring prop-
erties, but decreases with the average plot size of neighboring properties.
Our findings thus provide support for the tax capitalization hypothesis of
Hamilton (1976), who argues that smaller dwellings benefit from the pres-
ence of larger properties. The results also reveal that home values are higher
in neighborhoods that are characterized by low levels of diversity in building
types, the year of construction, size, and the shapes of buildings. Our find-
ings furthermore indicate that differences in the composition of the housing
stock at the neighborhood level are responsible for price differentials as large
as 12%. More generally, the results presented in this paper have potentially
far-reaching consequences for real estate professionals, policy makers and
urban planners, since they provide some guidelines on how think about the
development of new neighborhoods. In my opinion this chapter also pro-
vides an interesting example of the use of geospatial data, which is just one
example of what economists have dubbed “Big data”, in modern day econo-
metrics.
While the third chapter acknowledges that houses and neighborhoods are
heterogeneous, buyers and sellers of real estate are also heterogeneous in a
multiplicity of dimensions. Buyers, for example, can have a different willing-
ness to pay for the same property. Buyers and sellers, at the same time, can
also be heterogeneous in their search costs. Buyers and sellers with higher
search costs have traditionally been more inclined to hire real estate agents,
who help facilitating the sales process and serve as intermediaries between
buyers and sellers. In return, these real estate agents traditionally charge
a service fee. Despite low barriers to entry and housing price movements,
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these service fees are typically relatively stable and expressed as a percentage
of the eventual sales price (e.g. 6% in the US3). This had led many people
to conclude that the real estate brokerage industry is characterized by a
lack of price competition (see e.g. USDOJ, 2007; Anglin & Arnott, 1999).
Advances in modern information and communication technologies, however,
have put the fixed commission rates under pressure by allowing sellers to
sell their property more easily themselves and lowering search costs for both
buyers and sellers. Recent studies for the US (e.g. Schnare & Kulick, 2009;
Wiley et al., 2012) provide some evidence of price competition in recent
years. The obvious question that arises is: “is more price competition be-
tween real estate agents necessarily beneficial from a social point of view?”
In chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Bert Willekens, Maarten
Goos and Erik Buyst, a theoretical model of imperfect broker competition
is developed. The theoretical results show that, under a realistic set of as-
sumptions and heterogeneity in the valuations of buyers and sellers for the
services provided by real estate agents, neither the monopoly service fee,
nor the service fee that is charged under Bertrand competition is socially
efficient. Instead, there exists an inverse u-shaped relationship between the
degree of competition and the welfare generated by the brokerage industry.
This starkly contrasts the traditional paradigm that more competition is
always better. We furthermore show that free broker entry in the presence
of fixed operating costs always results in excessive private entry, which is
consistent with the findings of Mankiw & Whinston (1986). In the empiri-
cal part of this chapter we show that, under simple parametric assumptions,
the structural parameters of the model are identified. The model is subse-
quently calibrated for the Belgian real estate brokerage industry and welfare
counterfactuals are performed. The results presented suggest that the ob-
served average commission rate of 4.3% is below the socially commission
rate, which is estimated to range between 5.1% and 24%. A welfare gain of
1% to 11% could be established when regulating broker service fees, given
the number of brokers that currently operate in the market. When also reg-
ulating broker entry, a further welfare gain of 7% to 69% could be realized.
Various other policy relevant counterfactuals are constructed and discussed.
So far, we have discussed the unique set of features that underpin the housing
commodity and provided a short summary of the four chapters presented
in this thesis. All the chapters presented are in some way related to the
3See, for example, Hsieh & Moretti (2003).
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observations of Quigley (1979, 2002) and Maclennan (1982). As a general
context, this thesis was written in the midst of a period of what I believe
to be are major changes to the field of (housing) economics. Modern in-
formation and communication technologies have both altered the way in
which information is gathered and the way and frequency in which it is
distributed. The geospatial data used in chapter 3, for example, are just
one example of the ever increasing availability of what are known as “Big
Data”. These new sources of data allow researchers to answer novel and
interesting research questions. Housing markets are typically characterized
as “thin” markets, which suggests that there might be “bargaining effects”.
These, however, can only be studied when the appropriate data is available.
The results presented in chapters 2 and 4 suggest that bargaining-effects
are non-negligible. At the same time, however, big data presents new chal-
lenges. The large datasets, for example, require more computational power.
Moreover, as shown in the fourth chapter, the developments in ICT are also
likely to change existing market structures. This, consequently, raises new
research questions and calls for novel methodologies.
Despite that researchers and policy makers can use these new sources of
data to address research/policy questions, there are some (spatial) aspects
that are not easily quantifiable. Since the housing commodity is inher-
ently spatial, housing economists have also employed methods developed in
the domain of spatial econometrics. While the theoretical foundations for
models using cross-sectional data were already established in the eighties
(e.g. Anselin, 1988) and are by now well-integrated in mainstream eco-
nomics/econometrics, methods and models using spatial panel data were
developed more recently.4 Authors, such as Pesaran (see e.g. Breitung &
Pesaran, 2008; Chudik & Pesaran, 2011; Pesaran, 2004, 2007a, 2007b, 2011;
Pesaran & Tosetti, 2011) and Baltagi (2008), have made important contribu-
tions in recent years. As housing markets are inherently spatial, we believe
that these types of models are particularly eligible for analysing housing
prices, both at the micro- and macro level. The first chapter presented in
this dissertation provides just one contribution to this growing literature.
4Spatial Error Models (SEM) and Spatial Lag Models (SAR), which allow for spatial
autocorrelation in the error terms or dependent variable, are for example used in chapters
1, 2 and 3 of this dissertation.
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Chapter I
Spatial and Temporal Diffusion
of Housing Prices in the
Presence of a Linguistic border:
Evidence from Belgium
1 Introduction
In this paper we study the effects of the language border in Belgium on
the spatial and temporal diffusion patterns of housing prices1. A large lit-
erature has emerged, especially in the United Kingdom but more recently
also in other countries, that investigates regional convergence of and spatial
and temporal patterns in housing prices. In the UK, many authors have
found that regional house prices are interdependent in the long-run and ex-
hibit a distinct spatial pattern over time, rising first in a cyclical upswing in
the south-east and then spreading out over the rest of the country (Meen,
1999). This pattern is often referred to as the ripple effect hypothesis and
arguably has important implications for the functioning of regional labor
markets and the regional distribution of wealth and assets, since housing
is one of the most important assets of many households. While statistical
evidence for the ripple effect hypothesis has expanded over the past decades
and novel econometric models have been introduced to test its validity, Meen
1This chapter is published in Spatial Economic Analysis, 2016, 11(1), 92-122. We
are extremely grateful to Geoffrey Meen, Annelore Van Hecke, Frank Verboven, Frank
Vastmans, Sven Damen, Geert Goeyvaerts and the participants of the housing economics
workshops of the European Network for Housing Research conferences in 2012 (Lilleham-
mer, Norway) and in 2013 (Tarragona, Spain) for valuable comments and suggestions on
earlier drafts of this work.
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(1999) notes that there are fewer studies that provide convincing economic
explanations. He argues that the observed ripple effect may be the result of
(1) migration, (2) equity transfer, (3) spatial arbitrage, and/or (4) spatial
patterns in the determinants of housing prices. It is intuitive that especially
the first three of these mechanisms might be (strongly) influenced by the
presence of a (language) border. Descriptive results presented in table 3
suggest that the degree of coherence among regional housing markets is in-
deed higher within each linguistic region. This indicates that the language
border may play an important role.
Using mix-adjusted house price transaction data for 20 a priori defined
districts in Belgium and an extended version of an econometric model that
was recently proposed by Holly et al. (2011) to cope with the unique federal
structure of Belgium, we provide evidence for existence of the ripple effect
hypothesis and show that the linguistic border plays an ambiguous role. Our
findings show that an initial shock to house prices in the dominant region
(Antwerp) is quickly absorbed by districts located along the north-south axis
of Belgium, which constitutes Belgians economic spine, and thus crosses the
language border. We furthermore show that housing prices in the peripheral
regions in the eastern and western part of the country converge solely with
respect to their neighbors within their respective linguistic region. These
results suggest that housing markets in the peripherally located districts in
the eastern and western parts of Belgium are far less integrated with their
neighbors across the linguistic border than districts centrally located dis-
tricts along the north-south spine.
We contribute to the existing literature in a number of ways. Despite that
the literature on spatial and temporal diffusion patterns of regional housing
prices has also expanded outside the UK, the current paper is the first study
that provides evidence for the existence of the ripple effect hypothesis for
Belgium. Secondly, the current study contributes to the literature on the
existence of and the mechanisms that lay behind border effects. Similar to
the literature on the ripple effect hypothesis there is a growing body of lit-
erature that provides statistical evidence for the existence of border effects,
but there are fewer studies that investigate the reasons behind this. In the
current study we aim to fill this void. Using the unique federal structure of
Belgium as a case-study, we show that linguistic differences influence spatial
and temporal diffusion patterns of housing prices. Specifically for Belgium
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we contribute to the existing literature by showing that the linguistic border
does not only matter in the short-run, but that the observed effects are also
persistent in the long-run.
Despite that a similar study as the current one might only be carried out in a
few other multilingual countries (e.g. Switzerland and Canada), the results
presented here shed some light on why border effects are still observed as,
for example, reported by Chen (2004). Similar to a study by Ferreira-Lopes
& Sequiera (2012) our results might also hold lessons for the EU given the
many linguistic and cultural differences among its member states.
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. In section 2 we provide an overview
of the existing literature that is related to our study. In section 3, subse-
quently we present the data and provide a brief introduction into the federal
and linguistic structure of Belgium. In section 4 we present the methodol-
ogy used in the subsequent empirical analysis. The estimation results and
the simulated Generalized spatio-temporal Impulse Response Functions are
presented and discussed in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
Spatial and temporal diffusion patterns of regional housing prices have been
studied in the UK and other countries (e.g. Stevenson (2004) for Ireland, van
Dijk et al. (2010) for the Netherlands, Kuethe & Pede (2011) for the US).
In the UK many researchers (e.g. MacDonald & Taylor (1993), Alexan-
der & Barrow (1994), Holmes & Grimes (2008), and Abbott & De Vita
(2013)) have focused on long-run relationships between regional housing
prices. These and others authors (e.g. Giussani & Hadjimatheou (1991),
Ashworth & Parker (1997) and Meen (1999)) have also investigated (short-
run) causality between regional house prices, which has often been referred
to as the ripple effect hypothesis. As Meen (1999) points out, both strands of
literature are closely related since the ripple effect hypothesis implies that
“short-term variations in regional price differentials can be very large in-
deed, but in the longer term some normal relative price pattern tends to be
restored.” Despite the large interest and statistical evidence for the ripple ef-
fect hypothesis in the UK, Meen (1999) argues that are few studies providing
convincing economic explanations. He puts forward four possible explana-
tions, namely (1) migration, (2) equity transfer, (3) spatial arbitrage, and
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(4) spatial determinants of house prices. A fifth possible explanations that
is examined in Meen & Andrew (1998) are leads and lags in house prices.
It is intuitive that a (language) border might have important implications
for the relative strength of these mechanisms. Although we do not explic-
itly model the aforementioned explanations in our econometric framework
we provide some insights into the mechanisms that are responsible for the
observed ripple effect in Belgium.
Given that we study the effects of a (language) border on the spatial and tem-
poral convergence and diffusion of housing prices, our paper also relates to
the literature on border effects. The effects of (international) borders have
mostly been studied in the context of international trade patterns where
many authors have observed that trade volumes are much higher between
regions within a single country than equidistant regions that are located in
different countries. In a seminal paper by McCallum (1995), for example,
the author find that the relatively innocuous Canada-US border continues to
play a decisive effect on trade patterns. In another seminal paper by Engel
& Rogers (1996) the authors examine deviations from the law of one price
using CPI data for US and Canadian cities for 14 categories of consumer
products. Their results indicate that while the distance between cities ex-
plains a substantial amount of the variation in the data for similar goods, the
price variation is much higher for two cities located on opposite sides of the
border than for two equidistant cities in the same country. In the context
of regional housing prices the effects of a national border have been studied
by Stevenson (2004). The author investigates house prices diffusion within
the Republic of Ireland and between the Republic and Northern Ireland and
finds that the Northern Irish market is more linked with that of the Republic
than with the rest of the UK. All these papers suggest that national borders
(continue to) matter. Chen (2004) also investigates why national borders
continue to matter in the EU and finds that, contrary to previous findings
in the literature, trade barriers do provide an explanation. In particular, she
finds that technical barriers to trade, together with product-specific infor-
mation costs, increase border effects. Although the author does not specify
the nature of these information costs, it is intuitive that costs related to
linguistic differences may be one of them. In the current study we exam-
ine the effect of the linguistic border that divides Belgium into two distinct
regions on the spatial and temporal propagation of housing prices. While
many studies have estimated the effects of national borders, we are one of
11
Chapter I
Spatial and Temporal Diffusion of Housing Prices in the Presence
of a Linguistic Border: Evidence from Belgium
the first studies examining the effects of a well-defined border within a single
country. Given the almost identical institutional set-up on both sides of the
language border we can safely rule out this potential explanation for the
border effects that have been observed in previous studies.
A third strand of literature that relates to the current study focuses on
the economics of language. While the economics of language has especially
been studied in the context of labor markets (e.g. Chiswick, 2008) and the
form of human capital they provide to immigrants and native-born linguistic
minorities, there have been a few other studies that investigate the effects of
language (differences) on economic outcomes. Schulze & Wolf (2009) show in
a paper titled “On the Origins of Border Effects: Insights from the Habsburg
Empire” that borders continue to matter in periods of increasing economic
integration. They furthermore show that ethno-linguistic networks had per-
sistent trade diverting effects in the multi-national Habsburg Empire prior
to the First World War. More specifically, their results indicate that po-
litical borders became visible in the economy from the mid-1880s onwards.
They attribute this result, which they call “border before a border”, largely
to the ethno-linguistic composition of the population across the different re-
gions. In a more recent study Ferreira-Lopes & Sequeira (2012) investigate
the degree of interdependence among business cycles in different regions in
modern-day Switzerland. They find that the cantons - a level of aggregation
that is similar to that used in the current study - are closely related, but
there are dynamic effects toward more “independent” business cycles.
The current paper also relates to two studies that examine the effects of
the linguistic border in Belgium on (regional) housing markets. Goffette-
Nagot et al. (2011) find that the linguistic border acts as a strong barrier in
the spatial pattern of land prices. De Bruyne & Van Hove (2013) also find
important differences between the different Belgian linguistic regions using
municipality-level data on housing prices. While both of the aforementioned
studies use cross-sectional data on land and housing prices, in this paper,
we study the effects of the language border on the long-run convergence and
spatial and temporal diffusion patterns of housing prices by using a large
panel dataset of regional housing prices.
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3 Data and the linguistic border
Unlike many studies in the UK and the US, we unfortunately do not have
mix-adjusted volume-weighted hedonic price indices at our disposal. All data
concerning housing prices in Belgium are recorded by Statistics Belgium and
are published at a quarterly frequency for all municipalities and higher levels
of aggregation. The published data comprise the number of transactions
and the average, median and other quantile prices of all transactions that
occurred in a particular municipality in a particular period. These series are
reported for four different categories, namely (1) apartments, (2) “ordinary”
dwellings, (3) villa’s, mansions and bungalows, and (4) land, where we ignore
the latter two.2 We control for changes in composition and location using
the following simple weighting procedure:
pi,t = Σ
K
k=1w¯i,kpi,k,t where w¯i,k = T
−1ΣTt=1wi,k,t (I.1)
Where subscript i denotes the district, k the respective category and t the
quarter of sale. Since we want to study within country diffusion patterns and
our data is available at the municipal level, we exclude data from transac-
tions that occurred in municipalities located along borders with neighboring
countries and also exclude data from coastal municipalities. While house
prices in the border regions, especially along the border with the Nether-
lands, are likely to be influenced by the inflow of (fiscal) migrants, the Bel-
gian coastal municipalities are characterized by a high share of (transactions
of) secondary homes. After exclusion of these transactions we aggregate the
data at the level of the judicial districts3, since these largely correspond with
economic entities - i.e. city and its respective agglomeration and rural area.
Another reason for the aggregation procedure used it that the number of
transactions at the municipal level is very often too limited. A map of the
different districts used in the analysis is presented in figure 1.
2Villa’s, mansions and bungalows is a small subcategory with in general high trans-
action prices. Inclusion of these transactions might lead to unwanted outliers. Therefore
these transactions are dropped out of our sample. (Residential) land is left out for obvious
reasons.
3Before the reform of 2012/2013, there were 27 judicial districts in Belgium. In the
empirical analysis we use 20 districts. To this end we have merged the districts of Tournai
and Mons (Tournai), Verviers and Eupen (Verviers), Arlon, Neufchaˆteau and Marche-en-
Famenne (Arlon), Huy and Lie`ge (Lie`ge), and Tongeren and Hasselt (Hasselt).
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Figure 1: Regions, districts, coastal municipalities and border municipalities
Source maps: Belgian HISGIS
Once we have constructed the regional housing price series, we employ the
national Consumer Price Index (CPI)4 to deflate nominal housing prices in
line with the existing literature. Finally, we collected data from the National
Bank of Belgium concerning the evolution of real GDP in Belgium, which
are available at a quarterly frequency from 1980Q1 up to 2011Q1 (T=125).
An overview of the raw data is presented in appendix A.
Now that we have discussed the data used in the empirical analysis, it is
necessary to provide some insights on the origins and the nature of the lin-
guistic border in Belgium which spans over approximately 200 kilometers
through Belgium and is the official divide between the Northern Dutch-
speaking Flemish Region and the southern French-speaking Walloon Re-
gion. The linguistic border in Belgium is part of a much larger linguistic
(and cultural) border that divides western Europe in two large areas. With
the notable exceptions of Belgium and Switzerland, this continental division
coincides largely with national borders. South of the divide are countries,
such as France, Italy and Spain, where Romanic languages are spoken. In
4Data concerning the CPI is provided by Statistics Belgium and is unfortunately not
available on a more disaggregated level.
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countries that are located north of this border, such as the Netherlands,
Germany and Austria, Germanic languages are spoken. While the linguistic
conflict in Belgium was mostly non-violent, many wars have been fought be-
tween countries on both sides of this continental divide in Europe over the
past centuries (e.g. the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-1871). The linguistic
border in Belgium, which was explicitly fixed in Belgian law in 1962/1963
after an extensive period of linguistic conflict, implies among other things
that all official documents are only to be drafted in the official language spo-
ken in the respective Region. An exception however is the Brussels Capital
Region, which is an officially bilingual enclave located in the Flemish Region.
Now that we have discussed the origins, it is necessary to provide some
further/deeper insights. Up to 1947, as a part of the decennial census, the
government counted the use of the different languages in every municipal-
ity. Although these data date back almost 70 years, they shed some light
on the “hardness” of the border in daily life. Data from this last language
count in 1947 suggest that approximately 94.7% and 95.4% of all people in
respectively the Flemish Region and the Walloon Region mostly or exclu-
sively spoke the official language in their region, which suggests that there
were two distinct linguistic regions in Belgium. Since no official language
counts were held after 1947, we cannot evaluate whether this pattern re-
mains consistent over time using data from language counts. More recent
data concerning migration patterns at the provincial level presented in ta-
ble 1, however, show that migration is much lower between provinces on
opposite sides of the linguistic border than between provinces in the same
linguistic region.
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Table 1: Overview migration patterns within and between linguistic regions
Origin/destination Within Between BCR
Antwerp 86.7 4.7 8.5
Flemish Brabant 50.4 18.1 31.4
Walloon Brabant 53.3 13.2 33.3
West Flanders 76.6 15.4 7.9
East Flanders 83.9 7.7 8.3
Hainaut 58.6 18.2 23.1
Lie`ge 62.2 17.5 20.1
Limburg 62.2 9.1 5.4
Luxembourg 81.5 6.3 12
Namur 81.9 4.8 13.2
Average 72 11.5 16.3
Note: the migration data, which are for the year 2011, were collected from the website of Statistics
Belgium.
One might argue, however, that this higher probability of moving within
each linguistic region is due to other reasons, such as proximity. The results
of a simple regression analysis, presented in table 2, where we control for
the distance between different provinces (common border) indeed confirm
that mutual distance explains a substantial amount of the variation in mi-
gration patterns. The results, however, also reveal that the language border
continues to play an important role, since households are much more likely
to move within their respective linguistic region.
Table 2: Regression analysis migration patterns
Variable βˆ σˆ
Same linguistic region 0.093*** 0.016
Common border 0.118*** 0.016
Brussels CR 0.141*** 0.025
Constant 0.01 0.01
R-sq. 0.581
Obs. 110
Note: the dependent variable is the percentage of people migrating from province j to province i. ***,
** and * signify that the test rejects the null at respectively the 1, 5 and/or 10% level.
16
Chapter I
Spatial and Temporal Diffusion of Housing Prices in the Presence
of a Linguistic Border: Evidence from Belgium
So far, we have established that Flanders and Wallonia are two distinct
regions where most people mostly or exclusively speak the official language
of their respective region on a daily basis. We have furthermore shown that
both regions are characterized by a low rate of interregional migration.
4 Methodology
We continue in this section by proposing our empirical framework. In section
4.1 we discuss the spatial weights matrices used in the empirical analysis and
in section 4.2 we propose the econometric model.
4.1 Spatial weights matrices
Firstly, it is important to introduce the mathematical representation of the
spatial structure in the econometric model. Spatial structure has very of-
ten been operationalized by so-called spatial weights matrices, which are a
priori defined by the researcher. Given that there is no definite answer how
space should be mathematically represented and the estimation results are
conditional upon the mathematical structure of space, it is important to
investigate whether the results are driven by the chosen weighting scheme.
In the current study we use 2 of these schemes to ensure the robustness of
our results with respect to our choice concerning the mathematical repre-
sentation of spatial structure in the data. The first scheme we employ in
the current study is the so-called contiguity criterion, which has been used
on numerous occasions in the literature. Districts i and j are considered to
be neighbors whenever they share a common border.
W coni,j =
1 if i and j are neighbors0 otherwise (I.2)
A second weighting scheme that frequently appeared in the spatial econo-
metrics literature is the inverse distance scheme which relates to Waldo
Tobler’s (1979) first law of geography5.
5“Everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant
things.”
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W idi,j =
1
di,j
(I.3)
Where di,j denotes the distance between districts i and j and is measured as
the crowfly distance between the major cities of each pair of districts i and j.
Since we especially want to focus on the effects of the linguistic border in
the spatial and temporal propagation of housing prices, we have to take into
account in which linguistic region districts i and j are located. We there-
fore split the spatial weights matrices presented into four separate spatial
weights matrices by pre-multiplying the spatial weights matrices (we use the
Hadamard-product, i.e. element-by-element) W coni,j and W
id
i,j with W
o
i,j and
W ci,j, the elements of which are equal to 1 whenever the districts are located
in the same (other) linguistic region and equal to 0, otherwise. We thus
construct the following spatial weights matrices:
W coni,j,o = W
o
i,j ◦W coni,j (I.4)
W coni,j,c = W
c
i,j ◦W coni,j (I.5)
W idi,j,o = W
o
i,j ◦W idi,j (I.6)
W idi,j,c = W
c
i,j ◦W idi,j (I.7)
Finally, as conventional in the spatial econometrics literature, the result-
ing four spatial weights matrices (W coni,j,o, W
con
i,j,c, W
id
i,j,o, and W
id
i,j,c) are row-
normalized.6
4.2 Econometric model
The econometric model used in the subsequent empirical analysis is a spatio-
temporal model for housing prices that is similar to that proposed by Holly et
al. (2011) and has also been applied to the Chinese housing market by Gong
et al. (2014). As in their contributions, we are interested in the propagation
of (log) housing prices, pi,t, over time (indexed by t = 1, 2, ..., T ) and space
(indexed by i = 1, 2, ..., N). We furthermore want to allow for the possibility
of a dominant region, region 0, and error correcting mechanisms. Whilst
shocks to the dominant region are propagated to other regions immediately
6This transformation assures that every districts has the same number of neighbors.
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shocks to the remaining regions have no immediate impact on the dominant
region. The error correcting mechanisms take into account possible long-
run equilibria among housing prices in different regions and are allowed for
when the co-trending vector is found to be a valid representation of the data.
For the dominant region, region 0, the following house price equation thus
applies:
∆p0,t = φ0,so(p0,t−1 − p¯so0,t−1) + φ0,sc(p0,t−1 − p¯sc0,t−1) + α0
+β0,1∆p0,t−1 + γ0,1∆p¯so0,t−1 + δ0,1∆p¯
sc
0,t−1 + 0,t
(I.8)
where ∆po,t denotes the growth rate of housing prices in the dominant region
at time t, ∆p¯so0,t−1 represents the growth rate of housing prices in neighboring
regions on the same side of the linguistic border at time t − 1, and ∆p¯sc0,t−1
the growth rate of housing prices in neighboring regions on the opposite
side of the linguistic border at time t − 1. Shocks to housing prices in the
previous period in neighboring regions are thus allowed to have an effect on
the growth rate of housing prices in the current period in the the dominant
region. p0,t−1, p¯so0,t−1 and p¯
sc
0,t−1, respectively, denote the natural logarithm
of real housing prices at time t− 1 in the dominant region, neighboring re-
gions on the same side of the linguistic border, and neighboring regions on
the opposite side of the linguistic border. The growth rate of (real) housing
prices in the dominant region can thus be affected by deviations from long-
run equilibria and the growth rates of housing prices in both the own and
neighboring regions in the previous period.
For the remaining regions the following price equation is estimated:
∆pi,t = φi,0(pi,t−1 − p0,t−1) + φi,so(pi,t−1 − p¯soi,t−1) + φi,sc(pi,t−1 − p¯sci,t−1)
+αi + βi,1∆pi,t−1 + γi,1∆p¯soi,t−1 + δi,1∆p¯
sc
i,t−1 + κi∆pi,t + i,t
(I.9)
Where pi,t denotes the (natural) logarithm of real housing prices in district
i at time t, and ∆pi,t its growth rate. p¯
so
i,t denotes the (natural) logarithm of
real housing prices in neighboring regions on the same side of the linguistic
border and p¯sci,t denotes the equivalent for neighboring regions on the oppo-
site side of the linguistic border. Similarly, ∆p¯soi,t−1 and ∆p¯
sc
i,t−1 denote the
spatially and temporally lagged growth rates of housing prices for districts
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on respectively the same and the opposite side of the language border. Note
that the model presented here is a ‘pure’ price diffusion model where prices
in every region i solely react to house price developments in the dominant
and neighboring regions. Since it is likely that house prices changes are the
result of (macro)economic developments we also include the change in the
natural logarithm of real GDP at time t, ∆GDPt, in our regression anal-
ysis for every region i. Furthermore, note that the model presented here
is a first-order linear representation. In the empirical application, however,
we allow for higher order lags. Due to the presence of ∆p0,t in the price
equations for the remaining regions we have to perform, similar to Holly
et al. (2011), Wu-Hausman type of exogeneity tests (Wu, 1973). Once we
have estimated the model, we can also simulate the appropriate Generalized
spatio-temporal Impulse Response Functions.
5 Results
5.1 Long-run equilibria
Before we present the results of the selection procedure used to determine a
suitable candidate for the dominant region and the results from our econo-
metric model, we first provide some insights into the degree of integration
among housing prices in the different Belgian districts. To this end, we
use the recently developed pair-wise approach (Pesaran, 2007) that was also
used in an earlier study by Abbott & De Vita (2013). We perform unit
root tests on all N(N − 1)/2 pairs of house price differentials (pi,t − pj,t).
Descriptive statistics concerning the fraction of pairs for which the house
price differential is stationary at the 5% level using standard ADF-tests are
presented in table 3.
Table 3: Fraction of districts that are cointegrated at the 5% level using log
real house prices (1973Q1-2011Q3)
All Within linguistic Region Across border
Total Flanders Wallonia
0.468 (190) 0.563 (94) 0.454 (66) 0.821 (28) 0.375 (96)
Note: the number of observations is displayed between brackets. Cointegration statistics are calculated
using pairwise ADF-tests on regional house price differentials where the optimal lag is calculated using
the SIC-criterion. A full table of all cointegration statistics is available upon request from the authors.
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The results generally indicate that there is a high degree of interdependency
among the different Belgian districts, given that 46.8% of the 190 pairs of
house price differentials are stationary at the 5% level. Since Belgium is
only a small country this is intuitive. The results furthermore reveal that
the fraction of regional house price differentials that is stationary is higher
within each linguistic area (56.3%), which indicates that either language,
distance or other factors play a role. The results finally reveal that the
degree of coherence is higher among Walloon districts than among their
Flemish counterparts.
5.2 Choice of the dominant region
In the empirical model described in section 4.2 we allow for a dominant
region, where shocks to this dominant region are contemporaneously and
spatially propagated to the remaining regions without immediate feedback
effects. This type of model can be characterized as a VAR model with a
dominant unit (Chudik & Pesaran, 2011) and has previously been applied
by Holly et al. (2011) for the UK and Gong et al. for the Chinese housing
market. In the current study we estimate the following bivariate VAR(4)
models with error correcting coefficients, which allows us to assess whether
housing prices in a certain region are long-run forcing, in the sense of Granger
& Lin (1995), upon prices in the remaining regions:
∆pi,t = φi,j(pi,t−1 − pj,t−1) + Σ4l=1ai,j,l∆pi,t−l + Σ4l=1bi,j,l∆pj,t−l + i,j,t
∆pj,t = φj,i(pj,t−1 − pi,t−1) + Σ4l=1aj,i,l∆pj,t−l + Σ4l=1bj,i,l∆pi,t−l + j,i,t
(I.10)
Where the error correction coefficients, φi,j and φj,i, and their associated
t-ratios are estimated using a SUR-algorithm7. The results are presented in
table 4.8
7Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
8The significance levels for all the error correction coefficients are presented in table
B.1 in appendix B.
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Table 4: Error correction coefficients in cointegrating bivariate VAR(4) of log
real house prices of Antwerp and other Belgian districts (1973Q1-2011Q3)
District φˆ0,i t0,i R
2
0,i φˆi,0 ti,0 R
2
i,0
Mechelen 0.016 0.337 0.211 -0.167*** -2.923 0.304
Turnhout 0.043 1.305 0.159 -0.140*** -3.164 0.245
Brussels -0.054 -0.933 0.273 -0.118** -2.056 0.241
Leuven -0.093* -1.756 0.254 -0.231*** -3.292 0.264
Nivelles 0.042 0.767 0.23 -0.168*** -2.781 0.235
Bruges -0.017 -0.398 0.2 -0.115** -2.348 0.294
Kortrijk 0.003 0.09 0.189 -0.091** -2.421 0.297
Veurne 0.008 0.268 0.165 -0.189*** -3.627 0.297
Dendermonde 0.014 0.291 0.173 -0.170*** -3.084 0.288
Ghent -0.018 -0.588 0.182 -0.014 -0.394 0.322
Oudenaarde 0.029 0.916 0.194 -0.143*** -3 0.326
Charleroi 0.033 1.095 0.177 -0.052* -1.871 0.313
Tournai 0.021 0.563 0.194 -0.095** -2.477 0.317
Lie`ge 0.024 0.737 0.215 -0.075** -2.413 0.321
Verviers 0.034 0.957 0.256 -0.168*** -2.918 0.296
Hasselt 0.017 0.555 0.153 -0.103*** -2.598 0.313
Arlon 0.068* 1.902 0.197 -0.209*** -3.375 0.276
Dinant 0.03 0.86 0.151 -0.140*** -2.867 0.26
Namur 0.018 0.421 0.195 -0.090* -1.884 0.333
Note: the table displays the results of the pair-wise long-run causality test. ***, ** and * indicate that
the error correction coefficient is significant at the 1, 5 and/or 10% level. A full table for all the districts
is available from the authors upon request.
The estimates presented in table 4 indicate that the district of Antwerp is
the most suitable dominant region, given that housing prices in the district
of Antwerp are long-run causal (Granger & Lin, 1995) upon prices in all
other regions, except for the district of Ghent. The results presented in ta-
ble B.1 in appendix B furthermore confirm that Antwerp is the most suitable
candidate for the dominant region. This result might seem counter-intuitive
since Brussels is the largest city in Belgium, centrally located and home
to many national and international organizations. Our intuition however is
that Antwerp, with its port, is a more suitable candidate as it is more prone
to (international) economic shocks. The port of Antwerp is Europe’s second
largest port with a large hinterland including Western Germany and North-
ern France (Loyen et al., 2003) and hosts one of the world’s most important
clusters of chemical industry.9 Data from the National Social Security Office
9The port of Antwerp provided employment for 145,836 full time equivalents (FTE)
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in Belgium furthermore reveal that while 38.5% of the working population
in the Brussels Capital Region is employed by the public sector, this sector
is responsible for only 22% of total employment in Antwerp, which suggests
that economic shocks might be felt - and capitalized into housing prices -
sooner in the port town. Given the results presented in this subsection we
start from the hypothesis that Antwerp is the dominant region in Belgium
and estimate the full model accordingly.
5.3 Estimation results
So far, we have presented results which indicate that housing prices in dis-
tricts within each linguistic area display a higher degree of interdependence
and the district of Antwerp is likely a suitable candidate for the dominant
region. Obviously, these simple analyses do not capture all possible inter-
dependencies between housing prices in different districts. Therefore, we
estimate the full model presented in section 4.2 where Antwerp acts as the
dominant region and spatial relationships are split up into two separate com-
ponents (within and across linguistic region) using the contiguity criterion
discussed in section 4.1 to construct the appropriate spatial weights matri-
ces. All price equations are estimated using OLS and lag orders are selected
using the SIC criterion with a maximum lag order of 4. The results are
presented in table 5.
A first glimpse at the estimates presented in table 5 reveals that housing
prices in Belgium are highly integrated among each other, both in the short
run and in the long run. The table also shows that districts react hetero-
geneously with respect to shocks in (real) GDP growth. We furthermore
observe that the effect of shocks to Antwerp, are contemporaneously and
spatially propagated to 14 out of the 19 remaining districts, which sug-
gests that Antwerp is indeed a suitable candidate for the dominant region.
The Wu-Hausman test-statistics that are presented in the second to last
column, also suggest that Antwerp is an eligible candidate given that the
null-hypothesis of exogeneity is rejected for only one (Nivelles) of the 19
districts. The test-statistics thus ensure that the results are not subject to
in 2010, of which 60,509 direct and 85,327 indirect. The 10 largest employers were:
BASF, BNRC Group, Public sector, Antwerp Port Authority, General Motors Belgium,
ExxonMobil Petroleum & Chemical, PSA Antwerp, M.S.C. Home terminal, Electrabel
and Total Refinery Belgium. The port of Antwerp was responsible for approximately
19.2 billion euros of value added, which was approximately 5.5% of the total value added
in Belgium in 2010 (Mathys, 2012).
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simultaneity bias.
While the previous paragraph provides a general description of the results
presented in table 5, our goal is to study the effects of the linguistic border in
the spatial and temporal propagation of housing prices, which necessitates
a more thorough look at the results presented above. We already mentioned
that the cointegration statistics presented in table 3 and the error correc-
tion coefficients presented in table 5 suggest that housing prices in Belgium
are highly integrated, where the results presented in table 3 suggested that
housing prices are more highly integrated within each linguistic region. The
error correction coefficients presented in table 5 show that all districts, ex-
cept for Ghent, converge with respect to Antwerp, neighboring districts,
or both. A more thorough investigation shows that the districts can be
split up into approximately 3 different groups. A first group of districts
that comprises Mechelen, Brussels, Leuven, Nivelles, Namur and Verviers
are districts that are located along, except for Verviers, the economically
important north-south axis and converge with respect to the dominant re-
gion, Antwerp. Notice that Nivelles, Namur and Verviers are located in
the Walloon region, while the remaining districts are Dutch-speaking, which
implies that convergence is not strictly limited to districts within the same
linguistic region. A second group that comprises Bruges, Arlon, Kortrijk
and Dinant are (peripherally located) districts that converge both with re-
spect to the dominant region and neighboring regions. Observe that the
error correction mechanism with respect to neighboring districts is larger
for all four districts than the error correction mechanism with respect to
the dominant region. Furthermore note that although Kortrijk converges
with respect to neighboring districts on the opposite side of the linguistic
border, the error correction coefficient is only significant at the 10% level. A
final group of (peripheral) districts that comprises Turnhout, Dendermonde,
Veurne, Oudenaarde, Charleroi, Tournai, Lie`ge and Hasselt are districts that
converge solely with respect to neighboring districts. While the districts of
Oudenaarde, Tournai, Lie`ge and Hasselt can potentially display convergence
with respect to neighboring districts across the linguistic border only the er-
ror correction coefficient for Lie`ge is statistically significant.
Our econometric specification does not only allow for long-run convergence,
but also allows for short-run dynamics. These are captured by the lagged
own price changes and the lagged price changes of neighboring districts. The
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results point out that 14 out of the 20 districts have negative coefficients for
lagged own price changes. Although one might worry about potential sea-
sonality effects, we have already controlled for these effects by adding sea-
sonal dummies in our regressions. To capture spatial spillovers and account
for the presence of the linguistic border, we included lagged prices changes
of both neighboring districts within the same linguistic regions and neigh-
boring districts across the linguistic border. The estimates display a strong
linguistic pattern, where lagged price changes in neighboring districts within
the same linguistic region are generally positive (13 out of 20 districts) and
statistically significant (8 out of 20 districts), while lagged price changes of
neighboring districts across the linguistic border insignificant in 7 out of 8
cases. The notable exception here is the Walloon district of Nivelles, which
neighbors the Flemish districts of Leuven and Brussels. These three districts
together up to 1995 constituted the province of Brabant and are economi-
cally highly integrated due the presence of the (bilingual) Brussels Capital
Region (note that the Brussels Capital Region does not coincide with the
judicial district of Brussels). Many people working in the Brussels Capital
Region commute on a daily basis from municipalities that are located in
both Walloon and Flemish Brabant.
5.4 Robustness
Although the model presented previously allows for shocks in (real) GDP
to be absorbed in housing prices instantaneously (real) GDP is only avail-
able from 1980Q1 onwards, while housing prices are available from 1973Q1.
Therefore, we have also estimated the same model without (real) GDP
growth (full sample, i.e. T = 155). The results, which are presented in
table 6, indicate that the degree of interdependence among regional housing
prices is even higher as all regions have one or multiple (spatial) error cor-
rection terms that are negative and significant. Observe that only Kortrijk
converges with respect to neighboring regions on the opposite side of the
language border and only Leuven is affected by short-run spillovers from
districts across the language border. Furthermore observe that while hous-
ing prices in more districts (Turnhout, Lie`ge, Ghent and Charleroi) converge
with respect to housing prices in the dominant region, the error correction
component with respect to neighboring districts is very often small in mag-
nitude and the new districts are also affected by short-run spatial spillovers,
which makes it hard to interpret the separate effects in isolation.
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While we have already shown that the estimates are not sensitive with re-
spect to the sample period under consideration, it is also important to in-
vestigate the robustness of our results with respect to the spatial weights
matrices. As was already mentioned the results are conditional upon the
specification of the spatial weights matrices which are a priori defined by
the researcher. Therefore, we present the results of our baseline model where
the inverse distance criterion was used to construct the spatial weights ma-
trices in table 7. The results presented are very similar to those presented
in tables 5 and 6 and thus require little additional explanation.
5.5 Generalized spatio-temporal Impulse Response Func-
tions
Although the coefficient estimates presented in tables 5, 6 and 7 shed light
on the statistical relationships among housing prices in the different Belgian
districts, the estimated coefficients are ingredients of a large and complex
system of interactions and feedback mechanisms that can hardly be inter-
preted in isolation. Therefore, similar to Holly et al. (2011), we use Gener-
alized spatio-temporal Impulse Response Functions (GIRF) to analyze how
(idiosyncratic) shocks are propagated over time and space. Figure 2 displays
the spatial and temporal diffusion of an idiosyncratic shock (one standard
deviation) to the dominant region using the estimates from the baseline
model presented in table 5.10
10In appendix B we present the GIRFs for each district separately together with their
bootstrapped (5000 replications) confidence intervals.
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Figure 2: Generalized spatio-temporal Impulse Response Functions (horizon
= 40) for our baseline estimates (1980Q1-2011Q3)
Note: the different districts are ordered according to their respective averages over time.
The simulated GIRFs clearly provide evidence for the existence of the rip-
ple effect hypothesis in Belgium. Shocks to the dominant region are only
slowly propagated to other regions. A quick glance suggests that it takes
time (approximately 10 years) before a single shock is fully absorbed by
the remaining regions, which implies that there are frictions that prevent
housing markets to converge to their new equilibrium immediately. Also
observe that districts located along the north-south axis of Belgium, which
constitutes the economic spine of the country, converge much faster with
respect to Antwerp than districts in the more peripherally located eastern
and western parts of the country. Given that the initial convergence process
follows the line Antwerp-Namur, and thus crosses the language border, our
results suggest that the regions along this axis are sufficiently integrated to
overcome their linguistic differences. Our intuition for this result is that the
bilingual Brussels Capital Region, a main driver of the Belgian economy, is
likely to be the cement that connects the district Brussels to the French-
speaking district of Nivelles (and subsequently to Namur) and thus spans
across the linguistic border. Once the convergence process has initially oc-
curred along the north-south axis districts that are located in the eastern
and western parts of Belgium converge with respect to their neighbors. Al-
though this cannot explicitly be seen from the graph presented in figure 2,
the estimated error correction coefficients presented in table 5 suggested that
this convergence process occurs within each linguistic region. The GIRFs
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for our robustness checks, which display very similar patterns, are presented
in figures 3 and 4.
Figure 3: GIRFs using the full-sample (1973Q1-2011Q3) estimates and the
contiguity criterion to construct the appropriate spatial weights matrices
Note: the different districts are ordered according to their respective averages over time.
Figure 4: GIRFs using the reduced sample (1980Q1-2011Q3) estimates and
the inverse distance criterion to construct the appropriate spatial weights
matrices
Note: the different districts are ordered according to their respective averages over time.
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5.6 The role of language
The estimation results presented in tables 5, 6 and 7 and their correspond-
ing GIRFs presented in figures 2, 3 and 4 suggest that peripherally located
districts in the eastern and western parts of Belgium are far more integrated
with neighboring districts within their linguistic area than with neighboring
districts located across the linguistic border. Although we cannot explicitly
test using our econometric model that language as such is the main driver,
one might be concerned that there are other factors, which are correlated
with language, that might drive our results.
One might, for example, be concerned that the different peripheral districts
in our dataset have different economic structures which prohibit the integra-
tion of housing prices with their neighbors across the linguistic border. In
table C.1 in appendix C we present data that was provided by the National
Bank of Belgium (NBB) concerning the number of people employed in dif-
ferent sectors of the economy in 2011 at the provincial level. The figures
indicate that there are only minor differences for the different provinces,
which suggest that there is no reason to believe that differences in economic
structure explain our results.
One might also be concerned that our results are caused by differences in
the composition of sales. To this end we performed an additional robust-
ness check by estimating the same model for dwellings only. The estimation
results are presented in table C.2 and the GIRFs are plotted in figure C.1,
which are both in appendix C, again are very to those presented previ-
ously. We observe a strong interdependence among districts located along
the north-south axis of Belgium, while peripheral districts in the east and
west almost exclusively converge with respect to their neighbors on the same
side of the language border. This suggests that the results presented earlier
are not driven by changes in composition. Although the results presented
in this section do not prove that linguistic differences cause the low de-
gree of interdependence among housing prices in peripheral districts, it is
at least remarkable that housing prices in a small country such as Belgium
(approximately 30,000km2, compared to 245,000km2 for the UK and even
9,000,000km2 for the US) partially follow these linguistic patterns.
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6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have assessed the validity of the ripple effect hypothesis for
Belgium, and have especially focused on the role of linguistic border that
divides Belgium into two large linguistic regions. Simple descriptive statis-
tics presented in table 2 revealed that the degree of interdependence among
regional house prices is higher between districts within a linguistic region,
than between districts located in a different language region. After that we
determined a suitable candidate, Antwerp, for the dominant region in our
model in section 5.2 we estimated a flexible econometric model where we
allow for a full set of possible interactions and error correction mechanisms
between different regions. The spatial weights matrices used to construct
spatially weighted averaged additionally take into account the unique federal
structure of Belgium. The results presented in table 4 and figure indicate
that regional housing prices exhibit a distinct spatial pattern where hous-
ing prices in districts located along the centrally located north-south axis of
Belgium are more highly integrated among each other and converge faster
with respect to the dominant region, Antwerp. In a second wave of this
convergence process, housing prices in the more peripherally located eastern
and western parts of Belgium converge almost exclusively with respect to
neighboring districts in the same linguistic region, which suggests that there
are strong effects from the language border in these areas. Although the
current econometric framework does not allow to explicitly test whether the
observed effects are solely driven by linguistic differences, the results pre-
sented in section 5.6 suggest that the economic structure on both sides of
the language border is not that different, which makes our case stronger.
A first takeaway from this paper is that, similar to the results found in many
studies in the UK, regional housing prices in Belgium exhibit a distinct spa-
tial pattern over time that is consistent with the ripple effect hypothesis. The
second, perhaps more important, takeaway from this paper is that linguis-
tic differences between different regions might result into observed border
effects. This suggests that merely removing institutional differences is un-
likely to be sufficient to achieve full integration between different regions.
Although we do not claim that the results from the current study can easily
be extrapolated to other regions/countries and areas of study, the results
may provide valuable insights for, for example, the European integration
process. While the EU has been aiming at (and continues to aim at) remov-
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ing institutional differences between its different members states over the
past decades, differences in economic variables continue to persist between
the different countries. It is obvious that the different member states of the
EU continue to be heterogeneous with respect to factors such as language
and culture.
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Appendices
A Raw data (1973Q1-2011Q3) and the re-
sulting ADF-tests
Figure A.1: Overview of the raw data (1973Q1-2011Q3)
Note: the red, green and blue series represent respectively apartments, dwellings and the mix-adjusted
series constructed using the appropriate weighting procedure described in section 3.
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Table A.1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistics (1973Q1-2011Q3)
Mix-adjusted Dwellings Apartments
District ln(.) ∆ln(.) ln(.) ∆ln(.) ln(.) ∆ln(.)
Antwerp -0.95 -9.50*** -0.85 -7.72*** -1.34 -13.0***
Arlon -1.37 -11.6*** -1.32 -11.4*** -4.09*** -3.17**
Bruges -0.89 -10.2*** -0.82 -9.20*** -1.71 -17.3***
Brussels -1.72 -2.78* -1.25 -7.09*** -1.4 -2.84*
Charleroi -1.5 -3.83*** -1.46 -3.93*** -1.24 -14.0***
Dendermonde -0.96 -11.1*** -0.91 -10.8*** -1.66 -13.3***
Dinant -1.33 -11.0*** -1.25 -11.2*** -3.58** -3.30**
Ghent -1.1 -12.0*** -1.11 -12.0*** -1 -11.4***
Hasselt -0.97 -10.0*** -1.07 -10.3*** -1.67 -8.55***
Kortrijk -0.84 -10.9*** -0.68 -11.0*** -1.85 -11.9***
Leuven -1.1 -11.6*** -1.12 -10.6*** -1.32 -5.58***
Lie`ge -1.17 -3.26** -1.15 -2.75* -0.713 -11.5***
Mechelen -1.37 -4.80*** -1.07 -9.74*** -1.48 -10.5***
Namur -0.92 -3.30** -1.07 -3.16** -1.25 -14.6***
Nivelles -1.08 -8.61*** -1.04 -4.08*** -2.33 -13.0***
Oudenaarde -1.03 -10.6*** -1.04 -11.5*** -3.12* -4.98***
Tournai -1.23 -2.84* -1.21 -2.91** -1.73 -14.2***
Turnhout -1.15 -10.9*** -1.05 -4.59*** -2.45 -6.63***
Verviers -0.99 -12.6*** -1.03 -12.5*** -2.01 -11.5***
Veurne -1.37 -12.0*** -1.45 -11.7*** -1.63 -4.86***
Note: the lag orders are selected using the SIC-criterion. A trend is added for the series in levels. ***,
** and * signify the test rejects the null at respectively the 1, 5 and/or 10% level.
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B Choice of the dominant region
Table B.1: Results Granger & Lin (1995) long-run causality tests
Note: the *, ** and *** indicate that the assumed dominant region i is long-run forcing upon region j
at the 10, 5 and/or 1% level, respectively.
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C Generalized spatio-temporal Impulse Re-
sponse Functions and their bootstrapped
confidence intervals (horizon = 50) for the
baseline model
Figure C.1: Generalized spatio-temporal Impulse Response Functions and
their Bootstrapped Confidence Intervals (horizon = 50) for the baseline model
presented in table 5
Note: the depicted GIRFs and their confidence intervals are based upon the baseline estimates presented
in table 5 and using the procedure described by Holly et al. (2011) to perform the bootstrap procedure.
The other series are available from the authors upon request.
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Table D.1: Employment shares for the different provinces and sectors for the
year 2011
39
Chapter I
Spatial and Temporal Diffusion of Housing Prices in the Presence
of a Linguistic Border: Evidence from Belgium
T
ab
le
D
.2
:
E
st
im
at
io
n
re
su
lt
s
of
di
st
ri
ct
sp
ec
ifi
c
ho
u
se
pr
ic
e
di
ff
u
si
on
eq
u
at
io
n
(o
n
ly
dw
el
li
n
gs
)
w
it
h
A
n
tw
er
p
as
th
e
do
m
in
an
t
re
gi
on
an
d
u
si
n
g
th
e
co
n
ti
gu
it
y
cr
it
er
io
n
to
co
n
st
ru
ct
th
e
ap
pr
op
ri
at
e
sp
at
ia
l
w
ei
gh
ts
m
at
ri
ce
s
(1
98
0Q
1-
20
11
Q
3)
N
o
te
:
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
sh
o
w
n
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
*
*
*
,
*
*
a
n
d
*
si
g
n
ifi
es
th
a
t
th
e
te
st
re
je
ct
s
th
e
n
u
ll
a
t
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
th
e
1
,
5
a
n
d
/
o
r
1
0
%
le
v
el
.
A
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
a
n
in
te
rc
ep
t
te
rm
,
3
se
a
so
n
a
l
d
u
m
m
ie
s
a
n
d
a
n
a
d
d
it
io
n
a
l
d
u
m
m
y
v
a
ri
a
b
le
to
a
cc
o
u
n
t
fo
r
th
e
ch
a
n
g
e
in
th
e
cl
a
ss
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
p
ro
ce
ss
th
a
t
w
a
s
im
p
le
m
en
te
d
b
y
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
B
el
g
iu
m
a
t
2
0
0
5
Q
1
.
40
Chapter I
Spatial and Temporal Diffusion of Housing Prices in the Presence
of a Linguistic Border: Evidence from Belgium
D Additional tables and figures for section
concerning the role of language
Figure D.1: GIRFs using the reduced-sample (1980Q1-2011Q3) estimates
for dwellings only and the contiguity criterion to construct the appropriate
spatial weights matrices
Note: the different districts are ordered according to their respective averages over time.
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1 Introduction
It has been widely recognized that the housing commodity is characterized
by a number of peculiar features, such as locational fixity, durability and
heterogeneity.1 Despite these features and the substantial costs associated
with moving, it is nonetheless to be expected that differences in house prices
are limited between locations that are close to each other when barriers to
mobility are limited as a result of (spatial) arbitrage (Glaeser & Gyourko,
2007). In the case of national borders, however, differences in mortgage
markets and the language spoken on both sides of the border potentially
limit the scope for- and desirability of arbitrage. In a seminal paper that
was published in the American Economic Review, McCallum (1995) shows
that “even the relatively innocuous Canada-US border matters substantially
for international trade patterns.” In another seminal paper Engels & Rogers
(1996, AER) find that “crossing the border is equivalent to 1,780 miles of dis-
tance between cities in terms of the price dispersion of similar goods.” While
the aforementioned studies focus explicitly on international trade patterns,
border effects have also been reported in housing markets. In a recent pa-
1I would like to thank Erik Buyst, Frank Verboven, Maarten Goos, Jan Rouwendal,
Jan Mutl, Sven Damen, Geert Goeyvaerts, Frank Vastmans and the participants of the
European Network for Housing Research conference (July, 2015) and the (other) members
of the Flemish Policy Research Centre Housing (Dutch: Steunpunt Wonen) for valuable
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. I would furthermore like to
thank ERA Belgium, Statistics Belgium, Statistics Netherlands, and the Dutch associ-
ation of real estate agents (NVM, Dutch: Nederlandse Vereniging van Makelaars and
Taxateurs in onroerende goederen) for providing the data that was necessary to carry out
the analyses performed in this paper.
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per, Micheli et al. (2014) show, using the results from different estimation
strategies, that the ask prices of comparable housing drop by about 16%
when crossing the Dutch-German border. The authors argue that “Dutch
households might be paying as much as 26% higher house prices to live among
their own people.” These and other studies thus clearly show that borders
between countries limit the scope for arbitrage.
In this paper we investigate whether houses that are more proximate to
the Belgian-Dutch border are more expensive as a result of spatial arbi-
trage. Both Belgium and the Netherlands are among the founding fathers
of the European Union and the Benelux and share a long common history.2
The northern Flemish part of Belgium, which borders the Netherlands for
the most part and will thus be of special interest in this paper even shares a
common language with the Netherlands.3 Despite that both countries have
largely been subjected to similar monetary and macro-economic policies and
shocks, the evolution of housing prices in both countries has differed sub-
stantially in recent decades. While housing prices in the Netherlands have
boomed from the mid-1990s onwards as a result of, among other things, an
increase in the share of interest-only mortgages (Rouwendal, 2007), Belgian
housing prices only started to increase strongly from the mid-2000s due to
a more generous fiscal treatment of owner-occupiers (Damen et al., 2016).
This strong initial increase in housing prices in the Netherlands, combined
with the fact that housing prices in the Netherlands already exceeded those
in Belgium, led to a large discontinuity in housing prices at the border which
has led to opportunities for spatial arbitrage. In this paper we investigate
whether the prices of houses in Belgium that are located in closer proximity
to the Belgian-Dutch border are higher as a result of spatial arbitrage. The
intuition is that Dutch households, who moved (just) across the border to
benefit from the lower housing prices in Flanders, increased the demand and
prices of Belgian properties close to the border. We therefore use a large
sample of detailed individual transaction data that was provided by a large
franchise system of real estate agencies in Belgium and employ the well-
known (spatial) hedonic pricing model (Rosen, 1974). Our results suggest
2Belgium seceded from the Netherlands in 1830.
3Belgium is a federal state that is divided into three regions and three communities,
that exist next to each other. Its two largest regions are the Dutch-speaking region of
Flanders in the north and the French-speaking southern region of Wallonia. The Brussels-
Capital Region, officially bilingual, is a mostly French-speaking enclave within the Flemish
Region.
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that at the start of the sampling period (2003), the price difference between
a property located at the border and a property located 15 kilometers from
the border was about 13 percent. The boom in Belgian housing markets
since 2005, combined with the subsequent collapse of the Dutch housing
market after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, furthermore suggests
that the magnitude of the spatial arbitrage effect might not have been con-
stant over time. In the empirical application of this paper, we therefore
allow for interaction effects between the distance to the border and the year
of sale. Our results indicate that the magnitude of the spatial arbitrage ef-
fect although dwellings located 15 kilometers from the border were 13% less
expensive in 2003, this effect has decreased to only 2% in 2015. Since the
Belgian-Dutch border stretches out over 460 kilometers, we also investigate
whether the estimated effects are constant across space. Our results indicate
that the estimated spatial arbitrage effect is especially strong in the eastern
parts of Flanders, where sparsely populated Flemish regions border Dutch
cities. In a final extension, we also examine whether Dutch buyers pay a
premium compared to their Belgian counterparts. We indeed find evidence
that Dutch buyers pay a premium of about 12%. This premium, however,
has also been declining over time which seems to suggest that these premi-
ums are likely to be the result of anchoring bias.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide
an overview of the literature that is related to the current study. In the
third section we examine the developments in housing prices and markets
in Belgium and the Netherlands in recent decades. In section 4 we present
the data that is used in the subsequent empirical analyses. In section 5 we
lay out our empirical framework and in section 6 we present the baseline
results. In section 7, we report the results of a battery of robustness checks
and extensions. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 Literature review
Border effects have mainly been studied in the context of international trade
patterns. In a seminal article published in the American Economic Review
(1995) John McCallum shows that the border between Canada and the
United States, two countries that are similar in terms of culture, language
and institutions, continues to have a decisive impact on continental trade
patterns. In another seminal paper that was published in the AER, Engel
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& Rogers (1996) find that crossing the border is equivalent to 1,780 miles
of distance between cities in terms of price dispersion of similar goods. Fol-
lowing these seminal contributions a large and well-encompassing strand of
literature has developed where researchers look at the existence, magnitude
and explanations of border effects. Well-known examples include Parsley &
Wei (2001), Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) and Gorodnichenko & Tesar
(2009).
Although the literature on border effects originated in the context of interna-
tional trade patterns, border effects have also been studied in the context of
housing markets and housing prices. Cheshire & Magrini (2009), for exam-
ple, find that national borders still have a significant impact upon property
prices. They furthermore show that this is due to the fact that cities within
the Union still form national urban systems rather than a single European-
wide system. These results are also confirmed by Jacobs-Crisioni & Koomen
(2015), who show that national borders still affect the spatial urban pattern
in northern Europe. While the aforementioned studies look at the effects
of national borders, there are also a number of studies that examine the
effects of linguistic/cultural borders within a country. Goffette-Nagot et al.
(2009), for example, examine the spatial variation of land prices in Belgium
and find that the linguistic border acts as a strong barrier in the spatial
pattern of land prices. De Bruyne & Van Hove (2013) also observe that
there are large differences in housing prices between the northern (Flanders)
and the southern (Wallonia) part of Belgium in their analysis of the deter-
minants of housing prices. They also examine whether the determinants of
housing prices differ between the regions by splitting up their sample and
re-estimating the model. Their results suggest that the effect of various ex-
planatory variables on housing prices is different in the two regions. In a
recent article Micheli et al. (2014) show, by combining German and Dutch
real estate datasets, that the listing prices of observationally equivalent prop-
erties drop by about 16% when crossing the Dutch-German border. Given
that the price discounts in Germany are substantially larger, the authors in-
terpret their findings as indicating that “the willingness of Dutch households
to pay up to 26% higher housing prices to live among the Dutch.” While the
aforementioned studies investigate the “jump at the border”, the current
paper examines whether housing prices “closer to the border” are higher
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as a result of spatial arbitrage.4 If Dutch households indeed prefer to live
among the Dutch or close to the Netherlands, we would expect that housing
prices closer to the border, ceteris paribus, are higher.
The current paper also relates to a stand of literature that investigates spa-
tial and temporal spillovers in housing markets and housing prices across
countries. The majority of studies in this context have focused on the Euro-
pean Union, where the national economies are perhaps even more integrated
than those of the US and Canada. Stevenson (2004), for example, examines
house price diffusion patterns within the Republic of Ireland and between
the Republic and Northern Ireland. His results support the view that the
Northern Irish market is more linked with the housing market in the Repub-
lic than with the rest of the UK. Vansteenkiste & Hiebert (2011) estimate a
global VAR for three housing demand variables and seven Euro area coun-
tries and find limited evidence for house price spillovers in the Euro area.
While these studies explicitly focus at national borders, there are also some
studies that focus on the role of linguistic borders in housing markets. In a
recent study Helgers & Buyst (2016) examine whether the linguistic border
has an effect on the (long-run) convergence and the (short-run) spatial and
temporal diffusion of housing prices in Belgium. Their results suggest that
the border plays an ambiguous role. In the current study we also examine
whether the spatial arbitrage effect is constant across time and space.
Our work also relates to a strand of literature that has focused on the role of
language on economic outcomes. It has been well-documented in the inter-
national trade literature (e.g. Melitz, 2008) that the sharing of a language
increases the volume of traded goods and services between two countries. Al-
though the emergence of nation-states has led to sharp discontinuities in the
language spoken on both sides of the border for many European countries,
Flanders and the Netherlands share a common language. We would there-
fore expect that the border effect at the Flemish-Dutch border is smaller
than the border effect at, for example, the Dutch-German border as docu-
mented by Micheli et al. (2014).
Despite that language obviously is one of the most obvious cultural discrep-
ancies between countries, there are also other cultural factors that play a role.
4Our empirical model can in principle be easily extended to also estimate the jump
at the border when individual transaction data on both sides of the border is available.
46
Chapter II Spatial Arbitrage in Belgian Border Regions
Falck et al. (2012), for example, show in study of cross-regional migration
patterns in Germany between 2000 and 2006 that historical dialect similarity
has an important effect and increases cross-regional migration flows. Besides
the aforementioned cultural differences, there are also differences in spatial
planning between countries. Tennekes et al. (2015), for example, note that
“it is still relatively easy to see the lines of the border when crossing from the
Netherlands to Belgium, not only due to road signage and illumination but
also due to differences in dwelling types and the shape of urban development.”
The authors argue that “differences in national institutional environments
have contributed to differences in the urban morphology of residential areas.”
This study finally also relates to a strand of literature that investigates
whether certain types of buyers pay a premium over other types of buyers.
While countless studies have shown that housing prices depend upon the
attributes of houses, these studies have also shown that after controlling
for these characteristics, there is not one price but rather a distribution of
prices. Besides methodological issues, a potential explanation for this find-
ing is that housing markets are thin markets where prices are negotiated and
thus affect by the relative bargaining strength of buyers and sellers. While
the hedonic pricing framework has become the workhorse model for housing
economists, there is no explicit role for bargaining in the traditional model
(Harding et al., 2003), since the implicit prices of characteristics are revealed
to agents and markets are assumed to be sufficiently thick. While Harding et
al. (2003) and Ihlanfeldt & Mayock (2009) find evidence that suggests that
demographic characteristics of buyers and sellers influence the sales prices
of observationally equivalent properties, it has also been hypothesized that
out-of-state buyers pay a premium because of higher search costs, anchoring
bias, and/or a lack of market knowledge. Turnbull & Sirmans (1993) and
Watkins (1998), however, do not find evidence that supports this hypothe-
sis. Lambson et al. (2004) and Ihlanfeldt & Mayock (2011) though do find
strong evidence. Moreover, the results provided by Lambson et al. (2004)
suggest that these premiums are driven by higher search costs and anchor-
ing bias. In the current paper we use information on the previous address
of buyers to investigate whether Dutch buyers pay a premium compared to
their Belgian counterparts. Our findings indicate that Dutch buyers pay
a premium, that is likely to be the result of anchoring bias. In the next
section, we provide an overview of the developments in Belgian and Dutch
housing markets in recent decades.
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3 Housing Prices and Housing Markets in
Belgium and the Netherlands
3.1 A general overview
Vansteenkiste & Hiebert (2011) recently argued that despite that housing is
a non-traded good that cannot easily be substituted across geographic areas,
co-movement in international housing prices could nevertheless be expected
to arise from three different channels, notably (1) common developments
in housing market fundamentals, (2) the parallel introduction of capital and
mortgage innovations, and (3) “[...]housing-specific factors, notable related
to some convergence of housing risk premia associated with returns on hous-
ing as an asset” (p. 299). Given that Belgium and the Netherlands are both
members of the EMU, with its common monetary policy, housing market
fundamentals such as interest rates are similar. Both economies are further-
more close trading partners which suggests that the risk premia should also
converge.5 In figure 1 we plot the evolution of average real house prices and
the number of transactions in Belgium and the Netherlands using data from
Statistics Belgium, Statistics Netherlands, and the NVM 6.
Figure 1: Real house prices, # of transactions, and the % of people with the
other nationality for Belgium and the Netherlands (1990Q1-2014Q4)
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Note: Real house prices were calculated using data concerning the CPI for Belgium that was retrieved
from the website of Statistics Belgium. Similarly, we gathered data concerning the CPI in the Nether-
lands from the website of Statistics Netherlands. For both countries the CPI was normalized to 1 for
the first quarter of 1985. The data were not seasonally adjusted. The percentage of people with the
Dutch nationality living in Belgium and vice versa were provided by Statistics Belgium and Statistics
Netherlands, respectively.
Figure 1 shows that both the evolution of real house prices and the number of
5Data from the National Bank of Belgium suggests that approximately 21% or 52
billion Euros (12% of 28 billion Euros) of all Belgian imports (exports) comes from (goes
to) the Netherlands.
6Nederlandse Vereniging van Makelaars, Dutch Association of Real Estate Brokers
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transactions differed considerably between both countries in recent decades.
In a recent paper Damen et al. (2016) analyse the evolution of (nominal)
house prices across different European countries and provide convincing ev-
idence that these exhibit a long-run relationship with the ability to pay of
households, which they define as (p. 3) “[...] a constant fraction of income
that goes to housing payments, which results in an amount that people are
able to pay based on the possibility to deduct mortgage interest payments
and innovative mortgage products.” The results from their paper suggest
that the higher house prices in the Netherlands relative to Belgium are the
result of a more generous fiscal regime for owner-occupiers in the former.
Dutch households could (and still can) deduct all interest payments from
their mortgage loans from their taxable income. The articles by Rouwendal
(2007) and Damen et al. (2016) also help explaining the observed run-ups
observed in the Netherlands since the mid-1990s and in Belgium since 2005.
Both of these are likely to be the result of changes in underlying fundamental
values. While in the Netherlands the share of interest-only mortgages in-
creased significantly from the 1990s onwards (Rouwendal, 2007), in Belgium
the implementation of a more generous fiscal regime in 2005 combined with
a (consequent) lengthening in the mortgage term (Damen et al., 2016) in-
creased the ability to pay, which subsequently translated into housing prices.
It is obvious that these demand shocks, however, are only capitalized into
house prices whenever housing supply is relatively inelastic. Vermeulen &
Rouwendal (2007) for the Netherlands and Helgers & Buyst (2014) for Bel-
gium, however, show that this is the case for both countries.
After the run-ups in both countries, though, Dutch housing prices and trans-
action volumes declined after 2008, like in many other (European) countries
as a result of the global financial crisis. The average (real) house price and
the number of transactions in the Netherlands decreased with respectively
41% and 12% between the first quarters of 2008 and 2009. While the Dutch
housing market experienced a bust, the effect of the financial crisis on Bel-
gian housing prices and transaction volumes was only limited. Over the same
period (real) house prices and transaction volumes in Belgium decreased only
with 1.5% and 14%, respectively. Moreover, transaction volumes in Belgium
quickly recovered and even peaked in 2011, while transaction volumes in the
Netherlands remain relatively low until the present day. In a recent paper
Struyven (2015) attributes the low transaction volumes in the Netherlands
to the “housing lock hypothesis”. He observes that households who bought
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their house at the peak have higher Loan-To-Value (LTV) ratios than earlier
buyers, and also have much lower mobility rates in every year after purchase.
3.2 Developments in border regions
The previous section already showed that developments at the national level
in the number of transactions and housing prices have differed considerably
between Belgium and the Netherlands in recent decades. These develop-
ments at the national level, however, conceal considerable regional differ-
ences. It is therefore appropriate to focus on the evolution of housing prices
and transaction volumes in regions along the Belgian-Dutch border.
The Belgian-Dutch border spans over a length of approximately 460 kilome-
ters from the North Sea in the west to the tripoint between Belgium, the
Netherlands and Germany in the south-east. In the west, the border sep-
arates the Belgian provinces East- and West Flanders (Ghent and Bruges)
from the sparsely populated Dutch region Zeelandic Flanders (Terneuzen),
that is separated from the rest of the province Zeeland (and the Nether-
lands) by the Western Scheldt which connects the port of Antwerp to the
North Sea. The central part of the border separates the Belgian province
Antwerp (Antwerp and Turnhout) from the Dutch province North Brabant
(Breda, Tilburg and Eindhoven). In the east, the border splits the Belgian
provinces Limburg (Tongeren and Genk) and Lie`ge (Lie`ge and Verviers)
from the Dutch provinces Noord-Brabant (Eindhoven) and Limburg (Weert,
Roermond and Maastricht). Although approximately 20 kilometers of the
Belgian-Dutch border separates the French-speaking province Lie`ge from the
Dutch-speaking Netherlands, Dutch is the common language spoken on both
sides of the border for the remaining 440 kilometers. A graphical overview
of the Belgian-Dutch border region is provided in figure A.2 in appendix A.
While house prices might differ because of differences in housing attributes,
amenities, etc. spillovers in prices between both countries might also be
observed. Since the 2000s Dutch households living in neighboring countries
can opt for the Dutch income tax system, which implies that they can ben-
efit from the mortgage interest deductability in the Netherlands. In figure
1 we plot the evolution of real house prices, the number of transactions,
and the percentage of people who possess the nationality of the neighboring
country for the different Belgian and Dutch provinces that are located along
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the common border.
Figure 2: Real house prices, # of transactions, and the % of people with
the other nationality for (parts of) the provinces located along the common
border (1990Q1-2014Q4)
Note: in order to construct average (real) house prices and transaction volumes for the Netherlands
we used aggregated data provided by the NVM at the level of 76 designated NVM regions. We then
aggregated the data at the level of the provinces. For the province Limburg (NL) we used data for
the regions Zuid-Limburg, Roermond eo and Weert eo. The data for the province North Brabant were
constructed using data for the regions Eindhoven eo, Zuid Oost Brabant, Tilburg Oirschot, Breda, West
Brabant, and Bergen op Zoom eo. For Zeeland we simply took the region Zeelandic Flanders. The % of
people with the Belgian nationality for every municipality was provided by Statistics Netherlands. We
assigned the appropriate NVM region to every municipality using a spatial join procedure in Quantum
GIS. For Belgium, we used data concerning average house prices, the number of transactions and the %
of people with the Dutch nationality at the municipal level and only withheld those municipalities for
which the centroid is located within a 15 kilometer radius of the Belgian-Dutch border. The data were
then simply aggregated at the provincial level, where we considered the provinces East Flanders and
West Flanders to be a single province.
From figure 2 we immediately notice that the evolution of (real) housing
prices for the different provinces follow their respective national averages.
Note, however, that there are large differences in prices and transaction vol-
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umes between the different provinces. While house prices in North Brabant
were approximately equal to e180,000 in 2006, those in Zeelandic Flanders
were only as high as e120,000. A similar story applies in Belgium. While
house prices in Antwerp were approximately equal to e150,000 in 2006,
those in Limburg were only as high as e100,000. Furthermore observe that
while house prices are generally higher in the Dutch provinces, house prices
in East-and West Flanders are higher than in the neighboring Zeelandic
Flanders. This can partially be explained by the fact that Zeelandic Flan-
ders is a highly peripheral and sparsely populated region of the Netherlands
that lies south of the Western Scheldt which separates it from the rest of
Zeeland and the country. The (north of the) Belgian provinces East- and
West Flanders on the other hand are home to (major) cities such as Ghent
and Bruges and are densily populated. Where the higher house prices in
the Dutch provinces Limburg and North Brabant have led to an increase in
the percentage of people who possess the Dutch nationality living in Bel-
gium, the reverse pattern in the western part of both countries has led to a
migration flow from Belgium to the Netherlands. Observe that many peo-
ple who migrate between both countries remain close to the border of their
country of origin, since the percentages of people who possess the national-
ity of the neighboring country reported in figure 2 are high with respect to
their national averages reported in figure 1. A simple kernel-weighted local
polynomial of the percentage of inhabitants with the Dutch nationality at
the level of the statistical sector7 versus the distance to the border further
confirms this finding.
7The statistical sector is the most detailed territorial level Statistics Belgium uses for
its statistics and publications. The average statistical sector in Belgium has a territory
of about 1.5 square kilometers and houses 700 inhabitants.
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Figure 3: Kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing: % inhabitants with
Dutch nationality vs. distance to border
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Note: the data concerning the number and percentage of inhabitants with the Dutch nationality are
aggregated at the level of the statistical sectors in Belgium and were provided by Statistics Belgium. The
statistical sector is the territorial base unit resulting from a division of the municipalities and the former
municipalities by the former National Institute of Statistics for the dissemination of statistics on a more
detailed level than the municipal level.
The preference of Dutch households to live close to the Netherlands might
have had non-negligible effects on the demand for and prices of Belgian
houses close to the border, which is empirically tested in section 6. The
evolutions presented in figure 2 also suggest that there is considerable het-
erogeneity across regions. Heterogeneity of the arbitrage effect is empirically
tested in section 7.3. The higher house prices in the Netherlands finally
might lead to an anchoring bias, as for example suggested by Lambson et
al. (2004), and may cause Dutch buyers to pay more, ceteris paribus, than
their Belgian counterparts. This is empirically tested in section 7.4.
4 Data
The main dataset used in subsequent empirical analyses provides detailed
information on the sales price and the property and neighborhood charac-
teristics of approximately 26.200 dwellings sold in Flanders between 2003
and 2015 by the agents of a large (Belgian) franchise system of real estate
agents. The dataset contains information on the price- and date of sale, inte-
rior space (in m2), plot size (in m2), number of bedrooms and garages, and so
on.8 Besides a detailed description of the characteristics for every dwelling,
we also know its exact coordinates. This allows us to calculate the distance
to the border and the distance to other amenities, such as bus stops, highway
8A detailed overview of the data is presented in appendix B.
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entry/exits, grocery stores and city centers using a Geographic Information
System9.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics transaction data by region
Dist. to border ≤ 15km Dist. to border > 15km T-test
Variable Obs. Avg. (1) St. Dev. Obs. Avg. (2) St. Dev. (1)-(2)
Sales price (in e) 5,739 228,231.99 96,409.87 19,983 219,828.50 99,946.11 -5.658***
Living area (in sq. m.) 5,809 183.47 69.61 20,407 184.45 71.91 0.923
Plot size (in sq. m.) 5,809 789.74 1,023.80 20,407 733.12 1,055.15 -3.632***
# Bedrooms 5,808 3.14 0.86 20,402 3.11 0.93 -2.330**
# Garages 5,800 0.84 0.70 20,354 0.83 0.72 -1.527
Year of constr. 5,159 1970.19 22.89 17,490 1965.15 23.09 -13.781***
Year of sale 5,809 2010.34 3.46 20,407 2010.05 3.51 -5.518***
Central heating 5,728 0.79 0.40 20,206 0.70 0.45 -13.255***
The descriptive statistics presented in table 1 reveal that approximately
22% of the houses in the dataset are located less than 15 kilometers from
the Belgian-Dutch border. Although these 5,800 properties will thus be of
special interest in the subsequent empirical analyses, we will use samples of
the remaining 20,400 transactions to estimate several placebo-tests in sec-
tion 7.2. The descriptive statistics show that the dwellings located close to
the border are, on average, more expensive than their inland counterparts
(228,000 vs. 220,000). Although this may seem counterintuitive at first, it
has to be noted that some of the larger and more expensive Flemish cities
(e.g. Bruges, Ghent and Antwerp) are located close the Belgian-Dutch bor-
der. The descriptive statistics furthermore reveal that the average dwelling
within 15 kilometers of the border is located on a larger plot (789m2 vs.
733m2), has more bedrooms (3.14 vs. 3.11) and was constructed more re-
cently (1970 vs. 1965). The detailed transaction data presented above allow
us to estimate (spatial) hedonic models. The estimation strategy is presented
in the next section.
5 Methodology
Valuing a home has traditionally proven to be difficult. Every home has its
own specific location and its own (unique) set of characteristics that may
affect its value. Nonetheless, a large body of literature has attempted to
explain the value of housing by valuing its individual components using the
9A Geographic Information System is a system designed to capture, store, manipulate,
analyse, manage, and present all types of spatial or geographical data
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hedonic pricing model.10 The hedonic pricing model (HPM), for which the
theoretical foundations date back to the seminal works by Lancaster (1966)
and Rosen (1974), departs from the idea that utility is not generated by the
(composite) good per se, but by the characteristics that define the good. In
his excellent overview of the literature Malpezzi (2003) illustrates this idea
perfectly by stating: “I’m happy to be home, not so much to be in anything
called a ‘house’, so much as to be in a warm dry place, with a quiet space
for a comfortable chair, a functioning toilet or a hot bath should I require
them, and some other rooms in the house to store stacks of papers or noisy
children.” Following Rosen (1974), hedonic prices are defined as “the im-
plicit prices of attributes and are revealed to economic agents from observed
prices of differentiated products and the specific amounts of characteristics
associated with them.” Traditionally, the HPM is estimated using ordinary
least squares (OLS) where the estimated coefficients represent the shadow
prices of the attributes. In the current paper we allow for a more flexible
form and estimate variants of the following regression equation:
ln(p) = βX︸︷︷︸
Classical hedonic pricing model
+
Spatial arbitrage︷︸︸︷
γL + λln(p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Spatial lag component
+u
where
u = ρWu+ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Spatial error component
(II.1)
where ln(p) denotes a vector of logarithmically transformed sales prices, X
a matrix of the individual houses’ structural and neighborhood character-
istics as described in section 4, and β the vector of corresponding implicit
prices. The matrix L represents location-specific information, which con-
sists of two components. Firstly, we control for the proximity to centers of
employment (e.g. Antwerp, Ghent), various amenities and the municipality
the property is located in. Since the Flemish-Dutch border stretches out
over approximately 460 kilometer, house prices might differ substantially
across locations. Secondly, and more interestingly for the current paper, we
augment the regression with distance to the border in polynomial form and
interaction-effects between distance to the border and other variables.
10Excellent overviews of the use of the hedonic pricing model in housing economics
can be found in Malpezzi (2003) and Sirmans et al. (2005).
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While the regression analysis presented so far could be carried out using
ordinary least squares (OLS), the regression coefficients could be biased due
to spatial autocorrelation in the dependent and independent variables. We
therefore potentially allow for spatial autocorrelation in the dependent vari-
able (spatial lag component), ln(p), and spatial autocorrelation in the resid-
uals (spatial error component), u. The spatial structure of the model is cap-
tured by the spatial weights matrix W , where the elements wij represent the
spatial dependency between observation i and observation j and are equal to
zero whenever i = j.11 More specifically, we construct a row-normalized12 10
nearest neighbors and a row-normalized inverse-distance spatial weights ma-
trix. The models are estimated using the Generalized Spatial 2 Stage Least
Squares (GS2SLS) estimator in Stata 14 that was proposed by Kelejian &
Prucha (1998).13
6 Baseline results
In this section we report and discuss the results for our baseline analyses.
In table C.3 in appendix C the estimated coefficients of a classical (spa-
tial) hedonic model are presented. The coefficients for the house-specific
(e.g. structure size, plot size, # bedrooms,..) and neighborhood-specific
(e.g. population density, distance to city hall) are familiar and, in general,
have the expected signs and are statistically significant. Therefore, we pro-
ceed by estimating a number of (spatial) hedonic pricing models where we
investigate whether houses located closer to the Flemish-Dutch border are
more expensive. We also examine temporal and spatial heterogeneity by
allowing the distance to the border variable to interact with a time trend
and an urban area dummy variable. The results of our baseline analysis are
presented in table 2.
11An observation cannot be dependent upon itself.
12This is conventional in the spatial econometrics literature.
13The models could also be estimated using a Maximum Likelihood estimator, but
the GS2SLS estimator additionally allows for heteroskedasticity and is superior in terms
of speed. Excellent discussions of the generalized method of moments and instrumental
variables estimation approach underlying the GS2SLS-estimator can be found in Arraiz
et al. (2010) and Drukker et al. (2013).
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Table 2: Estimation results distance to the border (spatial error model, 10
nearest neighbors spatial weights matrix)
Note: ***, ** and * denote that the estimated regression coefficients are statistically significant at the
1, 5 and/or 10 percent level. In all the regression models presented we control for an extensive list of
property- and neighborhood characteristics equivalent to those presented in table C.3 in appendix C.
The results presented in table 2 generally suggest that dwellings located
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closer to the border are more expensive. In the simple specification pre-
sented in column (2), where we include the distance to the border linearly
and allow the distance to the border to interact with a simple time trend,
we find that dwellings located 15 kilometers from the Flemish-Dutch bor-
der were, ceteris paribus, approximately 13% cheaper in 2003 than their
equivalent counterparts located “at the border”. The quadratic and cu-
bic specifications reported in columns (3) and (4) show very similar results
where comparable houses that are 15 kilometers from the border were 13
and 16 percent less expensive in 2003 as can be observed from figure 4. Our
estimates thus confirm that the increase in demand for Flemish dwellings
close to the Flemish-Dutch border led to substantially higher prices along
the border.
Notice that the distance to the border only becomes statistically significant
when it is also allowed to interact with the year of sale.14. The reported
coefficients in columns (2)-(6) suggest that the distance to the border effect
decreases (in absolute value) with 0.06 percent per kilometer per year. The
estimates reported in column (2), for example, suggest that while houses
located 15 kilometers from the Flemish-Dutch border were approximately
13 percent cheaper in 2003, this effect was almost negligible (1.95%) in
2015.15 This finding is consistent with the boom in Belgian housing mar-
kets since 2005 and the subsequent collapse of the Dutch housing market
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. While Belgian
property prices generally rose due to a more generous fiscal treatment of
owner-occupiers (Damen et al., 2016), the (Dutch) demand for properties
close to the border decreased. As a result, the prices of properties close to
and further from the border equalized and the distance to the border has
become less important over time.
In columns (5) and (6) we furthermore include interaction effects between
the distance to the border and (1) a dummy-variable that is equal to one
whenever the property is located in an urban area, and (2) the travel time
14Notice that we normalized the year of sale, such that the estimated coefficient for
distance to the border variable represents the arbitrage effect in 2003, the first year for
which we have data.
15−0.0085∗∗∗ ∗ 15 + 0.0006∗∗∗ ∗ 12 ∗ 15 ≈ −0.0195
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to the nearest Dutch city. 16 17 The estimates reported in column (6) indi-
cate that the distance to the border effect is smaller, albeit not statistically
significant, in urban areas and larger when the travel time to the nearest
Dutch city is lower. An interpretation for the first effect is that property
prices in (Flemish) urban areas are generally higher, which limits the scope
for arbitrage. The reported positive coefficient (0.0005) for the second in-
teraction effect suggests that the demand for close to the border is higher
whenever the travel time to the nearest Dutch city is lower, which is also
intuitive. All in all, the results presented suggest that the distance to the
border effect is not constant across time and space.18
Figure 4: Visualization estimated effects distance to the border
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Note: the estimated effects and confidence bounds for columns (2), (3) and (4) of table 2 are depicted in
the figure for the years 2003 and 2015.
7 Robustness & extensions
Although the results presented in section 6 already shed light on the rela-
tionship between housing prices and proximity to the border, it remains to
perform a battery of robustness tests and extensions. In appendix C we
show that the reported coefficients are robust with respect to the type of
16To determine whether a property is located in an urban area, we use the classification
of Luyten & Van Hecke (2007) who allocate the 589 Belgian municipalities into one of 18
urban districts or the remaining rural area.
17We therefore used the geo-coordinates of the following Dutch cities (from west
to east): Terneuzen, Bergen op Zoom, Roosendaal, Breda, Tilburg, Eindhoven, Weert,
Sittard-Geleen and Maastricht.
18In section 7 we allow more generally for spatial heterogeneity.
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spatial spillovers (OLS19 and spatial lag model20) and the specification of
the spatial weights matrix (inverse-distance21). In section 7.1, we estimate
the same model, but use the travel time to the nearest border crossing as
our variable of interest. In section 7.2, we carry out several placebo tests.
The results presented in these sections, if anything, make our earlier findings
more convincingly. In section 7.3, we assess whether the estimated spatial
arbitrage effect is homogeneous across space and in section 7.4 we investigate
whether Dutch buyers pay a premium for comparable housing compared to
their Belgian counterparts.
7.1 Travel time to border crossing
In the previous section we used the euclidean distance between the transac-
tion and the border as our spatial arbitrage measure. It might however be
the case that, for example, natural barriers that coincide with the border
hamper arbitrage between regions on both sides of the border.22 Therefore,
we have also calculated the minimum travel time between every transaction
and the nearest border crossing.23 We now re-estimate the same model but
use the alternative distance measure. The findings are reported in table 3.24
19Table C.4.
20Table C.5.
21Tables C.6 and C.7.
22This is especially likely to be the case along the eastern border of Flanders where
the river Meuse separates Flanders from the Netherlands.
23In a first step, we identified the geographical coordinates of 76 border crossing using
a Geographical Information System and OpenStreetMap data. In a second step, we used
the geographical coordinates of properties and border crossings, respectively, to calculate
all mutual travel times (≈ 354, 000 combinations) using the osrmtime-algorithm (Huber
& Rust, 2016) available in Stata 14. In a final step we only kept the travel time to the
nearest border crossing for every transaction in our dataset.
24Similar robustness checks to those presented for the baseline model are presented in
tables C.8, C.10, C.9 and C.11 in appendix C.
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Table 3: Estimation results travel time to the nearest border crossing (spatial
error model, 10 nearest neighbors spatial weights matrix)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Travel time border -0.0031* -0.0083*** -0.0156*** -0.016*** -0.0158***
(0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0042)
Travel time border2 0.0004*** 0.0004** 0.0004
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Tr. time border*(Year of sale-2003) 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Tr. time border*Urban area 0.0012 0.0012
(0.0026) (0.0026)
Tr. time border*Tr. time Dutch city 0
(0.0002)
ρ 0.2047*** 0.2086*** 0.2075*** 0.2069*** 0.207***
(0.0325) (0.0326) (0.0326) (0.0326) (0.0326)
Obs. 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657
R-sq. 0.834 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835
Note: ***, ** and * denote that the estimated regression coefficients are statistically significant at the
1, 5 and/or 10 percent level. In all the regression models presented we control for an extensive list of
property- and neighborhood characteristics equivalent to those presented in table C.3 in appendix C.
The results reported in table 3 are similar to those presented in table 2, as
is to be expected since both measures are highly correlated. The reported
coefficient in column (2) for the travel time to the border (-0.0083), for
example, indicates that a 10 minute increase in travel time, ceteris paribus,
is associated with a 8.3% decline in housing prices. Again note that this
effect is decreasing over time. Where a 10 minute increase in travel time to
the border lowers home values with 8.3% in 2003, this effect reduces to 1.1%
in 2015. This is also consistent with our previous findings. In columns (3)-
(5) we once more allow for non-linearities and interaction effects. The results
suggest that the marginal effect of travel time to the border on housing prices
is strong for low travel time, but slowly decreases. Also observe that we no
longer find any evidence supporting interaction effects. The results of the
regression analyses are graphically portrayed in figure 5.
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Figure 5: Visualization estimated effects travel time to border crossing
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Note: the estimated effects and confidence bounds for columns (2), (3) and (4) of table 3 are depicted in
the figure for the years 2003 and 2015.
7.2 Placebo-testing
While the results presented in tables 2 and 3 suggest that dwellings that
are/were located in closer proximity to the border are more expensive due
to spatial arbitrage, it might be the case that the distance to the border
is correlated with other unobservables. As a result, the estimated spatial
arbitrage effect is potentially biased. To assess the robustness of the results
presented in the previous sections, we therefore perform several placebo
tests. Although placebo testing has become the standard practice in for
example medical sciences, its use in econometrics has been far less common.
Fortunately, our dataset does not only contain information on transactions
that are located within 15 kilometers of the actual border, but also con-
tains information on transactions located in other parts of Belgium. It is
therefore relatively straightforward to carry out several placebo tests. More
specifically, we perform these tests by “shifting” the Belgian-Dutch border
and the corresponding Belgian territory southwards by 5, 10, 15, 20, 30 and
40 kilometers, respectively.25 Subsequently, we calculate the distance to the
new border for all transactions located in the new hypothetical Belgium and
only retain those transactions located within 15 kilometers from the new
placebo border. We then simply repeat the analyses presented previously.
The results of the placebo tests are presented in table 4.
25In figure C.4 in appendix C the newly created hypothetical borders are presented.
Similar to the baseline analysis, we only include properties in the regression analysis that
are located within 15 kilometers of the placebo border.
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Table 4: Estimated placebo-effects
Placebo border 0km 5km 10km
Dist. to border -0.0083*** -0.0063* -0.0025
(0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0033)
Dist. to border*(Year of sale-2003) 0.0006*** 0.0011*** 0.0008***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
ρ 0.2054*** 0.3499*** 0.3591***
(0.0326) (0.0271) (0.0284)
Obs. 4,657 4,453 4,178
R-sq. 0.834 0.814 0.827
Placebo border 20km 30km 40km
Dist. to border 0.0017 0.0016 -0.0018
(0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0025)
Dist. to border*(Year of sale-2003) -0.0003 -0.0003 0
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
ρ 0.3204*** 0.1934*** 0.2665***
(0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0244)
Obs. 3,886 4,585 6,432
R-sq. 0.823 0.809 0.826
Note: ***, ** and * denote that the estimated regression coefficients are statistically significant at the
1, 5 and/or 10 percent level. In all the regression models presented we control for an extensive list of
property- and neighborhood characteristics equivalent to those presented in table C.3 in appendix C.
The results from the placebo tests support the hypothesis that the reported
coefficients for the distance to the border are the result of spatial arbitrage,
since the estimated coefficients for our variable of interest are close to zero
and no longer statistically significant for all but one of the placebo borders.
Note that the only placebo border for which we find a statistically significant
negative effect is 5 kilometers, which is intuitive since the placebo border
is still in close proximity to the actual border. Furthermore note that the
estimated effect for the 5 kilometer placebo border is smaller than that of the
original border, which is consistent with the earlier finding that the initial
effect of moving away from the border is strong but then slowly decays. The
results are also graphically portrayed in figure 6.
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Figure 6: Estimated spatial arbitrage effects placebo borders
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Note: the blue line displays the point estimates for various placebo tests. The dashed red lines represent
the corresponding confidence bounds at the 95% level.
7.3 Spatial heterogeneity
Since the Flemish-Dutch border stretches out over 460 kilometers and covers
multiple housing markets, it is likely that the estimated arbitrage effect is
not homogeneous across space. Although methods, such as Geographically
Weighted Regression (GWR; Brunsdon et al., 1996; Fotheringham et al.,
2003), have been developed to model spatially heterogeneous processes, we
employ a much simpler estimation strategy in the current paper. More
specifically, we divide the border into segments of predefined lengths and
calculate the distance to the closest border segment for every transaction in
our dataset. Since choosing the length of the border segments is arbitrary,
we conduct the analysis for various lengths (5, 10, 20, 30 and 40 kilometers)
of the border segments. An overview of the results is presented in table 5.
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Table 5: Overview spatial heterogeneity border effect
Length Neg. & Pos. & # Border
border segments Neg. stat. sign. Pos. stat. sign. segments
5km 34 10 11 1 45
75.56% 22.22% 24.44% 2.22%
10km 24 6 5 0 29
82.76% 20.69% 17.24% 0%
20km 18 6 1 0 19
94.74% 31.58% 5.26% 0%
30km 14 6 0 0 14
100% 42.86% 0% 0%
40km 11 6 0 0 11
100% 54.55% 0% 0%
Note: in table C.12 in appendix C.2 all the estimated slope coefficients and their respective standard
errors are presented. Kernel density plots and maps of the estimated coefficients are also presented in
figures C.4 and C.5 in appendix C.2.
When we divide the border into segments of 5 kilometer, our most flexible
specification, our estimates reveal that the slope coefficient is negative for
34 out of the 45 border segments and negative and statistically significant
for 10 regions. Observe furthermore that the estimated slope coefficient is
positive and statistically significant for only one border segment. A thorough
examination of a map of the estimation results presented in figure C.5 in
appendix C reveals that the estimated arbitrage effects are especially strong
in more rural regions that are mostly located east of Antwerp. These findings
are intuitive, since the scope for arbitrage was large in these regions as
relatively inexpensive Belgian regions are neighboring more expensive Dutch
regions there.
7.4 Do Dutch Buyers Pay a Premium?
While the traditional hedonic pricing model has developed into one of the
main workhorses of housing economists who investigate the determinants of
housing prices, more recently researchers have questioned some of the under-
lying hypotheses. The traditional hedonic model views a heterogeneous good
as a collection of characteristics, each of which has a well-defined shadow
price. Markets are furthermore assumed to be sufficiently thick, such that
the shadow prices of characteristics are revealed to all agents. As was argued
by Harding et al. (2003), these assumptions imply that there is no explicit
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role for bargaining in the traditional hedonic model. In a number of related
recent studies, however, Lambson et al. (2004) and Ihlanfeldt & Mayock
(2012) find that out-of-state buyers pay significant premiums for (observa-
tionally) equivalent dwellings. Lambson et al. (2004) argue and also find
evidence which suggests that these premia are likely to be the result of search
costs, biased beliefs (anchoring bias) and haste associated with out-of-state
buyers.
In the current setting we are fortunate enough that the real estate agencies
reported the previous address of 9,720 buyers in our full sample (≈ 37%).26
We observe that the previous address is located in the Netherlands for 183
buyers (≈ 1.9%). The data furthermore reveals that there are 1,989 transac-
tions located less than 15 kilometers from the border for which the address
is given. For this subset of transactions, there are 153 buyers (≈ 7.7%)
whose previous address was located in the Netherlands, which is consistent
with the earlier findings in figure 3 that Dutch buyers prefer to live close
to the border. A further exploration of the data suggests that the Dutch
buyers in our sample cluster spatially. 144 of the 153 Dutch buyers in our
sample bought a property that is located in the adjacent districts Maaseik
and Turnhout, where their share of the market is about 11%. Given this
clustering of Dutch buyers and the findings presented in the previous sec-
tion, we limit the analysis to the 1,337 transactions in these two districts.
In table 6 we present some descriptive statistics for the dwellings bought by
Dutch and Belgian buyers, respectively.
Table 6: Descriptive statistics transaction data by origin buyer
Buyer = Dutch Buyer = Belgian T-test
Variable Obs. Avg. (1) St. Dev. Obs. Avg. (2) St. Dev. (1)-(2)
Sales price (e) 144 260,554.30 88,638.13 1,190 224,783.24 84,886.97 4.753***
Living area (sq. m.) 144 217.25 64.87 1,193 180.58 66.01 6.308***
Plot size (sq. m.) 144 1,128.37 837.62 1,193 805.56 1,024.56 3.636***
# Bedrooms 144 3.42 0.87 1,193 3.13 0.82 3.949***
# Garages 144 1.04 0.62 1,192 0.80 0.64 4.171***
Year of constr. 137 1976.15 17.72 1,104 1972.10 23.68 1.935*
Year of sale 144 2007.84 2.23 1,193 2010.01 2.82 -8.908***
Central heating 144 0.96 0.18 1,191 0.86 0.34 3.543***
Dist. border (km) 144 4,464.94 3,416.87 1,193 6,072.69 3,453.37 -5.283***
Dist. buyer - pr. (km) 144 44.71 40.59 1,193 9.03 16.69 19.606***
The descriptive statistics presented indicate that, on average, Dutch buy-
26The total dataset contains 26,216 transactions.
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ers buy dwellings that are not only more expensive but also differ in their
structural characteristics and are located closer to the border. Observe fur-
thermore that the average year of sale of Dutch buyers is lower, which is
consistent with a decrease in the demand of Dutch buyers due to a bust
in the Dutch housing market after 2008. The results of various (spatial)
hedonic models are presented in table 7.
Table 7: Do Dutch buyers pay a premium
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Buyer NL 0.2795*** 0.159*** 0.1178**
(0.0622) (0.045) (0.0475)
Buyer NL*(Year of sale - 2003) -0.0336*** -0.0182** -0.0144*
(0.0113) (0.0065) (0.0066)
Buyer NL*Dist. to border -0.0099* -0.0057
(0.0044) (0.0046)
Buyer NL*Min. travel time
Min. travel time 0.0046 -0.0053 -0.0055
(0.0048) (0.0032) (0.0032)
Dist. to border -0.0317*** -0.0188*** -0.0148**
(0.0087) (0.0056) (0.0059)
Dist. to border*(Year of sale-2003) 0.0026*** 0.0017*** 0.0012*
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006)
ρ 0.7481*** 0.2398** 0.2118* 0.216*
(0.0444) (0.1028) (0.1055) (0.1062)
Observations 1,271 1,155 1,155 1,155
R-sq. 0.072 0.831 0.831 0.832
Property char. No Yes Yes Yes
Year of sale No Yes Yes Yes
Municipality dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Note: ***, ** and * denote that the estimated regression coefficients are statistically significant at the
1, 5 and/or 10 percent level. In all the regression models presented we control for an extensive list of
property- and neighborhood characteristics equivalent to those presented in table C.3 in appendix C.
In the first column of table 7 we report the estimated coefficients of an
“empty model”. While the results suggest that Dutch buyer pay a large
premium relative to their Belgian counterparts, we have to note that the
model does not take into account differences in the structural characteristics
of properties and does not contain any locational information. The estimates
presented in the second column indicate that a substantial part (≈ 12%) of
the difference in average transaction prices, however, can be explained by
differences in the dwellings bought by Dutch and Belgian buyers. Moreover,
the results presented in the fourth column suggest that the effect further
declines with 0.0412 after controlling for spatial arbitrage effects. The results
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reported in the fourth column indicate that, in 2003, the premium paid by
Dutch buyers was equal to 11.8%. The estimates, however, also indicate that
this premium has been steadily declining over time. Since the gap between
Belgian and Dutch housing prices has also steadily declined over time, we
interpret this finding as support for the anchoring-bias hypothesis. Finally
note, by comparing the estimated coefficients for the distance to the border
variable in the third and fourth column, that the spatial arbitrage effect
can partially be explained by Dutch buyers who pay a premium since the
estimated value of the distance to the border coefficient declines in absolute
value when controlling for the origin of the buyer.
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have investigated the determinants of Flemish housing
prices along the Flemish-Dutch border and focused on the distance to the
border effect using a large sample of detailed individual transaction data
provided by a large franchise system of real estate agencies. The results
from various (spatial) hedonic models suggest that the price of a dwelling
located at the border was about 13% higher in 2003 than an observationally
equivalent dwelling located 15 kilometers from the border. This finding is
consistent with spatial arbitrage by Dutch households who took advantage
of the lower housing prices in Flanders, but preferred to live close to the
Netherlands. The results found in various regression analyses also suggest
that this effect has been steadily decreasing over time, where the initial gap
of 13% in 2003 has decreased to 2% in 2015. This is in accordance with the
“catching up” of Flemish housing prices as a result of a more generous fiscal
regime for owner-occupiers in Belgium since 2005 and a bust in the Dutch
housing market in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008.
These (independent) developments have reduced the scope and desirability
of arbitration, as shown by the estimates of our hedonic model.
In a series of robustness tests we show that these results are robust with
respect to alternative econometric specifications and alternative measures of
distance to the border. Since the dataset does not only contain information
on transactions close to the border, we furthermore carry out a series of
placebo-tests that further strengthen our previous findings. In the last part
of the paper we show that the distance to the border effect is especially pro-
nounced in rural areas in the eastern parts of Flanders. Using a subsample
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of the full dataset for which the previous address of the buyer is known and
focusing on a well-defined local market, we finally show that Dutch buyers
pay a premium for observationally equivalent dwellings relative to their Bel-
gian counterparts. This premium, however, is decreasing over time which is
consistent with the notion of anchoring bias.
Although the paper shows a coherent series of findings, we unfortunately
have only detailed data available for real estate transactions on one side of
the border. In a next step, it would be interesting to supplement the current
dataset with information concerning transactions on the other side of the
border, as for example done in Micheli (2014). While these authors study
the magnitude of the border effect at the Dutch-German border, two coun-
tries that do not share a single common language, combining the current
dataset with data concerning Dutch real estate transactions would allow us
to study the magnitude of the border effect between countries that share
a common language. This would, for example, help us to develop a more
thorough understanding of the European integration process.
A The Belgian-Dutch border
Figure A.1: Graphical representation border effects
px¯,NL
px¯,BE
x¯
x
ln p(x) Border
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Table A.1: Moran’s I for % Dutch inhabitants
Spatial Weights Matrix I E[I] sd[I] z p-value
Negative exponential 0.67405 -0.00037 0.00746 90.350 0
Inverse distance 0.15799 -0.00037 0.00130 121.640 0
Figure A.2: Nominal house prices in different regions (2003 & 2011)
(a) 2003 (b) 2011
Source maps: Belgian HISGIS & Statistics Netherlands. Source data: Statistics Netherlands & Statistics
Belgium.
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B Overview of the data
Table B.2: Variables & sources of data
Source Variable Description
ERA Belgium Transaction price Sales price (in euro)
Date of sale
Location x- and y-coordinates
Type of construction (Semi-)detached vs. terraced housing
Year of construction
Living surface (in sq. m.)
Plot size (in sq. m.)
Number of bedrooms
Number of garages
State of property Ready to move in, luxuriously finished
Heating type Central heating
Heating material Gas, wood, electricity,..
Heating elements Radiators, underfloor heating,..
Hot water Condensing boiler,..
Glazing Single, double, triple,..
Basement Storage room, wine cellar,..
Bathroom Two/multiple bathrooms, bathtub,..
Kitchen Well-maintained, dishwasher,..
Various Fireplace, alarm, airconditioning,..
Fl. Geogr. Inf. Agency (AGIV) Bus stops x- and y-coordinates
Train stations
Highway entries/exits
Grocery stores
Shopping centers
Statistics Belgium (ADS) Transaction prices 1973Q1-2014Q4, municipalities
Number of transactions
Number of inhabitants 1996-2013, municipalities
Statistics Netherlands (CBS) Number of inhabitants 1996-2013, municipalities
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C Regression results
C.1 Baseline results
Table C.3: Estimated coefficients control variables
Note: ***, ** and * denote that the estimated regression coefficients are statistically significant at the
1, 5 and/or 10 percent level.
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C.2 Robustness & extensions
Table C.4: Estimation results distance to the border (ordinary least squares)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dist. to border -0.0029 -0.0082*** -0.0069 -0.0238*** -0.0259*** -0.0321***
(0.002) (0.0026) (0.0043) (0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0087)
Dist. to border2 -0.0001 0.0029** 0.0029** 0.0024*
(0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Dist. to border3 -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Dist. to border*(Year of sale-2003) 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Dist. to border*Urban area 0.0055 0.0048
(0.0035) (0.0035)
Dist. to border*Travel time Dutch city 0.0005**
(0.0002)
Obs. 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657
R-sq. 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.834
Note: ***, ** and * denote that the estimated regression coefficients are statistically significant at the
1, 5 and/or 10 percent level. In all the regression models presented we control for an extensive list of
property- and neighborhood characteristics equivalent to those presented in table C.3 in appendix C.
Table C.5: Estimation results distance to the border (spatial lag model, 10
nearest neighbors spatial weights matrix)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dist. to border -0.0032* -0.0086*** -0.0076* -0.0204*** -0.0214*** -0.0287***
(0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0041) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0081)
Dist. to border2 -0.0001 0.0022* 0.0022* 0.0015
(0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Dist. to border3 -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Dist. to border*(Year of sale-2003) 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Dist. to border*Urban area 0.0024 0.0015
(0.0032) (0.0032)
Dist. to border*Travel time Dutch city 0.0006***
(0.0002)
λ 0.0206*** 0.0205*** 0.0205*** 0.0212*** 0.0211*** 0.0206***
(0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076)
Obs. 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657
Note: ***, ** and * denote that the estimated regression coefficients are statistically significant at the
1, 5 and/or 10 percent level. In all the regression models presented we control for an extensive list of
property- and neighborhood characteristics equivalent to those presented in table C.3 in appendix C.
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Table C.6: Estimation results distance to the border (spatial error model,
inverse-distance spatial weights matrix)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dist. to border -0.0029 -0.0083*** -0.007* -0.0242*** -0.0263*** -0.0324***
(0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0041) (0.0076) (0.0077) (0.0081)
Dist. to border2 -0.0001 0.0029** 0.003*** 0.0024**
(0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Dist. to border3 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Dist. to border*(Year of sale-2003) 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Dist. to border*Urban area 0.0057* 0.005
(0.0032) (0.0032)
Dist. to border*Travel time Dutch city 0.0005**
(0.0002)
ρ 0.0471** 0.048** 0.048** 0.0482** 0.0483** 0.0479**
(0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0223) (0.0221) (0.0223)
Obs. 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657
R-sq. 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.834 0.834
Note: ***, ** and * denote that the estimated regression coefficients are statistically significant at the
1, 5 and/or 10 percent level. In all the regression models presented we control for an extensive list of
property- and neighborhood characteristics equivalent to those presented in table C.3 in appendix C.
Table C.7: Estimation results distance to the border (spatial lag model,
inverse-distance spatial weights matrix)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dist. to border -0.0029 -0.0082*** -0.007* -0.0238*** -0.0259*** -0.0321***
(0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0041) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0081)
Dist. to border2 -0.0001 0.0029** 0.0029** 0.0024**
(0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Dist. to border3 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Dist. to border*(Year of sale-2003) 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Dist. to border*Urban area 0.0055* 0.0048
(0.0032) (0.0032)
Dist. to border*Travel time Dutch city 0.0005**
(0.0002)
λ 0.0223*** 0.0222*** 0.0222*** 0.0231*** 0.0227*** 0.0224***
(0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076)
Obs. 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657
Note: ***, ** and * denote that the estimated regression coefficients are statistically significant at the
1, 5 and/or 10 percent level. In all the regression models presented we control for an extensive list of
property- and neighborhood characteristics equivalent to those presented in table C.3 in appendix C.
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Table C.8: Estimation results travel time to the nearest border crossing (or-
dinary least squares)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Travel time border -0.003* -0.0081*** -0.0146*** -0.0152*** -0.0153***
(0.0016) (0.0022) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0039)
Travel time border2 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Tr. time border*(Year of sale-2003) 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Tr. time border*Urban area 0.0015 0.0015
(0.0025) (0.0025)
Tr. time border*Tr. time Dutch city 0
(0.0002)
Obs. 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657
R-sq. 0.834 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835
Note: ***, ** and * denote that the estimated regression coefficients are statistically significant at the
1, 5 and/or 10 percent level. In all the regression models presented we control for an extensive list of
property- and neighborhood characteristics equivalent to those presented in table C.3 in appendix C.
Table C.9: Estimation results travel time to the nearest border crossing (spa-
tial error model, inverse-distance spatial weights matrix)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Travel time border -0.0031** -0.0083*** -0.0146*** -0.0152*** -0.0153***
(0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0037)
Travel time border2 0.0003*** 0.0003** 0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Tr. time border*(Year of sale-2003) 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Tr. time border*Urban area 0.0017 0.0017
(0.0023) (0.0023)
Tr. time border*Tr. time Dutch city 0
(0.0002)
ρ 0.0467** 0.0491** 0.0483** 0.0484** 0.0484**
(0.0221) (0.0224) (0.0226) (0.0225) (0.0225)
Obs. 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657
R-sq. 0.834 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835
Note: ***, ** and * denote that the estimated regression coefficients are statistically significant at the
1, 5 and/or 10 percent level. In all the regression models presented we control for an extensive list of
property- and neighborhood characteristics equivalent to those presented in table C.3 in appendix C.
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Table C.10: Estimation results travel time to the nearest border crossing
(spatial lag model, 10 nearest neighbors spatial weights matrix)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Travel time border -0.0028* -0.008*** -0.0148*** -0.0146*** -0.0157***
(0.0014) (0.0019) (0.003) (0.0031) (0.0037)
Travel time border2 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Tr. time border*(Year of sale-2003) 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Tr. time border*Urban area -0.0005 -0.0006
(0.0023) (0.0023)
Tr. time border*Tr. time Dutch city 0.0001
(0.0002)
λ 0.0217*** 0.0215*** 0.0215*** 0.0216*** 0.0214***
(0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075)
Obs. 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657
Note: ***, ** and * denote that the estimated regression coefficients are statistically significant at the
1, 5 and/or 10 percent level. In all the regression models presented we control for an extensive list of
property- and neighborhood characteristics equivalent to those presented in table C.3 in appendix C.
Table C.11: Estimation results travel time to the nearest border crossing
(spatial lag model, inverse-distance spatial weights matrix)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Travel time border -0.003** -0.0081*** -0.0147*** -0.0152*** -0.0153***
(0.0014) (0.0019) (0.003) (0.0031) (0.0037)
Travel time border2 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Tr. time border*(Year of sale-2003) 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Tr. time border*Urban area 0.0015 0.0015
(0.0022) (0.0023)
Tr. time border*Tr. time Dutch city 0
(0.0002)
λ 0.0234*** 0.0232*** 0.0232*** 0.0231*** 0.0231***
(0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076)
Obs. 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657 4,657
Note: ***, ** and * denote that the estimated regression coefficients are statistically significant at the
1, 5 and/or 10 percent level. In all the regression models presented we control for an extensive list of
property- and neighborhood characteristics equivalent to those presented in table C.3 in appendix C.
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Figure C.3: Placebo borders 20, 30 and 40 kilometers
Source maps: Belgian HISGIS
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Table C.12: Estimated coefficients spatial heterogeneity border effect
Note: ***, ** and * denote that the estimated regression coefficients are statistically significant at the
1, 5 and/or 10 percent level. In all the regression models presented we control for an extensive list of
property- and neighborhood characteristics equivalent to those presented in table C.3 in appendix C.
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Figure C.4: Kernel density plots spatial heterogeneity border effects for var-
ious lengths of the border segments
(a) 5km (b) 10km
(c) 20km (d) 30km
(e) 40km
Source maps: Belgian HISGIS
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Figure C.5: Spatial heterogeneity border effects for various lengths of the
border segments
(a) 5km (b) 10km
(c) 20km (d) 30km
(e) 40km
Source maps: Belgian HISGIS
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Chapter III
Housing Prices and Housing
Stock Composition: How Do
We Value the Homes of our
Neighbors?
1 Introduction
The housing commodity is a durable and highly heterogeneous that is fixed
in geographical space.1 Each house has its own unique set of characteristics
and amenities that affect its value and, as a result, valuing a house is dif-
ficult. A substantial body of historical research has nevertheless attempted
to explain value of housing by valuing its individual components. Typically,
this has been done using the hedonic pricing method, which assumes that
utility is not generated not by the good per se, but by the characteristics
that define the good. The view that the housing commodity can be char-
acterized as a “bundle of attributes” that provides housing services to its
occupants has been generally accepted in the literature and many studies
have included the attributes of the property that is up for sale in hedonic
regression analyses. At a slightly more aggregate level, however, neighbor-
1I would like to thank Jan Mutl, Jan Rouwendal, Frank Verboven Maarten Goos, Erik
Buyst and the seminar and conference participants of the EBS Workshop on Real Estate
Economics and Finance (Wiesbaden, March 2015), ENHR Housing Economics Workshop
(Oslo, March 2015) and (Flemish) Policy Research Centre Housing (Leuven, March 2015)
for useful suggestions and comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I would furthermore
like to thank ERA Belgium, the General Administration of Patrimonial Documentation
(GAPD) and the Flemish Geographical Information Agency (FGIA) for providing the
necessary data.
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hoods2 can also be viewed of “bundles of properties” where each property
has its own specific set of attributes. Although the hedonic pricing litera-
ture has clearly shown that different bundles of housing characteristics are
valued differently and the neighborhood’s amenities matter, there have been
virtually no studies that investigated whether different bundles of proper-
ties in an otherwise equivalent neighborhood are valued differently. It is
however likely that the price of the property that is up for sale is affected
by the characteristics of neighboring properties because of reasons related
to beauty and aesthetics. Ahlfeldt & Maennig (2010) and Ahlfeldt & Mas-
tro (2012), for example, report positive externalities of historic landmark
buildings on surrounding property values, which suggests that not only the
characteristics of the property itself matter for its price.
While the aforementioned studies are part of a strand of literature that
explicitly examines the spillover effects of certain well-defined buildings on
surrounding property values, the current paper focuses on the summary
statistics of several well-defined and easily measurable attributes of all the
properties surrounding the property that is up for sale. More specifically,
we investigate whether average values and diversity measures (e.g. standard
deviation) of the characteristics of all neighboring properties affect the value
of the property that is up for sale. We thereby look at the following charac-
teristics: building type, year of construction, size and shape of buildings and
plots, and the distance to the road of buildings. We thus try to shed light
on the following research question: “to what extent is the price of a house
affected by the characteristics of neighboring homes?” We therefore combine
a large and detailed dataset of approximately 6,100 dwellings that were sold
between 2003 and 2015 in the Flemish part of the Brussels Metropolitan Area
with administrative and geospatial data concerning the composition of the
housing stock at the neighborhood level.3 4 5 The results of a (spatial) he-
donic model indicate that the price of an observationally equivalent property
is increasing in the average size, year of construction, maximum roof height
2Goodman (1978) defines neighborhoods as “a small urban area within which the
residents receive or perceive a common set of socio-economic effects and neighborhood
services.”
3The Brussels Metropolitan Area is one of the 18 designated metropolitan/urban
areas in Belgium as defined by Luyten & Van Hecke (2007).
4Flanders is one of the three federal regions of Belgium, together with Wallonia and
the Brussels Capital Region.
5Although the transaction data and administrative data are available for the entire
Brussels Metropolitan Area, we restrict our attention to the Flemish part of the BMA
since the geospatial data are only available for Flanders.
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and distance to the road of neighboring properties, but decreases in the av-
erage size and shape of the plots of neighboring properties. Our finding that
the price of a property is increasing in the average size of neighboring prop-
erties provides supporting evidence for the tax capitalization hypothesis of
Hamilton (1976), who argues that relatively smaller houses benefit from the
presence of larger houses. The results presented for the diversity measures
reveal that home values are higher in neighborhoods that are characterized
by low levels of diversity in (1) the types of buildings, (2) the years of con-
struction, (3) the living areas, (4) the shapes of buildings, and (5) distances
to the road. Our findings furthermore indicate that after controlling for
an extensive list of property- and neighborhood characteristics, differences
in the composition of the neighborhood’s housing stock are responsible for
price differentials as large as 12%. This finding suggests that not only the
characteristics of the property itself matter for its sales price, but also the
characteristics of neighboring properties.
While the results provide just one example of how new and ever more present
geospatial data can be used in econometric analyses, it is also important to
emphasize that the results presented in this paper have important and poten-
tially far-reaching consequences for real estate professionals, policy makers,
and urban planners. Our findings, for example, provide backing for the
often-heard realtor’s advice to buy a small house in a neighborhood that is
dominated by larger houses. We, for example, also find that an equivalent
property is worth 0.8% more in a neighborhood where the average prop-
erty is 10 years younger, which suggests that the physical deterioration of
neighboring properties has an impact upon the price/value of the property
that is up for sale. This consequently implies that renovation subsidies for
the exterior of buildings might not only have an impact upon the value
and quality of renovated properties, but also have spillover effects on the
values of neighboring properties that should be taken into account in their
cost-benefit analysis. The finding that households generally prefer to live in
neighborhoods that are characterized by low levels of diversity in building
types, year of construction, and construction size is of interest for urban
planners and real estate developers when thinking about the development of
new neighborhoods. At a more general level the current paper shows that
data concerning neighboring properties that is becoming ever more available
in the form of, for example, geospatial data can be used to improve mass
appraisal systems as was also argued by Lindentahl (2016).
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The rest of this paper is set out as follows. In section 2, we provide an
(non-exhaustive) overview of the literature that is related to the current
study. In section 3, we briefly introduce the Brussels Metropolitan Area
and describe how the typical Flemish neighborhood is developed and subse-
quently constructed. In the fourth section the data and estimation methods
are presented that are used in the subsequent empirical analyses. In sec-
tion 5 the results of various empirical analyses are presented and discussed.
Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
The current study firstly relates to a long tradition of hedonic price studies
in economic research. The hedonic pricing method is based on the observa-
tion that goods are valued for their utility bearing characteristics and has
become one of the main workhorses of (housing) economists since the semi-
nal contributions of Lancaster (1966) and Rosen (1974). Excellent overviews
of the use of the hedonic pricing model in housing economics can be found in
Malpezzi (2003) and Sirmans et al. (2005). In the current paper we employ
hedonic techniques to estimate the marginal willingness-to-pay (WTP) for
property- and neighborhood attributes.
The current paper also relates to a strand of literature that has been con-
cerned with the relative consumption of households. Classical economists,
such as Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, already suggested that individ-
uals are at least partly motivated by concerns of relative position. Luttmer
(2005), for example, finds evidence that the negative effect of increases in
neighbors’ earnings on own well-being is most likely caused by interpersonal
preferences, that is, people have utility functions that depend on relative
consumption in addition to absolute consumption. While the evidence pro-
vided by Luttmer (2005) suggests that “men do not only desire to be rich,
but also richer than other men”, in real estate markets, there is no con-
sensus among economists and real estate professionals about the sign and
magnitude of this relationship. While the conspicuous consumption theory,
which dates back to Veblen (1899), suggests that households have a higher
willingness to pay for a large dwelling to signal their supposed aﬄuence to
their neighbors, Hamilton (1976) argues that capitalization of the property
tax for a given public service bundle penalizes larger houses and benefit
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smaller houses. A third theory, that can be attributed to Haurin (1988),
states that there is a non-monotonic relationship between relative size and
housing prices, where more atypical dwellings will sell at a discount. Despite
these conflicting hypotheses, there are relatively few empirical studies inves-
tigating the relationship between relative size and housing prices. In one of
the few attempts, to our knowledge, Turnbull et al. (2006) use a simultane-
ous price-liquidity model and a sample of 2,111 transactions from the Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, housing market. They find evidence that smaller houses
command a premium over larger houses. In their study, Narwold & Sandy
(2010) also find similar evidence. In this paper, we augment the traditional
hedonic pricing analysis with the average values of several property charac-
teristics of neighboring properties. The inclusion of both the property’s own
size and the size of neighboring properties allows us to say something about
the value of relative consumption.
Our paper furthermore relates to a strand of literature that has investigated
the relationship between diversity and housing values. Although a consid-
erable body of research has primarily focused on the relationship between
racial composition and housing prices (e.g. Burnell, 1988; MacPherson &
Sirmans, 2001; Collins & Margo, 2003; Cervero & Duncan, 2003), there are
a few studies that focus on the role of housing stock diversity. Miller (1978),
for example, provides evidence which suggests that houses in more homoge-
neous neighborhoods tend to have a shorter time on the market than houses
in diverse neighborhoods. In a study that is perhaps the most related to
ours, Narwold & Sandy (2010) explore the role of housing stock diversity
in explaining variation in housing prices. Using hedonic techniques and a
sample of approximately 6,500 transactions from the San Diego (Califor-
nia) housing market, they find that dwellings located in more heterogeneous
neighborhoods in terms of dwelling size command a premium. Their results,
however, also suggest that the price is decreasing with respect to the level of
heterogeneity in the age of buildings. Although the current paper is closely
related to that of Narwold & Sandy (2010), it also differs in a number of
ways. Firstly, the current paper uses data from a different market, namely
the Brussels Metropolitan Area. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly,
in the current paper we do not only have administrative data at a prede-
fined level at our disposal, but also use geospatial data which allows us to
aggregate flexibly and to construct additional variables, such as the shape
of buildings and plots. The current paper therefore also relates to a recent
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study by Lindentahl (2016), who uses a 3D-model for the city of Rotterdam
to quantify shape (dis)similarity. His results suggest that shape similarity
can be used to improve mass appraisal systems.
This study additionally relates to a strand of literature that has inves-
tigated the spillover effects of dwellings designed by famous architects or
(historic) landmark buildings/neighborhoods on surround property values.
Ahlfeldt & Mastro (2012), for example, show that homes within 50 meters
to a residential building by Frank Lloyd Wright in Oak Park, Illinois, enjoy
a price premium of 8.5%. The authors, however, argue that it may also be
partially attributable to the prominence of the architect. More generally,
positive externalities of (historic) landmark buildings and designated areas
have been documented for Texan cities (Leichenko et al., 2001; Coulson
& Leichenko, 2004), Baton Rouge (Zahirovic-Herbert & Chatterjee, 2012),
Memphis (Coulson & Lahr, 2005), Berlin (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2010), the
Netherlands (Lazrak et al., 2014), England (Ahlfeldt & Holman, 2015), and
the United States in general (Listokin et al., 1998). While all these studies
look at the spillover effects of well-designated buildings/areas, the current
study looks more generally at the effect of the composition of the neighbor-
hood’s housing stock on housing prices.
Our paper finally relates to a strand of literature which investigates the
effects of architecture on market prices of residential and non-residential
buildings. Moorhouse & Smith (1994), for example, investigate the market
for residential architecture for row houses in Boston’s South End. Their
results show that “residential architecture matters in the marketplace” and
that “specific architectural features are more highly valued when they differ-
entiate one row house from its immediate neighbor.” Fuerst et al. (2011)
investigate whether commercial offices designed by ’signature architects’ in
the United States achieve rental premiums compared with commercial of-
fices designed by non-signature architects. The results from their hedonic
regression analysis suggest that, compared with buildings in the same sub-
market, office buildings designed by signature architects have rents that are
5%-7% higher, and sell for prices 17% higher. Although we do not explicitly
take into the architectural features of the properties that are up for sale in
the current paper, we do include shape variables for the construction and
the plot is sits on in the empirical analysis.6
6The construction of the shape measures is described in appendix A.3.
86
Chapter III
Housing Prices and Housing Stock Composition:
How Do We Value the Homes of our Neighbors?
The current paper finally closely relates to the literature on spatial econo-
metrics. Including the characteristics of neighboring properties in a hedonic
pricing model is highly similar to the SLX model (e.g. Halleck Vega &
Elhorts, 2015), where spatially lagged values of independent variables are
included as (additional) regressors in the regression analysis. The approach
in the current study, however, deviates somewhat from this strand of litera-
ture as the spatially lagged values are constructed using data for the whole
housing stock instead of only using data from observations from the sample.
We furthermore use Spatial Lag (SAR) and Spatial Error Models (SEM) to
estimate the hedonic coefficients.
3 The Brussels Metropolitan Area and insti-
tutional context
3.1 The Brussels Metropolitan Area
In this paper we investigate the relationship between neighborhood housing
stock composition and housing prices using data from the Flemish part of
the larger Brussels metropolitan area (BMA).7 8 Due to data limitations,
which are discussed in section 4, we only consider the Flemish part of the
Brussels metropolitan. We thus exclude transaction from the Brussels Cap-
ital Region (BCR), which is located in the heart of our study region, and
the Walloon part of the BMA. The aforementioned Brussels Capital Re-
gion is one of the three federated regions of Belgium alongside Wallonia and
Flanders and is, besides the capital of Belgium, also the de facto capital of
the European Union since it hosts a number of principal EU institutions,
such as the European Commission and the Council of the European Union.
The secretariat of the Benelux and the headquarters of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) are also located in Brussels, as well as many
other international organizations such as the World Customs Organization,
7We use the definition set out by Luyten & Van Hecke (2007), who divide Belgium
into 5 large metropolitan areas (Brussels, Antwerp, Ghent, Lie`ge and Charleroi) and
13 smaller urban areas (Mons, Leuven, Bruges, Namur, Kortrijk, Mechelen, Hasselt,
Verviers, Ostend, Tournai, Genk, Sint-Niklaas and Turnhout) based on socio-economic
data.
8We refer to the larger BMA since we also retain transaction in the smaller Leuven
metropolitan area. Although Leuven is a separate urban area according to Luyten & Van
Hecke (2007), it is encompassed by the Brussels metropolitan area in the east, south and
west.
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EUROCONTROL and a large number of international corporations. It is
no wonder then the BCR is Belgian’s largest center of employment9 and also
responsible for a large influx (outflow) of employees every morning (evening)
from our study region and the rest of Belgium. Data from the Census 2011,
a large-scale questionnaire carried out by Statistics Belgium, suggests that
of the 575,000 people that are employed in our study region, more than
150,000 (≈ 27%) are employed in the BCR, which suggests that the travel
time to Brussels will have an important effect on housing prices and thus
has to be included in the hedonic pricing analysis.10 Other centers of em-
ployment in the Flemish part of the BMA are Leuven (≈ 72, 000), Zaventem
(≈ 42, 000) and Aalst (≈ 34, 000). In figure 1 a geographical overview of the
study region is presented.
Figure 1: Geographical overview study region
Source maps: Belgian HISGIS
3.2 Institutional context
As it is the goal of this paper to investigate the relationship between neigh-
borhood housing stock composition and housing prices, we cannot continue
without a brief description of how neighborhoods have come about in Flan-
9Approximately 675,000 people are employed in the BCR. About 388,000 of them
commute (on a daily basis) from municipalities outside the BCR. Source: Census 2011,
Statistics Belgium.
10In the hedonic pricing analyses presented in section 5 we explicitly control for the
travel time to Brussels. The travel time was calculated using the osrmtime algorithm in
Stata 14 (Huber & Rust, 2016), which calculates travel time and distance using Open-
StreetMap (OSM) data and an Open Source Routing Machine (OSRM).
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ders in the first place. As, for example, argued in Tennekes et al. (2015),
it is intuitive that the morphology of residential development is influenced
to a great extent by institutional arrangements. According to Ball (2003)
and Verhage (2002), the development process contains at least three stages
that are interrelated, namely 1) land assembly and development, 2) house
construction, and 3) house sales/end use. Differences in the institutional
arrangements between countries in these three phases can give rise to dis-
continuities in residential morphology along national borders. Tennekes et
al. (2015), for example, note that “it is still relatively easy to see the lines
of the border when crossing from the Netherlands to Belgium [...] due to
differences in dwelling types and the shape of urban development.” In a
comparative study Tennekes et al. (2015) show that the housing process in
Flanders is quite different from that in the Netherlands and North-Rhine
Westphalia (Germany). In Flanders, an excess of land that was zoned for
residential purposes (De Decker, 2011; Loris, 2011), combined with a highly
fragmented possession of the available land plots (Loris, 2008), has led to a
situation where generally the landowner took the initiative for development,
either individually or by selling it to a property developer (verkavelaar).
Consequently, the construction of new dwellings and apartments was, and
still is, frequently organized on a small-scale basis in Flanders/Belgium. A
quick glance at www.immoweb.be11, the largest listing platform in Belgium,
reveals that the 20 largest developers of (residential) real estate in Bel-
gium are listing 3,569 properties spread over 399 different projects, which
suggests that the average development consists of 8.94 properties. Data
retrieved from the website of Statistics Belgium furthermore suggests that
the combined market share of the 20 largest construction companies active
on www.immoweb.be is fairly limited (6.6%) as there were granted building
permits for more than 54,000 residences in Belgium in 2014. In contrast, the
largest housing development in the Netherlands, Leidsche Rijn near the city
of Utrecht, consists of 30,000 homes that were simultaneously developed and
built in a single development. This image of small-scale construction of new
housing developments in Flanders is also confirmed by data from the Flem-
ish Housing Survey 2013, a large-scale questionnaire where 10,000 randomly
selected Flemish households were interviewed about their housing expendi-
tures, methods of financing, their housing needs, and the housing career.
11Status at the 16th of August 2015.
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More than half12 of all the respondents who reported that they bought or
constructed a new residence since 1990, reported that they individually con-
structed their own house with the help of one or multiple architects and/or
contractors.
The image of Flanders (or more generally Belgium), with a lack of spatial
planning in the first decades after the second World War, highly fragmented
possession of open residential lots, and a large share of owner-occupiers who
designed and built their own dwellings, suggests that neighborhoods are
quite likely to be heterogeneous in terms of their housing stock. This is
in contrast to, for example, the Netherlands where new housing develop-
ments are frequently organized on a large scale and dwellings in the same
neighborhood are frequently much alike. This raises the question: “What do
households prefer?” In the next sections we try to shed some light on the
answer to this question.
4 Data & methodology
4.1 Data
In this paper, we combine information from four main sources. The main
dataset used in the subsequent empirical analyses is a sample of 6,450
dwellings that were sold through one of 50 real estate agencies of a large
franchise system in the Flemish part of the Brussels and Leuven metropoli-
tan areas in the period 2005-2014.13 For every property in the dataset, we
know its transaction price (in e), date of sale, construction type (terraced
vs. (semi-)detached), interior space (in m2), plot size (in m2), # of bed-
rooms, # of bathrooms, and year of construction. The dataset furthermore
comprises a wide range of dummy variables that indicate whether certain
12Of the total sample of 10,013 respondents, 7,561 (75.51%) are owner-occupiers. Of
these 7,561 owners-occupiers, 3,119 (41.2%) reported that they had either bought a newly
constructed house or constructed a new house themselves. Of these 3,119 respondents
2,180 (69.9%) reported that they constructed their own house with or without the help
of one or multiple architects and/or contractors.
13The dataset used for the current analyses is part of a larger sample of approximately
55,000 transactions of dwellings, apartments, offices, garages and residential land that
were sold through one of 110 real estate agencies of the franchise system in Belgium
in the period 2003-2015. For the sake of homogeneity and easier access for real estate
agents to other agents’ listings, the franchise system introduced and manages a centrally
stored where all listings are registered, together with their actual status. The real estate
agents/agencies are obliged and trained to submit the characteristics of properties of
clients in a highly structured manner, which results in a very clean database.
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features (e.g. central heating, dishwasher) are present or not and whether
certain criteria are met (e.g. condition = ready to move in).14 More impor-
tantly for the current analysis, the dataset also contains the address (street,
house number, zip code) and corresponding geographical coordinates (e.g.
50.87 ◦,4.70 ◦), which allows us to merge the data with the neighborhood
variables and housing stock diversity measures that are discussed in the next
paragraphs. In table 1 some descriptive statistics are provided.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics transaction data
Variable Avg. St. Dev. P5 P95
Sales price (in e) 260,272.33 105,123.11 121,468 450,000
Semi-detached 0.3 0.46 0 1
Detached 0.41 0.49 0 1
Living area (in sq. m.) 198.38 72.68 110 338
Plot size (in sq. m.) 788.49 1,057.04 112 2,362
# Bedrooms 3.17 0.96 2 5
# Garages 0.91 0.71 0 2
Year of constr. 1965.46 21.52 1930 2005
Year of sale 2009.64 3.59 2003 2015
Travel time Brussels (in min.) 21.58 8.44 11.08 36.65
Note: the descriptive statistics were calculated using the sample of 6,450 transactions.
The descriptive statistics reveal that the average property in our sample is
sold for e260,272, ranging from e121,468 at the 5th percentile to e450,000
at the 95th percentile. Approximately 71% of all dwellings are either semi-
detached (30%) or detached (40%). The average travel time to Brussels
by car (in min.) is equal to 21.5 minutes, but ranges from 11 minutes at
the 5th percentile to 37 minutes at the 95th percentile. While the table
presented above shows that there is considerable variation in the different
variables across properties, Moran’s I statistics (Moran, 1950) for the dif-
ferent variables presented in table A.2 in appendix A.1 show that the values
of the variables are also (strongly) correlated across space, which motivates
the use of spatial econometric estimation techniques in subsequent empirical
analyses.
The transaction data discussed in the previous paragraph is complemented
14A list of all the variables at our disposal is presented in table A.1 in appendix A.
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with a single cross-section (January 1, 2012) of administrative data con-
cerning the inventory of the Belgian housing stock that was provided by the
General Administration of Patrimonial Documentation (GAPD) for every
statistical sector15 in Belgium. In our study area, there are 2,240 statisti-
cal sectors with an average territory of approximately one square kilometer
and 600 inhabitants. This suggests that it is a suitable neighborhood defini-
tion. More specifically, for every statistical sector, we observe the number of
buildings/residences that belong to one of the 14 different16 categories. For
every category of buildings/residences, additionally, information is provided
concerning some of their structural characteristics, such as interior space,
parcel size, built-up area, # of floors, and the year of construction. The
data is organised in such a manner that for every local living area j and cat-
egory of buildings/residences we know the number of buildings/residences
that belong to each of the K classes, which are bounded by pre-defined
threshold values. An overview of these threshold values is provided in table
A.3 in appendix A.2. Using this dataset, we can calculate (approximate)
weighted averages17 for the variables living area, plot size and built-on sur-
face (in m2), and the year of construction for every local living area j. These
weighted averages can be used to capture the “average effect”. The dataset
also allows us to calculate several diversity measures for the different charac-
teristics l, such as the maximum share, an (approximate) standard deviation
and Simpson’s (1949) diversity index D. The latter is defined as:18
D = 1− ΣKk=1(pk)2 (III.1)
where pk is the proportion of the population within a certain category.
19
While Simpson’s (1949) diversity index D has frequently been applied in life
15The statistical sectors in Belgium are the smallest administrative level at which
Statistics Belgium collects (socio-economic) data. There are 19,781 statistical sectors in
Belgium, of which 9,182 are located in Flanders.
16(1) Apartments, (2) garages/storage, (3) buildings (apartment building owned by
a single owner), (4) homesteads/farm houses, (5) trading houses, (6) attached/terraced
houses, (7) semi-detached houses, (8) detached houses, (9) offices, (10) castles, (11) in-
dustry buildings, (12) social profit buildings, (13) vacation homes, and finally (14) villa’s.
17The weighted average of characteristic l is equal to ΣKk=1pk ∗ ( v
u
k−vlk
2 ), where pk
denotes the proportion of the population in class k, and vlk and v
u
k denote the lower and
upper threshold value for that respective class.
18Bivariate correlation statistics between the different diversity measures are provided
in table A.4 in appendix A.2.
19Note that Simpson’s diversity index D is inversely related to the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index that is frequently used as an indicator of the degree of competition
among firms.
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science applications, this is one of the first applications to housing prices.20
Descriptive statistics for Simpson’s D and other diversity measures are pro-
vided in table 2.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics housing stock diversity
Variable Measure Avg. St. Dev. P5 P95
Building types D 0.613 0.156 0.29 0.776
Max 0.526 0.162 0.319 0.838
Living area COV 0.415 0.063 0.325 0.532
D 0.548 0.077 0.399 0.647
Max 0.559 0.094 0.446 0.746
Plot size COV 0.554 0.176 0.292 0.84
D 0.63 0.143 0.336 0.78
Max 0.493 0.163 0.299 0.805
Year of constr. COV 0.015 0.004 0.008 0.021
D 0.805 0.088 0.643 0.876
Max 0.299 0.12 0.166 0.539
Note: all statistics were calculated for the 2,240 statistical sectors in our study region.
The descriptive statistics presented above, for example, suggest that the av-
erage neighborhood in our study region is composed out of multiple building
types, since the average value for the diversity index D is not equal to 0.
Note, however, that its standard deviation is also not equal to zero, which
suggests that there is across-neighborhood variation that can be exploited
to capture the “diversity effect”. Although the administrative data cover
various characteristics, there are also a few drawbacks. Firstly, the admin-
istrative data only contain information on the number of properties of a
certain type in a certain class for the characteristics, and these classes are
sometimes broadly defined (e.g. plot size is larger than 664m2 but smaller
than 1304m2). Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the administrative
data are gathered at a pre-defined level of aggregation (statistical sectors)
and thus do not allow for flexible aggregation. Therefore, we now turn to
the geospatial data.
The individual transaction data and administrative data is then further com-
plemented with variables that were created from geospatial data provided by
20The first application, to our knowledge, is Narwold & Sandy (2010).
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the Flemish Geographical Information Agency (FGIA).21 From the geospa-
tial data we were not only able to construct several interesting variables for
the properties in our transaction data, but were also able to calculate the
average values and standard deviations for these variables for neighboring
properties. Moreover, we were able to calculate these variables for several
levels of aggregation. More specifically, we calculated the surface (in m2),
perimeter (in m) and shape22 of the plot and built up area for both the own
property and neighboring properties. We were furthermore able to retrieve
the roof height (in m) and minimum distance to (in m)- and type of road
for both the own property and neighboring properties. For the neighboring
properties we calculated both the average values and the standard deviations
for these characteristics for four different levels of aggregation, namely (1)
statistical sectors, (2) properties within a 100 meter radius, (3) street, and
(4) 10 nearest neighbors. The descriptive statistics are presented in table 3.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics neighboring properties constructed from
geospatial data (100 meter)
Type Char. Statistic Obs. Avg. St. Dev. P5 P95
Building Dist. to road Avg. 6,404 5.298 5.312 0.347 11.56
St. dev. 6,389 4.634 4.231 0.879 11.98
Height Avg. 6,404 8.784 1.406 6.779 11.09
St. dev. 6,389 1.738 0.653 0.864 2.794
Number Obs. 6,404 39.36 28.48 8 97
Perimeter Avg. 6,404 52.85 10.36 40.01 68.92
St. dev. 6,389 17.79 13.35 6.339 41.21
Shape Avg. 6,404 1.152 0.065 1.061 1.264
St. dev. 6,389 0.126 0.053 0.047 0.215
Surface Avg. 6,404 142.7 66.77 84.66 221.5
St. dev. 6,389 95.85 133.1 24.78 282.6
Plot Number Obs. 6,405 47.58 29.67 14 107
Perimeter Avg. 6,405 123.7 44.55 72.87 194.9
St. dev. 6,404 62.59 40.64 23 120.1
Shape Avg. 6,405 1.276 0.115 1.106 1.476
St. dev. 6,404 0.249 0.122 0.1 0.46
Surface Avg. 6,405 810.8 1,059 222.9 1,834
St. dev. 6,404 825.2 1,105 159.3 2,157
21An elaborate description of the shapefiles used to construct the different variables
used in the regression analyses is provided in appendix A.3
22The shape variable was constructed using the following formula: Perimeter (in
m)/(4 ∗√Surface (in m2))
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The descriptive statistics presented in table 3 suggest that there is not only
considerable variation in both the average values and the standard devia-
tions of characteristics of neighboring properties, which implies that we can
identify both the average- and the diversity effect. Notice on the one hand
for example that the average value of average distance to the road of neigh-
boring properties for all properties in our transaction is equal to 5.3 meters.
The standard deviation of the average distance to the road of neighboring
properties is also equal to 5.3, which suggests that there is considerable vari-
ation in the average distance to the road that can be exploited to identify
the “average effect”. The average of the standard deviation of the distance
to the road, on the other hand, which is equal to 4.6, shows that there is con-
siderable heterogeneity in the distance to the road of neighboring properties
for most properties in our dataset. The standard deviation, which is equal
to 4.2, suggests that there is variation in the variation of neighboring prop-
erties’ distance to the road that can be used to identify the “diversity effect”.
While the geospatial data provides detailed information on some of the char-
acteristics of every neighboring property and allows us to flexibly aggregate,
there are less variables available. It, for example, does not contain infor-
mation on the type of building, interior space, and year of construction. In
the subsequent empirical analyses, we will therefore combine data from both
sources to overcome the drawbacks related to each one of them.
4.2 Methodology
Given the nature of our dataset, i.e. individual transaction prices and prop-
erty characteristics, and consistent with the literature, we employ the He-
donic Pricing Method (HPM) for which the theoretical foundations were
established in the seminal works of Lancaster (1966) and Rosen (1974). The
basic premise of the HPM is that utility is not generated by the good per
se, but by the characteristics that define the good. Malpezzi (2003), in his
excellent literature review23, illustrates the direct applicability to housing
perfectly by stating that “I’m happy to be home, not so much to be in any-
thing called a ’house’, so much as to be in a warm dry place, with a quiet
space for a comfortable chair, a functioning toilet or a hot bath should I
require them, and some other rooms in the house to store stacks of paper
23Another excellent literature review on the use of hedonic pricing models in housing
economics is Sirmans et al. (2005).
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or noisy children.” Traditionally, the HPM is estimated using regression
analysis where the estimated coefficients represent the implicit prices of the
attributes. In the current paper we allow for a more flexible form and esti-
mate variants of the following regression equation:
ln(pijt) = βXijt + αNjt + δIt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Classical hedonic pricing model
+
Neighborhood housing stock︷ ︸︸ ︷
γX¯j + κσ(Xj) + λΣ
N
n=1winln(pn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Spatial lag component
+uijt
where
uijt = ρΣ
N
n=1winun + ijt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Spatial error component
(III.2)
where ln(pijt) denotes the logarithmically transformed sales price of prop-
erty i located in statistical sector j that is sold at time t. Xijt and Njt,
respectively, denote vectors of structural and neighborhood characteristics
for each property and It is a vector of indicator variables that capture time-
specific effects. β, α and δ denote their respective vectors of shadow prices.
We then augment the classical hedonic pricing model with average values of
the characteristics of neighboring properties and also include measures that
capture the heterogeneity in these characteristics for neighboring properties.
More specifically, we add (natural logarithms of) averages and heterogene-
ity measures for the following characteristics: types of buildings, year of
construction, interior space, plot size, building shape, plot shape, maximum
roof height, and the distance to the nearest road.
While the regression analysis presented so far could be carried out using
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), the regression coefficients could be biased
due to spatial autocorrelation present in the dependent and independent
variables. We therefore potentially allow for spatial autocorrelation in the
dependent variable, ln(pijt), and spatial autocorrelation in the residuals,
uijt. The spatial structure of the model is captured in a spatial weights
matrix, where the elements win represent the spatial dependency between
observation i and observation n and are equal to zero whenever i = n.24
More specifically, we construct a row-normalized25 10 nearest neighbors and
a row-normalized inverse-distance spatial weights matrix. All models are
24An observation cannot be dependent upon itself.
25This is conventional in the spatial econometrics literature.
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estimated using the Generalized Spatial 2 Stage Least Squares (GS2SLS)
estimator in Stata 14 that was proposed by Kelejian & Prucha (1998).26
5 Results
5.1 Baseline results
In table B.1 in appendix B the results of a hedonic model without size and
diversity measures for neighboring properties are presented. The coefficients
of the house- and neighborhood-specific attributes, such as structure size,
plot size, age, bedrooms, bathrooms, travel time to Brussels are familiar
and in general have the expected signs and are (highly) significant. The
coefficients of determination (R2) are equal to 0.808 for a model without
municipality fixed effects and 0.848 for a model with municipality dummies.
80.8% and 84.8% of all variation in housing prices can thus be explained
by a traditional hedonic model. These values serve as a reference point to
assess the incremental explanatory power of models with average and diver-
sity measures which are presented below.
In table 4 the results of various models with average values of and/or hetero-
geneity measures for neighboring properties are presented. All the models
presented allow for spatially autocorrelated error terms (SEM) and a 10
nearest neighbors matrix is used to construct the spatial weights matrix
W .27 It is furthermore necessary to note that we used a 100 meter radius
to construct the measures from the geospatial data.28 In columns (1)-(3) we
gradually augment the classical HPM with averages and/or diversity mea-
sures of neighboring properties, which culminates in the full model presented
in column (4). In column (5), we additionally add dummy variables for the
72 municipalities in our study region.
26The models could also be estimated using a Maximum Likelihood estimator, but
the GS2SLS estimator additionally allows for heteroskedasticity and is superior in terms
of speed. Excellent discussions of the generalized method of moments and instrumental
variables estimation approach underlying the GS2SLS-estimator can be found in Arraiz
et al. (2010) and Drukker et al. (2013).
27In appendix B robustness checks with respect to the model specification (SAR-model)
and the spatial weights matrix (inverse-distance) are presented.
28In section 5.2 we carry out robustness tests with respect to the level of aggregation.
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Table 4: Baseline results: average values and diversity measures
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln(avg.) Living area 0.2837*** 0.3328*** 0.2859*** 0.2849***
(0.0309) (0.0327) (0.0335) (0.0307)
Plot size -0.0683*** -0.0371* -0.0195 -0.0312
(0.0196) (0.021) (0.0212) (0.0197)
Avg.: Year of construction 0 0.0007* 0.0011*** 0.0008***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Shape buildings 0.0327 0.0926
(0.0779) (0.0757)
Shape plots -0.1493*** -0.1326***
(0.0383) (0.0364)
Height 0.0148*** 0.0168***
(0.0028) (0.0027)
Dist. to road 0.0059*** 0.0061***
(0.0015) (0.0014)
D: Buildings -0.0536** -0.0755*** -0.0719*** -0.0366
(0.0254) (0.0257) (0.0258) (0.0232)
Year of construction -0.0303 -0.0986** -0.0936** -0.0587
(0.0392) (0.0403) (0.0402) (0.0367)
Living area 0.0699 -0.1152** -0.1137** -0.1776***
(0.045) (0.0511) (0.0508) (0.0469)
Plot size -0.0309 0.061 0.0741* 0.0952***
(0.0342) (0.038) (0.0378) (0.0337)
St. dev.: Shape buildings -0.1843** -0.2042***
(0.0759) (0.0732)
Shape plots 0.056** 0.0403
(0.0272) (0.026)
Height -0.0025 0
(0.004) (0.0038)
Dist. to road -0.0019* -0.0027***
(0.001) (0.001)
Diagnostics: ρ 0.5454*** 0.554*** 0.5388*** 0.5299*** 0.2134***
(0.0187) (0.0185) (0.019) (0.0193) (0.032)
Obs. 4,276 4,276 4,276 4,276 4,276
R-sq. 0.82 0.816 0.823 0.826 0.86
Mun. FE: No No No No Yes
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01,
respectively. Besides the reported coefficients, all the regression analyses presented furthermore include
an extensive list of property- and neighborhood characteristics that is equivalent to those presented in
table B.1 in appendix B.
Average values of characteristics of neighboring properties
The results presented in table 4 suggest that the price of an observation-
ally equivalent property is increasing in the average interior space, year of
construction, maximum roof height and distance to the road of neighboring
properties, but is decreasing in the average size and shape of the plots of
neighboring properties.
The estimates presented in column (5), for example, reveal that a 1 per-
cent increase in the interior space of neighboring properties is associated
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with a 0.285 percent increase of the price of the property that is up for
sale. This is consistent with the tax capitalization hypothesis of Hamilton
(1976), who shows that local property tax differentials can lead to price
differentials between large and small houses in heterogeneous communities,
where small houses have higher unit prices than larger houses.29 The critical
reader might argue that Hamilton’s capitalization hypothesis only applies
when properties enjoy the same bundle of public services. In the regression
analyses, however, we control for various other neighborhood characteristics,
such as income, population density and distance to the city hall. In column
(5) we also augment the model with dummy variables for the different mu-
nicipalities. Since the municipalities are the main provider of public services,
we can safely rule out alternative explanations. This result is furthermore
consistent with evidence provided by Turnbull et al. (2006) and the often-
heard realtor’s advice to buy a small house in a neighborhood dominated
by larger houses. The estimated coefficients similarly show that an equiv-
alent property is worth 0.8 percent in a neighborhood where the average
property is 10 years newer. Although the model does not contain informa-
tion about the state of neighboring dwellings, this result likely suggests that
the physical deterioration of neighboring properties has an impact upon the
price of the property that is up for sale. A potential policy implication of
this finding is that a cost-benefit analysis of renovation subsidies should not
only include the positive effects upon the quality of renovated properties,
but should also take into account the spillover effects on neighboring prop-
erties. The estimates presented in column (5) of table 4 furthermore suggest
that an increase in the average maximum roof height with one meter is as-
sociated with a 1.7 percent price increase and an increase in the average
distance to the road of neighboring properties with one meter is leads to a
0.6 percent price increase. A plausible explanation for the first finding is
that the maximum roof height is higher in more densely populated areas
(e.g. apartment buildings, town houses) which are typically associated with
higher housing prices. Although we explicitly control for the population den-
sity of the statistical sector in our model, it might be that this effect is not
yet fully accounted for. Moreover, the population density variable is only
available for the statistical sectors, which have an average size of one square
kilometer. The average maximum roof height, however, is calculated only
29It should be noted, however, that the result of Hamilton (1976) is derived using
a number of assumptions. Like in the seminal Tiebout (1956) model, Hamilton (1976)
assumes that households are perfectly mobile. Hamilton (1976) furthermore states that
market interference (e.g. zoning) is required to ensure efficiency.
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for all properties within a radius of 100 meters, which implies a surface of
approximately 0.031 square kilometers. A likely explanation for the second
effect is that households benefit from the presence of open space in front of
their house and neighboring properties. While the critical observer might
note that properties with a higher value of distance to the road are typically
larger, we argue that these potential “size effects” are already accounted for
due to the inclusion of (average) the average plot- and building size in our
model.
The results presented in table 4, however, also suggest that there are neg-
ative effects related to the average size and shape of plots of neighboring
properties, albeit that the estimated coefficient of average size (in m2) of
the plots of neighboring properties is no longer statistically significant in
columns (4) and (5). The estimates presented in column (5) reveal that an
increase in the average shape of neighboring plots with 0.45 is associated
with a 6 percent price decrease.30 People thus prefer and are willing to pay
to live in neighborhoods with compact plots. Furthermore note that this
finding is not the result of the property’ own plot shape, since this variable
is already included in our list of control variables.31
Diversity measures
Besides the average values for the characteristics of neighboring properties,
the regression analyses presented in table 4 also include several diversity
measures for the same set of characteristics. On the one hand, the estimated
coefficients generally reveal that home values are higher in neighborhoods
that are characterized by low levels of diversity in (1) types of buildings, (2)
year of construction, (3) interior space, (4) shape, and (5) distance to the
road of buildings. Heterogeneity in plot size, on the other hand, positively
affects housing prices.
The estimated coefficients for Simpson’s D for the types of buildings in
columns (2)-(4) suggest that an increase in the heterogeneity of building
types has a negative effect on home values. An increase of Simpson’s D
with 0.1 in the model presented in column (4), for example, leads to a 0.72
30This roughly corresponds with comparing perfectly rectangular plots of 625m2 with
equally sized plots with a width of 10 meters and depth of 62.5 meters.
31The estimates for the building/plot shape of the property and the type of road it is
located along are presented in table B.2 in appendix B.
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percent price decrease. Notice that the estimated coefficient is no longer
statistically significant after controlling for municipality fixed effects in col-
umn (5). Nonetheless, the sign of the coefficient remains the same and the
associated t-value (-1.58) of the estimate is close to being statistical signifi-
cant at the 10 percent level after the inclusion of municipality fixed effects.
A similar story applies for diversity in the years of construction of build-
ings, where the estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant
in columns (2)-(4) but loses its statistical significance in column (5). The
estimated coefficient in column (5) suggests that an increase in Simpson’s
D with 0.1 is associated with a 0.59 percent price decrease, but we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the estimated coefficient is equal to zero. Poten-
tial explanations for this loss of statistical significance after the inclusion of
municipality fixed effects are (1) that the diversity measures are correlated
with (unobserved) municipality effects, and (2) a loss of statistical power due
to the inclusion of 71 additional dummy variables.32 All in all, these results
suggest that households have a willingness to pay to live in neighborhoods
that are characterized by low levels of diversity in building types and the
age of buildings.
While the results presented in the previous paragraph provide a mixed pic-
ture, the reported results for the diversity measures of living area, plot size,
building shape, and distance to the road are fairly stable across the different
regression specifications and thus remain statistically significant even after
the inclusion of municipality fixed effects. One the one hand, an increase in
Simpson’s D with 0.1 for the living area of properties in column (5) is, for
example, leads ceteris paribus to a decrease of home values with 1.8 percent.
An increase in Simpson’s D with 0.1 for the plot size, on the other hand,
leads to an increase of property values with 0.95 percent. An increase in the
standard deviation of the shapes of neighboring buildings with 0.1 results
in a price decrease of approximately 2.04 percent.33 Note, by comparing
the estimated coefficient for the average shape of buildings with that of the
standard deviation of building shapes, that households do not care about
the average shape of buildings, but (negatively) value heterogeneity in the
32Essentially, the identification now stems from within municipality variation in the
diversity measures. It should therefore be noted that our transactions are located in 1,139
statistical sectors of 71 municipalities, which implies that on average there are only 16
statistical sectors in a municipality.
33In a neighborhood where the average plot is 600m2 with a width of 15 meters and
depth of 40 meters, the typical deviation from the average is a plot that has a width of
approximately 12.5 meters and depth of approximately 47.5 meters.
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shapes of neighboring buildings. Households thus dislike dissimilarity in the
shapes of buildings in the neighborhood. The estimates finally reveal that
this result also applies for the diversity in the distances to the road of build-
ings. The estimated coefficient in column (5) indicates that an increase of
the standard deviation with one meter leads to a 0.27 percent price decrease.
General insights
The results presented in the previous paragraphs suggest that it is necessary,
if feasible, to augment classical hedonic regression analysis with averages-
and diversity measures of (structural) characteristics of neighboring prop-
erties. While the previous paragraphs suggested an array of positive and
negative effects for the various measures included in the regression anal-
yses, we now perform a simple analysis to investigate the “total effects”
to get an idea about the price differentials as a result of differences in the
neighborhood’s housing stock composition. More specifically, we look at
the distribution of the estimated average and/or diversity effects using the
following simple formula:
ˆNHSi = γˆX¯ij + κˆσ(Xij) (III.3)
where NHSi denotes the total neighboring housing stock effect for property
i in our sample, and γˆX¯ij and κˆσ(Xij) denote the average effect and diversity
effect, respectively. The results are presented in table 5.34
Table 5: Average, diversity and total effects
Location controls Effect St. dev. P5 P95
No dummies Average 0.044 -0.07 0.069
Diversity 0.029 -0.042 0.052
Total 0.042 -0.058 0.072
Municipality Average 0.043 -0.066 0.066
Diversity 0.03 -0.046 0.05
Total 0.041 -0.057 0.067
Note: all the effects were calculated using the results presented in columns (4) and (5) of table 4.
The results presented in table 5 suggest that there is a total price differential
34In figures B.1 and B.2 in appendix B kernel density plots of the full distribution are
provided.
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of approximately 13 percent due to differences in the housing stock compo-
sition when dummy variables for the municipalities are not included and
12.4 percent when dummy variables are included. The results furthermore
suggest that the price differential as a result of difference in average values
of neighboring properties is larger (13.9 and 13.2 percent, respectively) than
the price differential as a result of differences in diversity measures (9.4 and
9.6 percent, respectively). Finally, note that both effects are negatively cor-
related (the correlation statistics are equal to -0.41 and -0.4 for the model
with and without municipality dummy variables, respectively), since the to-
tal effects are smaller than the sum of the respective average- and diversity
effects. This implies that a higher (lower) estimated average effect is typ-
ically associated with a lower (higher) estimated diversity effect and vice
versa.
In a more general sense, the results presented in columns (1)-(5) are fairly
stable across the different model specifications and suggest that averages
and standard deviations of characteristics of neighboring properties influ-
ence the price of the property that is up for sale. This is, for example,
consistent with the results documented in a strand of literature that investi-
gates the positive externalities of (historic) landmark buildings (e.g. Ahlfeldt
& Maennig, 2010; Ahlfeldt & Mastro, 2012) and finds significant effects.
The current study, however, does not only consider the spillover effects of
(historic) landmark buildings, but looks at the structural characteristics of
neighboring properties more generally. Observe that the R2 increases from
0.808 to 0.826 (+2.2%) in a model without municipality dummies and from
0.848 to 0.86 (+1.4%) in a model with municipality dummies. It is therefore
fair to state that including information concerning neighboring properties in
traditional regression models is worthwhile and can, for example, improve
the performance of automatic mass appraisal systems.35
5.2 Robustness & extensions
Although the analyses presented in the previous section provide important
insights, it remains to perform some robustness checks and extensions. In
table B.3 in appendix B we present the results of a similar regression analysis,
but use alternative measures of diversity. In table B.4 in appendix B the
35In his paper, Lindenthal (2016), also argues that including shape information that
partially explains transaction prices of buildings improves the performance of automatic
mass appraisal systems.
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model is re-estimated using an inverse-distance spatial weights matrixW and
in table B.5 in appendix B we present the estimated regression coefficients
using a spatial lag model where we allow for spatial spillover effects in the
dependent variable. The results presented in all these tables are all highly
similar to those presented in section 5.1, which suggests that the results are
not driven by the specification of the spatial weights matrix or the type of
spatial spillover effects (lag versus error).
Level of aggregation
As previously mentioned, one of the major drawbacks of using the adminis-
trative data is that they do not allow us to aggregate flexibly. Nonetheless,
the results presented in the previous section might be sensitive with respect
to the spatial definition of neighborhood. Therefore, we perform a number of
regression analyses where we use the same set of variables in the regression,
but at different levels of aggregation.36 More specifically, we have calculated
the averages and standard deviations of the sizes, shapes, height and dis-
tances of buildings and plots for different levels of aggregation. The levels
of aggregation considered are (1) 100 meter radius, (2) street, (3) 10 nearest
neighbors, and (4) statistical sectors. The results are presented in table 6.
36Since the types of buildings and the year of construction is only known from the ad-
ministrative data, we cannot allow these to vary flexibly and keep using the administrative
data for their respective variables.
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Table 6: Robustness with respect to alternative levels of aggregation
Category Variable 100 meter Street 10 NN LLA
Avg.: Built-on surf. (ln) 0.083*** 0.0642*** 0.0507*** -0.0095
(0.0195) (0.0183) (0.0153) (0.0176)
Shape buildings 0.0204 0.0074 -0.1014* 0.0493
(0.0805) (0.0695) (0.0577) (0.1598)
Height 0.0222*** 0.0209*** 0.0164*** 0.0273***
(0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0044)
Dist. to road 0.0068*** 0.0056*** 0.0048*** 0.0054**
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0022)
Plot size (ln) -0.0212* -0.0037 0.0164* 0.0206
(0.0124) (0.0115) (0.0096) (0.02)
Shape plots -0.1253*** -0.0749** -0.0453 -0.1476**
(0.0385) (0.0348) (0.0301) (0.0701)
Year of construction 0.0005** 0.0005* 0.0005** 0.0005
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
St. dev.: Built-on surf. (ln) -0.0197*** -0.0104* 0.0006 -0.0107*
(0.0061) (0.0057) (0.005) (0.0059)
Shape buildings -0.1529** -0.1146* -0.0768 -0.0263
(0.0766) (0.0668) (0.0597) (0.1315)
Height 0.0026 -0.0028 0.0022 0.0065
(0.004) (0.0038) (0.0032) (0.0062)
Dist. to road -0.0026*** -0.0024** -0.0024** -0.0014
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Plot size (ln) -0.0031 -0.0071 -0.0156*** 0.0013
(0.0056) (0.0051) (0.0047) (0.0076)
Shape plots 0.0376 -0.0464 0.0406* 0.1247**
(0.0271) (0.0387) (0.023) (0.0511)
D: Buildings -0.0106 -0.0091 -0.0197 -0.0322
(0.0207) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0227)
Year of construction -0.0237 -0.009 -0.0233 -0.0429
(0.0327) (0.0327) (0.0326) (0.0337)
Diagnostics: ρ 0.2409*** 0.2504*** 0.2541*** 0.2465***
(0.0312) (0.031) (0.0312) (0.0312)
Obs. 4,276 4,270 4,222 4,281
R-sq. 0.857 0.858 0.858 0.855
Mun. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01,
respectively. Besides the reported coefficients, all the regression analyses presented furthermore include
an extensive list of property- and neighborhood characteristics that is equivalent to those presented in
table B.1 in appendix B.
The results presented in the different columns of table 6 are fairly similar,
which suggests that the results presented earlier are robust with respect to
the level of aggregation considered. Note that R2 is lower for all specifica-
tions compared to the base model presented in column (5) of table 4. It
is likely that this is due to the fact that we no longer take into account
the average size of- and heterogeneity in interior space, but use the built-
on surface which is available for all levels of aggregation in the geospatial
data, as its proxy. Note furthermore that the number of statistically signifi-
cant coefficients and the R2 are higher in the first three specifications. This
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seems to suggest that buyers especially take into account the characteristics
of neighboring properties at low levels of aggregation. This is, for example,
consistent with the findings of Ahlfeldt & Mastro (2012), who show that the
spillover effects of neighboring dwellings designed by the famous architect
Frank Lloyd Wright (steeply) decay with distance.
Relative size effects
We also estimate a model where we allow for relative size effects instead of
absolute size effects. It is, however, intuitive that both are highly correlated
since an increase in the own size of the property implies a decrease in its
relative size when holding the size of neighboring properties constant. In
constructing the relative size measures we follow Turnbull et al. (2006) and
allow for asymmetric size effects and potential non-linearities.37 We then re-
estimate the baseline model with dummy variables for the municipalities38,
but use relative size measures for the interior space, plot size and the year of
construction. The model is again estimated using a spatial error model and
the 10 nearest neighbors spatial weights matrix. The results are presented
in table 7 and figure 2.
37More specifically, we first construct standardized measures of “relative size” in the
following way: k˜Ji = (ki − Σj∈Jkj)/Σj∈Jkj , where k, i and j denote the characteristic,
property and neighborhood, respectively. We subsequently construct the variables k :
smaller and k : larger. k : smaller is equal to its absolute value whenever the relative
size measure k is smaller than zero. k : larger is equal to its absolute value whenever
the relative size measure for k is larger than zero. In a final step, we also calculate their
respective squared values.
38As a robustness check, we have also estimated a model without dummy variables for
the municipalities and the results are very similar.
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Table 7: Relative size effects
Variable (1) Variable (1)
Int.: larger -0.268*** Plot: smaller sq. -0.1622***
(0.0354) (0.0529)
Int.: larger sq. 0.0916*** YoC: larger -1.0492
(0.0193) (1.0523)
Int.: smaller 0.3255*** YoC: larger sq. 58.8539*
(0.0553) (30.0319)
Int.: smaller sq. 0.1283 YoC: smaller 1.2622
(0.102) (1.5393)
Plot: larger 0.0441*** YoC: smaller sq. -105.4014
(0.0163) (101.7703)
Plot: larger sq. -0.0098*** ρ 0.214***
(0.0036) (0.0318)
Plot: smaller 0.0574 Obs. 4,276
(0.0351) R-sq. 0.861
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01,
respectively. Besides the reported coefficients, all the regression analyses presented furthermore include
an extensive list of property- and neighborhood characteristics that is equivalent to those presented in
table B.1 in appendix B. We additionally control for municipality fixed effects.
Figure 2: Relative size effects
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Note: the dashed lines represent the 95% confidence intervals.
Although the reported regression coefficients are now somewhat harder to
interpret, the relationships presented in figure 2 show that there is a positive
effect of being located in the presence of relatively larger dwellings and a
negative effect associated with relatively larger plots, which is consistent
with earlier findings. Note however that we no longer find a significant
effect for the relative year of construction.
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Heterogeneity in valuations
In all the analyses carried out so far, we did not allow for interactions be-
tween the degree of atypicality of the property and the degree of heterogene-
ity at the neighborhood level. It could however be the case that atypical
properties are valued differently in homogeneous and heterogeneous neigh-
borhoods. In the current section, we therefore extend the analyses presented
previously by allowing for several interaction effects. More specifically, we
augment the (spatial) hedonic model with the following variables:
Abs. dev. ki,j = |ki,j − k¯j
k¯j
| (III.4)
and:
Int. ki,j = Abs. dev. ki,j ∗Dk,j (III.5)
where j denotes the neighborhood property i is located in, and k and D
denote the characteristic and Simpson (1949)’s D, respectively. The first
variable simply denotes the absolute percentage deviation of characteristic
k for property i with respect to its neighborhood (denoted by j) average.
When the estimated coefficient is positive (negative), this suggests that more
atypical properties are more (less) expensive. The second variable captures
whether properties that have a more atypical value of characteristic k are val-
ued more (less) in neighborhoods that are characterized by a higher (lower)
level of diversity in characteristic k. The results from the regression analysis
are presented in table 8.
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Table 8: Heterogeneous valuations
Variable k βˆ σˆ
Dev. Building type 0.0098 (0.0305)
Year of constr. -0.01 (0.0855)
Living area 0.0794 (0.0721)
Plot size -0.0513** (0.0225)
Int.: Building type -0.0805 (0.0523)
Year of constr. -0.0125 (0.1068)
Living area -0.1039 (0.1277)
Plot size 0.0796** (0.0337)
Diagnostics: ρ 0.2137*** (0.0321)
Obs. 4,276
R-sq. 0.861
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01,
respectively. Besides the reported coefficients, all the regression analyses presented furthermore include
an extensive list of property- and neighborhood characteristics that is equivalent to those presented in
table B.1 in appendix B. We additionally control for municipality fixed effects. The results of the “average
effects” and “diversity effects” are reported in table B.6 in appendix B. The deviation for the building
type was calculated as 1 minus the share of the building type of property i.
The results presented in table 8 reveal that there is little evidence for het-
erogeneous valuations. We only observe that properties that have a more
atypical plot size are valued negatively. Notice, however, that the magni-
tude of this effect decreases whenever the neighborhood is characterized by
a higher degree of heterogeneity in plot sizes.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we started from the observation that although housing economists
have frequently viewed houses as “bundles of characteristics” and used prop-
erty attributes to explain sales prices, it has been far less common to view
neighborhoods as “bundles of properties” and include the characteristics of
neighboring properties in traditional hedonic regression analysis. Neverthe-
less, research has shown that beauty and aesthetic characteristics can have
a significant effect on perceived community satisfaction and property values.
While a large number of studies has explicitly focused on (positive) spillover
effects of certain well-defined (historic) landmark buildings, we focus more
generally on the composition of the housing stock at the neighborhood level
in this paper. More specifically, we investigate whether the average values
for- and diversity measures of certain objectively measurable characteris-
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tics, such as type, age, size and shape at the neighborhood level influence
home values. Therefore, we augment a large and detailed dataset of indi-
vidual transactions with administrative and geospatial data concerning the
housing stock at the neighborhood level for the Flemish part of the Brussels
Metropolitan Area for the period 2003-2015. The results of a (spatial) hedo-
nic model indicate that the price of an observationally equivalent property is
increasing in the average size, year of construction, roof height and distance
to the road of neighboring properties, but decreases in the average size and
shape of plots. Our finding that the price of a property is increasing in
the average size of neighboring properties provides supporting evidence for
the tax capitalization hypothesis of Hamilton (1976), who argues that rela-
tively smaller houses benefit from the presence of larger houses. The results
presented for the diversity measures reveal that home values are higher in
neighborhoods that are characterized by low levels of diversity in (1) the
types of buildings, (2) the year of construction, (3) the living area, (4) the
shapes of buildings, and (5) distance to the road. Our findings indicate that
differences in the housing stock composition at the neighborhood level can
lead to price differentials as large as 12% across neighborhoods for an equiv-
alent property.
While the results presented are just a single example of the use of “Big
Data” in modern day econometrics, it is also intuitive that the results pre-
sented have important and potentially far-reaching consequences for policy
makers, real estate professionals, and urban planners. We, for example, find
that an equivalent property is worth 0.8% more in a neighborhood where
the average property is 10 years younger, which suggests that the physical
deterioration of neighboring properties has an impact upon the price/value
of the property that is up for sale. This consequently implies that renova-
tion subsidies for the exterior might not only have an impact upon the value
and quality of renovated properties but also have spillover effects on the
values of neighboring properties that should be taken into account in their
cost-benefit analysis. Our results also provide backing for the often-heard
realtor’s advice to buy a small house in a neighborhood that is dominated by
larger houses. The current paper also shows that data concerning neighbor-
ing properties that is becoming ever more available in the form of geospatial
data can be used to improve mass appraisal systems.
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A Appendix A: Overview of the data
A.1 Transaction data
Table A.1: Overview of the variables in the transaction data
Variable Description
Transaction price Sales price (in euro)
Date of sale
Location x- and y-coordinates
Type of construction (Semi-)detached vs. terraced housing
Year of construction
Living surface (in sq. m.)
Plot size (in sq. m.)
Number of bedrooms
Number of garages
State of property Ready to move in, luxuriously finished
Heating type Central heating
Heating material Gas, wood, electricity,..
Heating elements Radiators, underfloor heating,..
Hot water Condensing boiler,..
Glazing Single, double, triple,..
Basement Storage room, wine cellar,..
Bathroom Two/multiple bathrooms, bathtub,..
Kitchen Well-maintained, luxuriously finished, dishwasher,..
Various Fireplace, alarm, airconditioning,..
Table A.2: Moran’s I statistics for different variables
Variable I z
Sales price (in e) 0.267808*** 59.271943
Living area (in sq. m.) 0.085973*** 19.051213
Plot size (in sq. m.) 0.166771*** 36.998163
# Bedrooms 0.051255*** 11.370069
# Garages 0.147593*** 32.675321
Year of construction 0.101192*** 22.415327
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A.2 Administrative data housing stock composition
Table A.3: Overview structural characteristics and their respective threshold
values (January 1, 2011, source: General Administration of Patrimonial
Documentation (GAPD))
Characteristic (l) Threshold values # of classes
# Buildings integer, 0-max. infinite
# Residences integer, 0-max. infinite
Year of construction 1899, 1918, 1945, 1961, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 9
Living area (in sq. M.) 44, 64, 104, 184, 344 and 664 7
Plot size (in sq. M.) 44, 64, 104, 184, 344, 664, 1304, 2584, 5144 and 10264 11
Built-up area (in sq. M.) 44, 64, 104 and 184 5
# Floors 1, 3 and 5 4
Cadastral revenue (in e) 499, 744, 999, 1499 and 2499 6
Note: the threshold categories indicate that the value for the respective variable has to be smaller than
or equal to the threshold value. Mention that no lower and upper bounds are mentioned, although there
are obviously are certainly lower bounds for almost all variables (e.g. areas, # of floors and cadastral
revenue cannot be smaller than zero).
Table A.4: Correlation statistics housing stock diversity measures
variable Measure COV D Max
Building types COV
D 1 -0.958
MAX -0.958 1
Living area COV 1 0.815 -0.656
D 0.815 1 -0.919
MAX -0.656 -0.919 1
Plot size COV 1 0.872 -0.867
D 0.872 1 -0.969
MAX -0.867 -0.969 1
Year of constr. COV 1 0.594 -0.567
D 0.594 1 -0.95
MAX -0.567 -0.95 1
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Table A.5: Property characteristics own property vs. property characteristics
neighboring properties
(kij − k¯j) |kij − k¯j |
Variable Obs. Corr. Avg. St. Dev. Avg. St. Dev.
Living area 6,450 0.257 0.355 70.492 51.771 47.839
Plot size 6,450 0.413 221.547 990.463 437.926 915.586
Year of constr. 5,489 0.373 6.472 20.944 16.506 14.424
Figure A.1: Simpson’s diversity index D for (a) year of construction, (b)
living area and (c) plot size
(a) Year of construction
(b) Living area
(c) Plot size
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A.3 GIS-data
Description of the data
In this paper, we use information from a large bundle of shapefiles39 that
were provided by the Flemish Geographical Information Agency (FGIA)40.
We use information from five main databases:
1. Central Reference Address Database (CRAD):
The CRAD contains the street names, house numbers and informa-
tion about the geographical positioning of approximately 3.4 million
Flemish addresses. The data are available as a point shapefile in the
coordinate reference system (CRS) Lambert 72 (EPSG: 31370).
2. Large-Scale Reference Database (3D-version, LRD-3D):
The LRD-3D is an object oriented reference map of Flanders with
precise and current information on buildings, administrative parcels,
roads (and their lay-out), watercourses, railways and works of art. The
database contains several polygon shapefiles in the CRS Lambert 72
(EPSG: 31370). We focused our attention towards information on the
approximately 4.9 million buildings in Flanders. For each building, we
know its exact location and lay-out, surface, perimeter, and maximum
roof height.
3. Cadastral parcelling plans (CPP):
The CPP is an object oriented reference map of the properties as they
are know by the cadastre. The data are available as a polygon shapefile
in the CRS Lambert 72 (EPSG: 31370) and contain information on
the location, lay-out, surface and perimeter of the approximately 4.7
million Flemish administrative parcels.
4. Mid-scale Reference Database Roads (MRD-Roads):
The MRD-Roads is a mid-scale reference database of the roads in
Flanders. It contains the location and lay-out of all Flemish roads
together with their matching attribute data. The data are available
as a polygon shapefile in the CRS Lambert 72 (EPSG: 31370).
39The shapefile is a popular geospatial vector data format for geographic information
system (GIS) software and was/is developed by Esri as a (mostly) open specification for
data interoperability among Esri and other GIS software product.
40The Flemish Geographical Information Agency was founded in 2006 and is respon-
sible for provision of (Flemish) geographical data to government agencies, businesses and
citizens.
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5. Points of interest (POIs):
the POI database contains the exact location of various POIs, such as
bus stops, train station, highway entries/exits, grocery stores, shop-
ping centers, schools, town halls, and so on. The data are available as
a point shapefile in the CRS Lambert 72 (EPSG: 31370).
A geographical overview of the different databases is presented in figure A.2.
Figure A.2: Visual representation databases Flemish Geographical Informa-
tion Agency (FGIA)
Source maps: FGIA
Managing the data
In a first step, we merge the transaction data (≈ 6.450 transactions) with the
data from the Central Reference Address Database. For 6.405 transactions
we were able to merge the address contained in the transaction database to
the address information in the CRAB.
In a second step, the different spatial databases provided by the FGIA are
merged using the appropriate spatial join procedures in ArcGIS. Firstly, the
CRAD is merged with the administrative parcels. Secondly, the centroids
of the buildings in the LRD-3D are spatially joined to the administrative
parcels. By calculating the distance between the facade points of the differ-
ent buildings to the different road segments in the MRD-Roads database,
we can also determine the minimum distance to the road for every build-
ing in Flanders. Since the attribute data in the MRD-Roads also contains
information on the type of road, we also know the type of road for every
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building in Flanders. Using the location information on various amenities
(bus stops, train stations, highway entries/exits, grocery stores, shopping
centers, and so on) we can furthermore calculate the (crow-fly) distance to
these amenities and the number within a certain radius. To summarize, for
every address in Flanders, we know (1) the surface (in m2) and perimeter
(in m) of the administrative parcel on which it is located, (2) the type (main
building versus outhouse), surface (in m2), perimeter (in m), maximum roof
height (in m) and minimum distance to the road (in m) for every that is
located on that administrative parcel and (3) the type of road (highway,
primary, secondary, tertiary, residential) along which the address is located.
In a third step, we calculate some additional variables that provide informa-
tion concerning the shape of the building/parcel using its respective surface
and perimeter. The following shape measure is employed:
Shape =
Perimeter (in m)/Surface (in m2)
4/
√
Surface (in m2)
(III.6)
where the numerator represents a normalization, since the denominator for
an equally shaped parcel/building is increasing in its surface. For a perfectly
square plot/building, this ratio reduces to (4s/s2)/(4/s) = 1, where s is the
side of the object. The shape variable increases when the plot/building is
more elongated and/or irregularly shaped.
Descriptive statistics
Table A.6: Descriptive statistics properties using GIS-data
Variable Obs. Avg. St. Dev. P5 P95
Plot size (in sq. m.) 5,668 653.7 794.5 96.57 1,876
Perimeter plot (in m.) 5,668 116.8 80.93 46.6 231.4
Shape plot 5,668 1.27 0.26 1.008 1.757
# Buildings 5,668 1.582 0.864 1 3
Total built up area (in sq. m.) 5,668 146.8 99.3 63.1 284
Avg. shape main building 5,668 1.155 0.143 1.008 1.445
Max. height main building 5,668 8.872 2.058 5.48 11.89
Min. dist. to road 5,668 4.68 7.11 0 12.91
Perc. built upon 5,668 0.355 0.298 0.085 0.974
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Table A.7: Descriptive statistics neighboring properties constructed from
geospatial data (street)
Type Char. Statistic Obs. Avg. St. Dev. P5 P95
Building Dist. to road Avg. 6,041 5.149 5.467 0 12.01
St. dev. 6,006 3.742 4.126 0 11.11
Height Avg. 6,041 8.846 1.535 6.607 11.36
St. dev. 6,006 1.494 0.668 0.531 2.575
Number Obs. 6,041 20.44 12.5 5 45
Perimeter Avg. 6,041 52.65 10.97 38.25 70.14
St. dev. 6,006 15.47 13.61 4.467 38.36
Shape Avg. 6,041 1.153 0.073 1.052 1.278
St. dev. 6,006 0.119 0.06 0.035 0.22
Surface Avg. 6,041 139.7 67.28 78.5 220.7
St. dev. 6,006 77.7 130.9 15.97 227.7
Plot Number Obs. 6,041 19.91 11.98 5 43
Perimeter Avg. 6,041 119.7 41.77 69.07 187.2
St. dev. 6,011 43.75 34.47 8.671 93.55
Shape Avg. 6,041 1.257 0.142 1.058 1.505
St. dev. 6,011 0.177 0.099 0.039 0.352
Surface Avg. 6,041 718.6 684.4 191.5 1,593
St. dev. 6,011 501.3 596.3 69.4 1,402
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Table A.8: Descriptive statistics neighboring properties constructed from
geospatial data (10 nearest neighbors)
Type Char. Statistic Obs. Avg. St. Dev. P5 P95
Building Dist. to road Avg. 6,107 4.743 4.478 0 11.47
St. dev. 6,100 3.1 3.818 0 9.914
Height Avg. 6,107 8.839 1.587 6.571 11.47
St. dev. 6,100 1.422 0.756 0.312 2.741
Number Obs. 6,107 9.197 1.947 6 12
Perimeter Avg. 6,107 50.96 10.3 36.61 67.97
St. dev. 6,100 12.98 10.4 3.502 30.89
Shape Avg. 6,107 1.15 0.079 1.046 1.297
St. dev. 6,100 0.111 0.062 0.029 0.223
Surface Avg. 6,107 129.4 50.96 71.84 207.4
St. dev. 6,100 56.06 75.01 11.42 150.5
Plot Number Obs. 6,109 11 0 11 11
Perimeter Avg. 6,109 111.7 38.65 59.05 184.1
St. dev. 6,109 43.27 38.88 7.384 99.13
Shape Avg. 6,109 1.27 0.149 1.076 1.549
St. dev. 6,109 0.205 0.143 0.05 0.445
Surface Avg. 6,109 622.9 467.7 145.5 1,558
St. dev. 6,109 450.5 565.1 48.57 1,473
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Table A.9: Descriptive statistics neighboring properties constructed from
geospatial data (statistical sectors)
Type Char. Statistic Obs. Avg. St. Dev. P5 P95
Building Dist. to road Avg. 6,273 5.909 3.625 1.04 12.81
St. dev. 6,273 7.982 5.845 2.893 18.99
Height Avg. 6,273 8.742 1.188 7.227 10.84
St. dev. 6,273 2.055 0.484 1.489 2.872
Number Obs. 6,273 427.8 256.9 100 873
Perimeter Avg. 6,273 54.9 9.903 42.89 67.55
St. dev. 6,273 27.98 20.54 11.6 55.46
Shape Avg. 6,273 1.153 0.047 1.078 1.229
St. dev. 6,273 0.141 0.038 0.081 0.201
Surface Avg. 6,273 165.3 126.1 98.52 240
St. dev. 6,273 252.4 457.1 50.99 645.2
Plot Number Obs. 6,273 661.6 473.6 183 1,560
Perimeter Avg. 6,273 145.5 57.51 81.75 269.8
St. dev. 6,273 100.5 51.16 47.36 201.3
Shape Avg. 6,273 1.279 0.07 1.175 1.405
St. dev. 6,273 0.298 0.073 0.203 0.426
Surface Avg. 6,273 1,326 1,273 299.7 4,274
St. dev. 6,273 2,428 2,962 502.9 7,500
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A.4 Other data
Table A.10: Descriptive statistics data Census 2011 & taxable income statis-
tics (ADS)
Variable Obs. Avg. St. Dev. P5 P95.
Area (in sq. km.) 2,240 1.081 1.536 0.12 3.964
# Inhabitants 2,213 598.5 557.8 33 1,719
Inh./sq. km. 2,213 1,434 1,779 32.46 5,161
% Belgian 2,213 94.21 8.337 77.52 100
% Women 2,213 50.69 5.023 45.87 55.42
% Married 2,213 43.75 8.67 31.05 54.55
% Divorced 2,213 6.785 4.314 2.83 11.23
Avg.: age 2,213 41.97 4.183 36.49 48.2
Max: age 2,213 0.302 0.07 0.245 0.387
D: age 2,213 0.779 0.066 0.738 0.806
St. dev.: age 2,213 21.64 2.252 19.31 23.76
COV: age 2,202 1.938 0.314 1.735 2.202
Avg.: education 2,211 4.204 0.43 3.626 4.946
Max: education 2,211 0.373 0.098 0.28 0.554
D: education 2,211 0.727 0.081 0.617 0.78
% Student 2,213 7.891 3.212 3.704 12.55
% Retired 2,213 1.682 2.426 0 3.627
% Inactive labor m. 2,213 53.56 7.365 45.45 64.75
% Unemployed 2,213 1.682 2.426 0 3.627
# Tax returns 2,212 337.6 323.2 18 991
Avg. tax. inc. 1,975 34,282 6,987 25,193 46,519
Median tax. inc. 2,091 25,573 3,875 19,713 31,840
Interquartile coefficient (IC) 2,091 111.1 24.7 80 152
# Residences 2,212 244.8 238.8 12 730
% Owner-occupied 2,212 78.01 16.71 45.72 95
% Rental 2,212 21.1 16.39 4.348 52.73
Avg.: # rooms 2,211 5.807 0.756 4.621 6.846
Max: # rooms 2,211 0.317 0.104 0.214 0.488
D: # rooms 2,211 0.783 0.095 0.667 0.856
St. dev.: # rooms 2,211 1.44 0.282 1.085 1.85
COV: # rooms 2,192 4.143 1.092 2.674 5.455
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B Appendix B: Regression results
Table B.1: Results baseline model without diversity measures
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and
p < 0.01, respectively.
Table B.2: Baseline results: additional features property retrieved from
geospatial data
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Road: Dist. to road 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0022*** 0.0012** 0.0013**
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Primary -0.0658*** -0.0616*** -0.0639*** -0.0673*** -0.0544***
(0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0119)
Secondary -0.0401*** -0.0357*** -0.0381*** -0.0367*** -0.0384***
(0.0109) (0.011) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0105)
Tertiary -0.0184*** -0.0135** -0.017*** -0.0134** -0.0105*
(0.006) (0.0061) (0.006) (0.0061) (0.0059)
Shape: Building -0.0356** -0.0316* -0.036** -0.0209 -0.0206
(0.0176) (0.0177) (0.0175) (0.0183) (0.018)
Plot -0.0758*** -0.075*** -0.0738*** -0.0621*** -0.0625***
(0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0106) (0.0105)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and
p < 0.01, respectively.
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Figure B.1: Kernel density plots average-, diversity- and total housing stock
composition effects
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Note: all the results were obtained using the kdensity-procedure in Stata 14.
Figure B.2: Kernel density plots average-, diversity- and total housing stock
composition effects (2)
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Note: all the results were obtained using the kdensity-procedure in Stata 14.
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Table B.3: Robustness with respect to alternative measures of diversity
Category Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(avg.) Living area 0.317*** 0.3506*** 0.2781*** 0.2734***
(0.0446) (0.0417) (0.0332) (0.0305)
Plot size -0.0567*** -0.0765*** -0.0209 -0.0328*
(0.0217) (0.0206) (0.0211) (0.0196)
Avg.: Year of construction 0.0012*** 0.0008** 0.001*** 0.0006**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Shape buildings 0.0305 0.0883 0.0306 0.0883
(0.078) (0.0758) (0.0776) (0.0755)
Shape plots -0.1538*** -0.1331*** -0.1521*** -0.1336***
(0.0382) (0.0363) (0.0383) (0.0364)
Height 0.0145*** 0.0165*** 0.0146*** 0.0166***
(0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0027)
Dist. to road 0.0057*** 0.0059*** 0.0058*** 0.006***
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0014)
D: Buildings -0.0693*** -0.0236
(0.0259) (0.0234)
Ln(st. dev.) Living area -0.0461* -0.0796***
(0.0236) (0.0221)
Plot size 0.0354* 0.0381**
(0.02) (0.018)
St. dev.: Year of construction -0.001* -0.0008
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Shape buildings -0.1821** -0.2009*** -0.1838** -0.201***
(0.0761) (0.0734) (0.0758) (0.0732)
Shape plots 0.0556** 0.0388 0.0569** 0.0395
(0.0272) (0.0261) (0.0272) (0.026)
Height -0.0029 -0.0005 -0.0025 -0.0001
(0.004) (0.0038) (0.004) (0.0038)
Dist. to road -0.0019* -0.0027*** -0.0019* -0.0027***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Max: Buildings 0.0613*** 0.0314
(0.0236) (0.0212)
Year of construction 0.063** 0.0425*
(0.0282) (0.0257)
Living area 0.101** 0.1219***
(0.0397) (0.0363)
Plot size -0.0404 -0.069**
(0.0312) (0.028)
Diagnostics: ρ 0.5284*** 0.2119*** 0.5309*** 0.2187***
(0.0194) (0.0323) (0.0192) (0.0317)
Obs. 4,276 4,276 4,276 4,276
R-sq. 0.826 0.86 0.826 0.86
Mun. FE No Yes No Yes
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and
p < 0.01, respectively.
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Table B.4: Robustness with respect to the spatial weights matrix
Category Variable (1) (2) Category Variable (1) (2)
Road: Dist. to road 0.0012** 0.0012** (0.0029) (0.0027)
(0.0006) (0.0006) Dist. to road 0.0058*** 0.006***
Primary -0.0631*** -0.0518*** (0.0015) (0.0014)
(0.0127) (0.0121) D: Buildings -0.0572** -0.0318
Secondary -0.0306*** -0.0353*** (0.0251) (0.0231)
(0.0113) (0.0107) Year of constr. -0.0893** -0.0562
Tertiary -0.0145** -0.0109* (0.0392) (0.0364)
(0.0062) (0.006) Living area -0.0902* -0.173***
Shape: Building -0.0164 -0.0204 (0.0503) (0.047)
(0.0184) (0.018) Plot size 0.0564 0.0856**
Plot -0.0639*** -0.0634*** (0.037) (0.0336)
(0.0108) (0.0105) St. dev.: Shape buildings -0.2002*** -0.213***
Ln(avg.) Living area 0.2677*** 0.274*** (0.0773) (0.0738)
(0.0333) (0.0308) Shape plots 0.047* 0.0374
Plot size -0.0109 -0.0262 (0.0275) (0.0262)
(0.0206) (0.0196) Height -0.0008 0.0007
Avg.: Year of constr. 0.0009** 0.0008** (0.0041) (0.0039)
(0.0003) (0.0003) Dist. to road -0.0015 -0.0026***
Shape buildings 0.009 0.0912 (0.001) (0.001)
(0.079) (0.0762) Diagn.: ρ 0.522*** 0.2461***
Shape plots -0.1433*** -0.132*** (0.0178) (0.0292)
(0.0386) (0.0365) Obs. 4,276 4,276
Height 0.016*** 0.0176*** R-sq. 0.827 0.86
Mun. FE No Yes
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and
p < 0.01, respectively.
124
Chapter III
Housing Prices and Housing Stock Composition:
How Do We Value the Homes of our Neighbors?
Table B.5: SAR model
Category Variable (1) (2) Category Variable (1) (2)
Road: Dist. to road 0.0012* 0.0013** (0.0027) (0.0026)
(0.0006) (0.0006) Dist. to road 0.0053*** 0.0057***
Primary -0.0647*** -0.0513*** (0.0015) (0.0014)
(0.0121) (0.0117) D: Buildings -0.0585*** -0.0312
Secondary -0.03*** -0.0366*** (0.021) (0.0214)
(0.0106) (0.0103) Year of constr. -0.0532 -0.0303
Tertiary -0.012** -0.0093 (0.0356) (0.0347)
(0.006) (0.0058) Living area -0.1054** -0.1778***
Shape: Building -0.0179 -0.02 (0.0434) (0.044)
(0.019) (0.0181) Plot size 0.0917*** 0.089***
Plot -0.0556*** -0.0611*** (0.0305) (0.0309)
(0.0111) (0.0105) St.dev.: Shape buildings -0.2098*** -0.2193***
Ln(avg.) Living area 0.2303*** 0.2494*** (0.0756) (0.0724)
(0.0289) (0.0294) Shape plots 0.0459* 0.0376
Plot size -0.0649*** -0.0479*** (0.0266) (0.0256)
(0.0176) (0.0186) Height -0.0037 -0.0003
Avg.: Year of constr. 0.0013*** 0.0009*** (0.004) (0.0038)
(0.0003) (0.0003) Dist. to road -0.0007 -0.0024**
Shape buildings 0.0106 0.0954 (0.001) (0.001)
(0.0762) (0.0748) Diagn.: ρ 0.002 0.003
Shape plots -0.1104*** -0.1228*** (0.007) (0.0066)
(0.0368) (0.0355) Obs. 4,276 4,276
Height 0.015*** 0.0171*** Mun. FE No Yes
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and
p < 0.01, respectively.
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Table B.6: Average effects and diversity effects under heterogeneous valua-
tions
Variable k βˆ σˆ
Ln(avg.): Living area) 0.2961*** (0.031)
Plot size) -0.0328* (0.0199)
Avg.: Year of construction 0.0007** (0.0003)
Max. roof height 0.0172*** (0.0027)
Dist. to road 0.0062*** (0.0014)
Shape building 0.0932 (0.0757)
Shape plot -0.1288*** (0.0364)
D: Buildings 0.0182 (0.0324)
Year of constr. -0.055 (0.0423)
Living area -0.1536*** (0.0552)
Plot size 0.069* (0.037)
St. dev.: Max. roof height 0.0007 (0.0039)
Shape building -0.2059*** (0.0733)
Dist. to road -0.0026*** (0.001)
Shape plot 0.0422 (0.026)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01,
respectively. Besides the reported coefficients, all the regression analyses presented furthermore include
an extensive list of property- and neighborhood characteristics that is equivalent to those presented in
table B.1 in appendix B. We additionally control for municipality fixed effects.
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1 Introduction
One-to-one matching markets are often characterized by a dual structure.1
On the one hand, there is an industry of intermediaries who guide the match-
ing process between market participants and they usually charge a significant
fee in return for this service. On the other hand, there is an outside market
in which market participants independently search for a trading partner and
incur their own search costs. For example, in real estate markets there is
typically a real estate brokerage industry and a “for-sale-by-owner” market.
In labor markets, firms can utilize the services of a recruitment agency or
can internally organize the process of hiring a new employee. Importantly,
different types of participants in these markets self-select across the different
matching channels. They do so, not only based on their own preferences,
but also based on their expectations about which type of trading partner
they will eventually meet. So, the participation decision of each market
participant entails an externality for the participants on the other side of
1This chapter is based upon joint work with Bert Willekens, Maarten Goos and Erik
Buyst. We would like to thank Liran Einav, Jon Levin, Andras Niedermayer, Glen Weyl,
Jan Rouwendal, Jan Mutl, Frank Verboven, Jo Van Biesebroeck, Patrick Van Cayseele
and seminar and conference participants at the University of Leuven, Stanford University,
Bocconi University (EARIE 2014), University of Alicante (ENHR 2014) and University
of Reading (AREUEA 2014) for useful comments and suggestions.
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the market and it is important to recognize that these externalities might
influence the optimal pricing behavior of the intermediaries. For example,
real estate brokers might have the incentive to charge a relatively high ser-
vice fee to attract only the sellers most eager to sell their property, as these
sellers are the ones buyers prefer to trade with. Or, a recruiter might charge
a high placement fee in order to attract only high-level job vacancies and
candidates.
This paper investigates what the socially optimal size and market struc-
ture is of an industry of private intermediaries, taking into account that the
service fee charged by the intermediaries influences which types of partici-
pants are selected into the intermediary market. It is important to address
this question, given that the incentives of private intermediaries that maxi-
mize profits are not necessarily aligned with those of a social planner. Not
only because the intermediaries might possess market power, which can cer-
tainly be the case due to the informational advantages they inherently have
over the market participants, but also because they might not properly in-
ternalize the externalities present in the market when pricing their services.
To address the issue, a general model of imperfect competition among inter-
mediaries is presented and the private market outcome is compared to the
socially optimal outcome. Subsequently, the model is empirically applied
to the Belgian real estate brokerage industry which provides an adequate
setting to test our model and for which we have unique data. Real estate is
a particularly interesting application because different types of buyers and
sellers typically decide to hire the services of a real estate broker compared
to those who trade in the for-sale-by-owner market.2
In the model, interactions among market participants - referred to as buyers
and sellers - and the intermediaries that operate in the market - referred to
as brokers - occur in four stages.3 In the first stage, brokers can freely enter
the market as long as they expect it is profitable to do so. In the second
stage, the brokers that entered the market imperfectly compete to attract
buyers and sellers by announcing their service fee charged to either buyers or
2Hendel, Nevo and Ortalo-Magne´ (2009), for example, provide evidence that less
patient sellers and more patient buyers (to avoid patient sellers) tend to trade in the
brokerage market compared to those who trade in the for-sale-by-owner market.
3Equivalently, for a labor market one can think of the sellers as workers, of the buyers
as firms and of the brokers as recruiters. The price of the traded “good” is then the wage
of the worker.
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sellers. The service fee possibly consists of a flat fee and a fee proportional
to the price of the traded good and is only paid conditional on a successful
transaction. In the third stage, buyers and sellers enter the intermediary
market when their expected utility of participating is greater than when
participating through the outside market. In the final stage, buyers and
sellers that participate in the intermediary market are randomly assigned
to one another and the sales price of the traded good is determined by a
Nash bargain between the buyer and the seller. The assumptions in the fi-
nal stage are imposed to capture the intuition that market participants care
about the characteristics of their trading partner - the price a seller receives
and a buyer pays depends on the reservation value of their trading part-
ner - and that due to information imperfections there is uncertainty about
which trading partner they will meet when deciding on market participation.
A first important result derived from this setting is that a social planner
always charges an intermediary service fee above the per-match cost of serv-
ing buyers and sellers. The planner internalizes the externality that buyers
dislike high reservation price sellers and sellers dislike low valuation buyers,
which are excluded from the intermediary market by charging a relatively
high service fee. It follows that some market power attributed to intermedi-
aries is justified when they compete in a private market. The monopoly (or
collusive) service fee, however, always exceeds the socially optimal fee. So,
there exists an inverse u-shaped relationship between private broker mar-
ket power and social value created by the intermediary industry. A second
finding is that the private market outcome is generally characterized by an
excessive number of intermediaries that operate in the market compared to
what is socially optimal. That is, when a novel entrant steals business from
incumbent brokers, valuable resources are wasted by brokers inefficiently
competing to realize the same number of transactions that could also be
established with fewer brokers operating in the market. Furthermore, this
entry distortion is more severe when brokers possess more market power in
pricing their services. So, combined with the result that some broker mar-
ket power is justified to properly internalize the participation externalities
of buyers and sellers, the model has nonstandard policy implications.4
4Note that it is important to also account for the entry distortion on top of the
distortion in the service fee, as there are typically little barriers for novel intermediaries
to enter and operate in matching markets. Hsieh and Moretti (2003) and Barwick and
Pathak (2015), for example, provide evidence that the entry distortion is quantitatively
important in the US real estate brokerage industry.
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In comparison to the private free entry equilibrium, the welfare effects are
derived when a social planner optimally regulates broker service fees, broker
entry or both. When regulating both, all market distortions can be elimi-
nated by setting the service fee such that the participation externalities of
buyers and sellers are properly internalized and by minimizing the number
of brokers that operate in the market. However, the welfare gains and redis-
tributive effects of only regulating either broker service fees or broker entry
are ambiguous. They depend on the underlying parameters of seller supply
and buyer demand and the structure of broker costs. The model outcomes
are therefore further illustrated for realistic calibrated parameter values us-
ing data from the Belgian real estate brokerage industry.5
The empirical results suggest that the observed average commission rate
of 4.3% charged by brokers is below the socially optimal commission rate,
which ranges from 5.1% to 24% for the estimated range of feasible values
for the parameters of seller supply and buyer demand. This implies that
the externalities present in the market are insufficiently internalized and it
would be welfare improving to exclude more buyers and sellers. For the
most inelastic bound on estimated supply and demand elasticities, the wel-
fare counterfactuals suggest that a welfare gain of 19% could be established
when regulating both service fees and market entry of brokers. The outcome
of a social planner that regulates broker entry and allows brokers to privately
compete in pricing their services is calculated to generate a welfare gain of
18%, while regulating service fees and allowing for free broker entry only
implies a welfare gain of 5%. For the most elastic bound on the supply and
demand elasticities, however, regulating both service fees and entry implies
a welfare gain of 71%, only regulating entry results in a gain of 40% and
only regulating service fees in a gain of 52%. These results suggest that
it is more effective to regulate broker entry for relatively inelastic and to
regulate service fees for relatively elastic supply and demand, respectively.
It should also be noted, however, that all the welfare gains are gains in con-
5The institutional setting of the Belgian real estate market is particularly interesting
to apply the model because there are no significant barriers for new brokers to enter the
market and there are no institutional restrictions for brokers to compete in pricing their
services. It is therefore sensible to construct welfare counterfactuals in which both the
pricing and entry behavior of brokers is affected by policy interventions. This contrasts
with the US, for example, where commission rates charged by real estate brokers typically
show little variation, which suggests a lack of competition among brokers in pricing their
services (e.g. Hsieh and Moretti 2003).
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sumer surplus attributed to buyers and sellers when regulating service fees,
while regulating broker entry implies a loss in consumer surplus, which is
compensated by a gain in broker profits.
In the literature, there is an extensive strand of research that investigates the
role of intermediaries to facilitate market transactions - see, for example, Ru-
binstein and Wolinsky (1987), Biglaiser (1993) and Yavas (1994) for seminal
contributions. Spulber (1999) provides a unified perspective on the different
views on firm intermediation in the early literature, in which intermediaries
usually play the role of market clearing entities and the externalities induced
by the participation decision of different buyer and seller types emphasized
here play no role. More recently, Niedermayer and Shneyerov (2014) and
Loertscher and Niedermayer (2015) explore how an optimal market clearing
mechanism can be implemented by intermediaries that charge a service fee
instead of directly setting bid-ask spreads.
Evaluating the optimal pricing behavior of platform businesses in the pres-
ence externalities across different groups of market participants has been the
topic of interest in the so-called two-sided markets literature - e.g. Rochet
and Tirole (2003), Armstrong (2006) and Weyl (2010). In this literature it
is typically assumed, however, that only the size and not the composition
of one group of market participants affects utility of another group. In our
setting, it is precisely the changed composition of user types when more or
less buyers and sellers participate in the intermediary market that drives the
results. Damiano and Li (2007, 2008) analyze a similar composition effect.
Although their setup is quite different from ours - e.g. they allow for com-
plementarities in the match value function and analyze duopoly competition
among endogenously differentiated platforms - Damiano and Li (2008) es-
tablish a similar result that the market outcome under duopoly can be less
efficient than the monopoly outcome. The basic intuition for this result is
the same as in our setting. Since market participants care about the quality
of their trading partner, it can be socially efficient to exclude some partici-
pants from the market.6
Our work also relates to recent research on competition among service providers
in markets where consumer selection plays an important role, like insurance
6Gomes and Pavan (2015) build on Damiano and Li (2007) to investigate optimal
matching mechanisms in many-to-many matching settings.
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and credit markets - e.g. Einav and Finkelstein (2011), Veiga and Weyl
(2015) and Mahoney and Weyl (2015). In particular, Mahoney and Weyl
(2015) demonstrate that an inverse u-shaped relationship exists between
competition and welfare in markets characterized by advantageous selection.
The matching markets we study can also be interpreted as being character-
ized by advantageous selection in the sense that buyers and sellers with a
high willingness to pay for the brokerage service are assumed to be the ones
that bring most value to the market through the Nash bargain. The cru-
cial difference with insurance or credit markets, however, is that consumer
selection does not directly affect the cost function of the service providers,
but instead manifests through an externality across the market: buyers care
which sellers are selected into the intermediary market and vice versa. This,
in turn, affects the revenue function of the intermediaries.
Finally, there is vast body of research that investigates the inefficiencies
in the US real estate brokerage industry that can be attributed to a lack
of price competition among brokers. Seminal theoretical contributions that
point out conditions under which fixed commission rates can be socially
harmful are Yinger (1981), Crockett (1982) and Miceli (1992). Hsieh and
Moretti (2003) provide supporting empirical evidence of significant social
waste in the US brokerage industry due to excessive broker entry. Other
recent contributions that structurally aim to quantify the entry distortions
are Han and Hong (2011) and Barwick and Pathak (2015).7 In the present
paper, the entry distortion is evaluated when brokers do compete in pricing
their services. It is particularly relevant to address this question today, given
that the adoption of new information technologies seems to have intensified
price competition among intermediaries, not only in real estate brokerage
(e.g. USDOJ and FTC report 2007), but also for many other intermediate
service providers, like travel agencies and stock brokers, as pointed out by
Levitt and Syverson (2008a).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the theoretical model and results. Section 3 proposes the methodology to
empirically implement the model. Section 4 describes the data and the in-
7In addition, there are several papers that investigate the question whether fixed
commission rates could be the result of a competitive market outcome or are more likely
to arise from (tacit) collusion among brokers, usually from a principle-agent perspective.
Examples are Carroll (1989), Anglin and Arnott (1999), Yavas (2001), Miceli, Pancak
and Sirmans (2007), Levitt and Syverson (2008a) and Fisher and Yavas (2010).
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stitutional setting of the Belgian real estate brokerage industry. Section 5
presents the results for the model calibration and welfare counterfactuals.
The final section concludes.
2 Model
Consider a four-stage static model of symmetric imperfect competition among
brokers who offer a service of matching buyers and sellers in a market for a
homogeneous good. The implications of allowing for heterogeneous product
characteristics are discussed in the next section when the methodology to
implement the model empirically is introduced. The timing of the model
can be summarized as follows:
• Stage 1: N brokers (out of a potentially infinite amount) enter the
market.
• Stage 2: Participating brokers simultaneously announce the fees charged
to sellers and buyers in return for their service.
• Stage 3: NS sellers and NB buyers (out of a potential mass S enter
the market through one of the brokers.
• Stage 4: M real estate transactions occur through the brokerage in-
dustry and the broker service fees are paid.
Assume that brokers, sellers and buyers are risk-neutral and that sellers and
buyers have unit supply and demand, respectively. Sellers are heterogeneous
in their reservation value of providing the good to the market through one of
the brokers, denoted by s and assumed smoothly distributed by F S(.) with
density fS(.) on [sL, sH ] with sH > sL. One can think of s as the reservation
price of selling the good either through the brokerage market or the outside
market (for-sale-by owner) net of the gain (or loss) due to decreased (in-
creased) search costs when hiring a broker. So, sellers with a low value of s
are the ones who gain relatively most from the brokerage service. Similarly,
buyers are heterogeneous in their valuation of purchasing the good through
the brokerage market, denoted by b and assumed smoothly distributed by
FB(.) with density fB(.) on [bL, bH ] with bH > bL. One can again think of
b as the reservation value for the good added by the gain (or loss) in search
costs when purchasing through one of the brokers compared to searching
for the good through the outside market. Buyers with a high value of b
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are thus the ones that gain relatively most from the brokerage service. The
outside option of not participating in the market through one of the brokers
(that is, the expected payoff of participating through the outside market) is
normalized to zero for both sellers and buyers.
Assume that the distributions of seller reservation values and buyer valu-
ations for the good are public information. Individual seller and buyers
types, however, are ex ante private information, when sellers and buyers de-
cide upon market participation (stage 3), and they become revealed ex post
once a buyer is matched to a seller (stage 4).8 The remainder of this sec-
tion recursively specifies the occurrence of events and reports the resulting
outcomes for each stage of the model.
2.1 Individual transaction valuations (stage 4)
When sellers participate in the market by hiring a broker they are charged a
fee that only has to be paid conditional on the good being sold by the hired
broker. The fee possibly consists of a flat component T and a percentage fee
t charged proportional to the sales price of the property, p. The individual
transaction value of a seller type s can hence be written as:
(1− t)p− s− T (IV.1)
where p denotes the transaction price. Buyers are not directly charged for
the broker service and the individual transaction value of buyer type b can
therefore be written as:
b− p (IV.2)
The fee charged to the seller, however, can (partially) be passed through
in the bargain over the sales price between the buyer and the seller. More
8Note that the good traded in the market is implicitly assumed to be homogeneous.
In practice, goods traded in one-to-one matching markets such as housing units or jobs of
course consist of many attributes for which buyers and sellers might have heterogeneous
valuations. For now, one can think of the model as being applicable to a market for
a single good (with possibly multiple characteristics) for which buyers and sellers have
heterogeneous preferences. Issues concerning aggregation to a market with many multi-
characteristic goods are further discussed in sections 4 and 5 when the model is applied
to the case of real estate brokerage.
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specifically, assume the transaction price is chosen to maximize an asym-
metric Nash bargain:
maxp(b− p)(1−β)((1− t)p− s− T )β (IV.3)
where β ∈ [0, 1] denotes the bargaining weight of sellers and 1 − β is the
bargaining weight of buyers.9 This yields the following expression for the
transaction price:
p(b, s) = βb+ (1− β)T + s
1− t (IV.4)
Nash bargaining implies that the transaction price is match-specific and de-
pends on the valuations of the buyer and the reservation price of the seller
that are being matched. The homogeneous real estate good is therefore
allowed to be sold at dispersed prices, rather than being determined by a
competitive market clearing mechanism, which would imply a single market
price. This is consistent with the arguments of Stigler (1961) that price dis-
persion is inherent to markets with imperfect information and costly search,
of which matching markets are a primary example.1011
2.2 Buyer and seller participation (stage 3)
Assume that the service offered by brokers is perceived as differentiated
across buyers and sellers, for example, by different locations of the brokers.
Service differentiation is restricted, however, by the assumption that in equi-
librium a symmetric and representative set of buyers and sellers is attracted
by each broker. Market supply of sellers is equal to NS = ΣNi=1n
S
i , where
nSi is the number of sellers attracted by broker i, which is assumed to be
9Note that in real estate markets, the broker, rather than the seller, usually bargains
over the transaction price with potential buyers (or buyer-brokers). However, a seller-
broker (buyer-broker) contract typically also explicitly specifies that the broker should
represent the best interest of the seller (buyer) in this process, which is assumed to be
the case here. More generally, this paper ignores any potential principle-agent problems
concerning the seller-broker or buyer-broker relationship, as investigated, for example, by
Rutherford, Springer and Yavas (2005) and Levitt and Syverson (2008b).
10See, for example, Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2007) for a further discussion on the
determinants of price dispersion in markets with imperfect information.
11It should also be noted that the specific assumptions that only sellers are charged
for the brokerage service and that buyers are not directly charged does not drive any of
the results. All the derived results are robust to only buyers being directly charged, or
when both sellers and buyers are charged part of the fee, as formalized in appendix A.1.
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the same across brokers: nS1 = .. = n
S
N = N
S/N ≡ nS. Similarly, mar-
ket demand for buyers is equal to NB = ΣNi=1n
B
i where n
B
i is the number
of buyers attracted by broker i, again assuming symmetry across brokers
nB1 = .. = n
B
N = N
B/N ≡ nB.
Assume, in addition, that the matching technology offered by the bro-
kers is efficient and random. That is, the number of matches established
by every broker is equal to min[nB, nS], the match probability of sellers is
min[nB, nS]/nS ≡ mS and the match probability of buyers is min[nB, nS]/nB ≡
mB. It follows, by broker symmetry, that the equilibrium number of matches
that occur through the brokerage market is equal to M = min[NB, NS]. In
what follows, broker subscripts i are omitted to minimize the notational
burden.
Expected seller and buyer utility of participating through the brokerage
market can be written as:
us = ((1− t)p(b¯, s)− s− T )mS = β((1− t)b¯− s− T )mS (IV.5)
ub = (b− p(b, s¯))mB = (1− β)(b− T + s¯
1− t )m
B (IV.6)
where b¯ denotes the expected buyer valuation for the good and s¯ the expected
seller reservation price, respectively:
b¯ =
S
NB
∫ NB/S
0
(FB)−1(1− x)dx (IV.7)
s¯ =
S
NS
∫ NS/S
0
(F S)−1(x)dx (IV.8)
Sellers participate when uS ≥ 0 ↔ s ≤ (1 − t)b¯ − T ≡ s˜, where s˜ denotes
the reservation price of the marginal seller that participates through the
brokerage market. Similarly, buyers participate when uB ≥ 0↔ b ≥ T+s¯
1−t ≡
b˜, where b˜ denotes the marginal buyer valuation. Market supply of sellers
and buyers can thus be summarized as:
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NS = SF S(s˜) = SF S((1− t)b¯− T ) (IV.9)
NB = S(1− FB(b˜)) = S(1− FB(T + s¯
1− t )) (IV.10)
Expression (IV.9) shows that market supply of sellers depends negatively
on the service fees T and t charged by brokers, as one would expect. In
addition, seller supply depends positively on the expected buyer valuation
b¯. All else equal, when sellers expect that buyers with a higher valuation
participate in the market, more sellers participate because they expect to
receive a higher price for their property. This in turn implies that seller
supply is characterized by a negative externality induced by the participa-
tion decision of buyers. As illustrated by expression (IV.7), the expected
buyer valuation depends negatively on the number of buyers that partici-
pate. This is because the marginal buyer always has a lower valuation for the
good than infra-marginal buyers. Hence, the participation of this marginal
buyer drives down the average valuation of all the buyers that participate
in the market. Expression (IV.10), similarly, shows that market demand
for buyers depends negatively on the service fees. In addition, it is char-
acterized by a negative externality induced by the participation decision of
sellers, through the expected seller reservation price s¯. Low reservation price
sellers enter the market first and hence increased seller participation raises
the sales price buyers expect to pay, which in turn reduces buyer demand.12
Using expressions (IV.9) and (IV.10) and the definitions of s˜ and b˜ allows us
to write the market clearing fees T and t as functions of the marginal and
average preference values of sellers and buyers:
12Note that there is another channel through which externalities can result from the
participation decision of users on either side. As is clear from the expressions (IV.5)
and (IV.6) for expected seller and buyer utilities, respectively, the match probabilities
on both sides, ms = min[NB , NS ]/NS and mb = min[NB , NS ]/NB , also depend on
the participation decision of users on both sides. The assumption that the matching
technology is efficient, however, will imply that profit-maximizing brokers always balance
the market by attracting the same amount of buyers and sellers. This in turn implies that
the match probabilities of both buyers and sellers are equal to 1 in equilibrium and that
these additional externalities play no role. See, Goos, Van Cayseele and Willekens (2014)
for a more general treatment of the implications of matching frictions on the optimal
pricing behavior of platform businesses.
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T =
b˜s˜− b¯s¯
b¯− b˜ (IV.11)
1− t = s˜− s¯
b¯− b˜ (IV.12)
Expressions (IV.11) and (IV.12) can be interpreted as a system of inverse
demand equations, in which b˜ = FB
−1
(1−NB/S) and s˜ = F S−1(NS/S), as
follows from (IV.9) and (IV.10), and b¯ and s¯ are given by expressions (IV.7)
and (IV.8). In what follows, it is assumed that any equilibrium market
allocation NB, NS is uniquely established through the two market clear-
ing values of the pricing instruments T and t that follow from (IV.11) and
(IV.12).1314
2.3 Imperfect broker competition (stage 2)
Broker profits and welfare
Expected broker profits can be written as:
13In other words, it is assumed that brokers can always resolve the coordination prob-
lem they face to attract two distinct user groups in the presence of indirect network
externalities. This coordination problem is well-known from the two-sided markets liter-
ature and various solutions were proposed, for example, by Caillaud and Jullien (2003),
Weyl (2010) and White and Weyl (2015). We do not explicitly address the issue here,
however, given that it is precisely an important part of the “job” of brokers in match-
ing markets to resolve the coordination problem. Brokers can credibly commit to sellers
to search for a buyer to their best effort, given that payments to the broker only occur
when a transaction is actually established. By this logic, the coordination problem is less
of an issue in markets where intermediaries are involved in the trading process between
participants and charge conditional payments compared to the classic two-sided market
examples where the platform has no direct control over the interactions between attracted
user groups, like payment card networks or newspapers.
14Another important concern is that the specification of seller supply and buyer de-
mand implicitly assumes that sellers and buyers cannot reject a match in the final stage
of the model, not even when the ex post realized transaction valuation is negative, which
might be the case for some high reservation price sellers and low valuation buyers. If
they could reject, the expectations about trading partner types, b and s , as currently
presented would not be correctly defined - they would have to be defined conditional on
individual buyer and seller types. One way to address this issue in our static setting is
to assume that there is an opportunity cost for buyers and sellers to participate in the
market while remaining unmatched. Appendix A.2 derives supply and demand including
such a cost and shows that the reduced form specification in the main text is consistent if
this cost is sufficiently large such that the marginal buyer and seller are always willing to
trade. This cost can be interpreted as the direct disutility buyers and sellers experience
when participating in the market while failing to find a trading partner, or as a reduced
form characterization of the discounted search costs participant have to incur to stay in
the market for more than one period in a dynamic setting.
138
Chapter IV
Intermediation in Markets with Buyer and Seller Selection:
Theory and an Application to Real Estate Brokerage
pi = (AR−MC)min[nB, nS]− FC (IV.13)
where MC ≥ 0 denotes a constant per-match cost incurred when matching
buyers and sellers and FC ≥ 0 denotes a fixed cost incurred to operate in
the market by each broker, independent of the number of transactions that
they help carrying out. AR is defined as the expected or average per-match
revenue:
AR ≡ T + tp¯ (IV.14)
in which p¯ ≡ p(b¯, s¯) denotes the expected transaction price of transactions
that occur through the brokerage market, which by the symmetry assump-
tions is the same for all brokers. Using equations (IV.4), (IV.11) and (IV.12),
the average transaction price can be written as:
p¯ = βb¯+ (1− β)b˜ (IV.15)
In addition, using expressions (IV.11), (IV.12) and (IV.15), the average per-
match revenue can be written as a function of marginal and average user
types on both sides of the market:
AR = β(b¯− s˜) + (1− β)(b˜− s¯) (IV.16)
Given that the marginal and average buyer types (b˜ and b¯, respectively)
are strictly decreasing in the number of buyers attracted into the brokerage
market and the marginal and average seller types (s˜ and s¯, respectively)
are strictly increasing in the number of sellers, expression (IV.16) implies
that expected per-match revenue is strictly decreasing in both the number
of buyers and sellers that participate in the market by hiring a broker.
To model symmetric imperfect competition among brokers in providing their
service to the market, we follow the approach of, for example, Bresnahan
(1989) and Weyl and Fabinger (2013) who capture the degree of imperfect
competition by a single “conduct parameter”. To apply the approach to our
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setting, the assumption is made that strategic interactions among brokers
are restricted such that average per-match revenue for individual brokers is
strictly decreasing in the number of users attracted on both sides of the mar-
ket, i.e. dAR/dnI < 0 for I = B, S, which is the equivalent to assuming that
firms face downward sloping individual demand curves. This implies that
individual broker profits, given by expression (IV.13), are strictly decreasing
in the number of users on one side of the market if the attracted number
of users on that side exceeds the number of users attracted on the other
side, i.e. dpi/dnI < 0 if nI > nJ for I 6= J . This in turn implies that any
profit maximizing equilibrium must always be balanced, i.e. nS = nB = n
or, equivalently, NS = NB = M . If not, brokers can always raise profits
by lowering the number of users on the long side of the market. This result
directly follows from the assumption that the matching technology available
to brokers is efficient and it conveniently allows us to convert the problem
of brokers competing to attract users on two distinct sides into a problem
where the brokers compete in a single quantity (n) by using one of the avail-
able pricing instruments (e.g. T ). The other available pricing instrument
(e.g. t) is simply adjusted to ensure the balanced market condition holds
and therefore no longer needs to be considered as a strategic decision vari-
able.
Following Weyl & Fabinger (2013), instead of explicitly modeling the in-
teractions among competing brokers, we assume that in any imperfectly
comptitive equilibrium the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index is set equal to a
conduct parameter θ, which in the model satisfies:
AR−MC
AR
(− dM
dAR
AR
M
) = θ (IV.17)
where θ ∈ [0, 1] when the broker services are substitutes, which is assumed
to be the case. As formalized by Weyl and Fabinger (2013), this frame-
work nests a broad range of imperfect competition models, among which
monopoly or cartel (θ = 1); Bertrand (θ = 0); Cournot (θ = 1/N); Bresna-
han (1989)’s constant conjectural variations model (θ = (1 + R)/N where
dM/dn = 1 + R); and symmetrically differentiated Nash-in-prices and mo-
nopolistic competition (for which θ is not a constant). In our setup, however,
we do not derive explicit conditions for these models, given that none of the
results hinge on the specific underlying model of imperfect competition. The
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only thing that matters here is that any outcome on the continuum between
monopoly and Bertrand is a feasible imperfect competition equilibrium.
To evaluate market efficiency, the private market equilibrium is compared to
the outcome determined by a Pigouvian planner that optimally chooses the
number of sellers NS and buyers NB attracted in the brokerage industry to
maximize total social value, taking the number of brokers that operate in
the market as given. Total social value generated in the market is equal to
the sum of total industry profits Π ≡ piN and total consumer surplus CS,
defined as the sum of total buyer and seller surplus, which can be written
as:
CS = (β(s˜− s¯) + (1− β)(b¯− b˜))min[NB, NS] (IV.18)
By combining expressions (IV.13), (IV.16) ,and (IV.18), total social value
W simplifies to:
W = (b¯− s¯−MC)min[NB, NS]− FC ∗N (IV.19)
Given that b¯− s¯ is strictly decreasing in NB and NS, the Pigouvian planner
always balances the market, i.e. NB = NS = M , because welfare is strictly
decreasing in participation on the long side of the market. This again con-
veniently allows us to simplify the social optimization problem to a problem
with a single decision variable, in this case M .
Private market outcome
Proposition 1 summarizes the private market equilibrium when an exogenous
number N of symmetric real estate agents operate the market. This result
follows from equation NS and NB to M in expression (IV.16) for average
per-match revenue, differentiating with respect to M and substituting the
solution in the imperfect competition equation (IV.17).
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Proposition 1 Optimal private broker behavior implies that the equi-
librium number of matches M established through the brokerage market
satisfies
AR−MC = θ(MS + ET ) (IV.20)
where MS denotes marginal consumer surplus, defined as dCS/dM ,
which can be written as:
MS = β
F S(s˜)
fS(s˜)
+ (1− β)1− F
B(b˜)
fB(b˜)
(IV.21)
and ET refers to an “externality tax”, raised to internalize the cross-
side participation externalities in buyer demand and seller supply,
which can be written as:
ET = β(b¯− b˜) + (1− β)(s˜− s¯) (IV.22)
Expression (IV.20) shows that the mark-up of average per-match revenue
over per-match cost is increasing in the conduct parameter θ, ranging from
zero under Bertrand competition (θ = 0) toMS+ET , which is the monopoly
mark-up (θ = 1). The first term, MS, denotes marginal consumer surplus,
which in a standard monopoly model is equal to the inverse hazard rate (or
semi-elasticity) of demand and coincides with the classic Cournot distortion.
In the present setting, MS is equal to the weighted sum of inverse hazard
rates of seller supply and buyer demand, where the weights are equal to
the bargaining weight of users on these respective sides. This is intuitive:
if one side possesses no bargaining power in determining sales prices, users
on that side capture no surplus from transactions and hence no surplus can
be extracted by brokers from that side, independent of the elasticity of de-
mand or supply. The second term, ET , refers to an externality tax raised
by brokers to internalize the negative cross-side externalities present in the
market. That is, brokers want to avoid attracting too many buyers because
more buyers imply a lower average buyer valuation for the good, which in
turn is disliked by the sellers because they expect to receive a lower price
for their properties. Similarly, too many sellers imply a high average reser-
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vation price of sellers, which is disliked by buyers because they expect to
pay a higher price for the good. To account for this, brokers charge a higher
mark-up than they would without externalities.
From expression (IV.22) it is clear that the magnitude of ET depends on the
spread between average and marginal user types on both sides of the market
or, in other words, on the degree of heterogeneity in user types. When buy-
ers are, for example, homogeneous in their valuation, sellers are indifferent
to which buyer they will be matched and the participation decision of the
marginal buyer causes no externalities. In this case, b¯ = b˜ and the first term
in ET disappears because there is no externality for brokers to internalize on
the buyer side. In contrast, when dispersion in buyer valuations is large, the
spread between the marginal and average buyer valuation will be large and
the marginal buyer entails a large externality. The tax raised to internalize
this externality is precisely the spread between the average and marginal
buyer valuation, weighted by the bargaining strength of sellers. Similarly,
the tax to internalize the externality on the seller side is equal to spread
between the marginal and average seller (where the former has a higher
reservation price than the latter which is disliked by buyers), weighted by
the measure of buyer bargaining power.
To sum up, proposition 1 demonstrates that under Bertrand competition
(θ = 0) the mark-up of average per-match revenue over per-match cost is
equal to zero, whereas under monopoly pricing (θ = 1) it is equated to a
weighted version of the classic Cournot distortion plus a tax imposed to
internalize the negative cross-side externalities present in the market. De-
pending on the degree of competition among brokers in pricing their services,
any mark-up between these two bounds is a feasible private market outcome.
To evaluate the distortions that might arise from private broker behavior,
we now turn to the socially optimal market outcome.
Socially optimal outcome
Proposition 2 summarizes the social optimum chosen by a Pigouvian plan-
ner. The result follows from equating NS and NB to M in expression (IV.19)
for total social value and rewriting the first-order condition with respect to
M . The socially optimal degree of broker competition is derived from equat-
ing the private and social first-order conditions.
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Proposition 2 At the first-best social optimum, the equilibrium
amount of matches M∗ established through the brokerage market sat-
isfies:
AR−MC = ET (IV.23)
This implies that the socially optimal degree of competition among
brokers in a private market satisfies:
θ∗ =
ET
MS + ET
(IV.24)
Expression (IV.23) demonstrates that a Pigouvian planner also internalizes
the selection effect by taxing the negative externalities induced by the par-
ticipation decision of users on both sides. Furthermore, it does so exactly to
the same extent a monopolist does in the private market. The externality
tax is strictly positive in the presence of heterogeneity in buyer and/or seller
types, which implies that Bertrand competition among brokers (AR = MC)
is not socially optimal. In this case, broker fees are too low and the equi-
librium number of matches is too high compared to the social optimum
because the participation externalities present in the market are not prop-
erly internalized. The monopoly outcome, on the other hand, can never be
efficient because, on top of the externality tax, broker fees are marked up by
the weighted Cournot distortion, which results in upward distorted broker
fees and hence insufficient participation of buyers and sellers. In a private
market there thus exists an intermediate degree of imperfect competition θ∗,
which establishes the first-best social optimum. Expression (IV.24) shows
that θ∗ depends on the magnitude of MS relative to ET . When marginal
consumer surplus (the Cournot distortion) is small relative to the external-
ity tax, the desired degree of market power is large and vice versa. Which
of both measures prevails depends on the underlying distributions of user
types and relative bargaining weights, as is clear from expressions (IV.21)
and (IV.22).
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Figure 1: Graphical representation propositions 1 and 2
Note: figure 1 assumes that market size is equal to one (S = 1), bargaining weights are symmetric
(β = 0.5), seller reservation prices and buyer valuations are uniformly distributed on a unit interval
(s ≈ U [0, 1], b ≈ U [1, 2]) and MC = 0.5.
To further illustrate the intuition of propositions 1 and 2, Figure 1 graphi-
cally summarizes the results for linear buyer demand and seller supply. The
number of transactions that occur through the brokerage market (M) are on
the horizontal axis and broker revenues and costs are on the vertical axis.
The AR curve illustrates that the expected per-match revenue of brokers
decreases in the number of transactions that occur in the brokerage market.
The marginal revenue curve, given by MR = AR −MS − ET , always lies
below the average revenue curve. The Bertrand equilibrium is characterized
by the point where the AR curve crosses the constant marginal cost curve
and the monopoly (or cartel) equilibrium by the point where the marginal
revenue curve crosses the marginal cost curve. As formalized in proposition
1, depending on brokers’ market power measured by the conduct parame-
ter θ, the private market equilibrium lies somewhere on the continuum in
between the monopoly and Bertrand outcome. The social optimum is es-
tablished at the point where the average revenue curve crosses the upward
sloping social cost curve. The social cost of attracting buyers and sellers is
equal to the marginal cost plus the tax raised to internalize the participa-
tion externalities of buyers and sellers: SC = MC +ET . In the presence of
heterogeneity in buyer and seller types, the social optimum on the average
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revenue curve always lies in between the Bertrand and monopoly outcomes.
So, there exists an intermediate degree of broker competition θ∗ for which
the incentives of the social planner and the private brokers are aligned, as
formalized in proposition 2.
2.4 Free broker entry (stage 1)
Free entry equilibrium
In the first stage of the model brokers can freely enter the market and they
will do so as long as profits of the marginal entrant are weakly positive.
Ignoring the integer constraint on the number of brokers, this implies that
in a free entry equilibrium individual broker profits must be equal to zero:
pi = (AR−MC)M
N
− FC = 0⇒ N e = (AR−MC)M
FC
(IV.25)
The number of brokers that enter the market depends on the mark-up
they expect to receive in the second stage, given by expression (IV.20).
When brokers, for example, collude on charging the monopoly service fee,
expected per-match revenue (AR) and hence the number of transactions
that occur through the brokerage industry (M) are independent of the
number of brokers that enter the market. In this case, N is equal to
(AR − MC)M/FC. Equation (IV.25), on the other hand, shows that
Bertrand equilibrium (AR = MC) is not feasible in the presence of a pos-
itive fixed cost. More generally, when market power in the second stage is
sufficiently large to cover the fixed cost of at least one entrant, the number
of brokers that operate the market follows from the zero-profit condition
(IV.25), where AR and M depend on N through the private first-order con-
dition (IV.20). In what follows, the free entry equilibrium number of bro-
kers that operate the market is denoted as NFE and the average per-match
revenue earned by brokers is always equal to the average per-match cost,
AR = AC, where AC = MC + FC/(M/N), as follows from rewriting ex-
pression (IV.25).15 Greater market power in the second stage induces more
brokers to enter the market, such that the number of transactions per broker
(M/N) falls and hence the average cost incurred by each broker increases.
15Following Mankiw and Whinston (1986), the free entry equilibrium is unique when
assumptions (a), (b) and (c) specified in proposition 3 below are satisfied.
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Figure 2: Graphical representation free entry equilibrium
Note: in addition to the assumptions in figure 1, figure 2 assumes FC = 0.01 and that N = 35 for AC1
and N = 15 for AC2.
Figure 2 graphically illustrates the free entry equilibrium, which is charac-
terized by the crossing of the average revenue curve and the average cost
curve. Two cases are drawn. The average cost curve AC1 crosses the aver-
age revenue curve above the social optimum, which implies that the average
service fee is too high and too few transactions occur through the brokerage
market compared to what is socially optimal. This case is more likely to
occur when either fixed costs are high or when broker entry is high because
brokers possess market power in setting their service fees (in stage 2), or
both. In the extreme case where fixed operating costs are such that only
one broker can enter the market, it will set the monopoly service fee and the
AC curve will cross the AR curve at the monopoly outcome. Alternatively,
when brokers collude to charge the monopoly service fee, the AC curve will
also cross the AR curve at the monopoly outcome, even when fixed costs are
relatively small. Many brokers will enter the market, which pushes up the
AC curve, and every broker will only carry out a few but highly profitable
transactions. In the second case, the average cost curve AC2 crosses the av-
erage revenue curve below the social optimum, the average service fee is too
low and too many transactions occur through the brokerage market because
the negative participation externalities are not properly internalized. This
is more likely to occur when fixed costs are small or when brokers possess
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limited market power in setting their service fees, or both.
Socially optimal entry
To evaluate how the private entry decision of brokers potentially distort the
market outcomes, we follow Mankiw and Whinston (1986) by comparing
the private free entry equilibrium to that of a social planner who optimally
chooses the number of brokers that operate the market, taking private bro-
ker behavior once they enter the market as given. That is, the planner
maximizes W , given by expression (IV.19) in which NB = NS = nN , by
optimally choosing N , taking into account that the number of buyers and
sellers attracted by individual brokers n is affected by N through the pri-
vate first-order condition in the second stage of the model. The results are
summarized in proposition 3.16
Proposition 3 If for any N : (a) dM/dN = n + Ndn/dN > 0, (b)
Ndn/dN < 0 and (c) AR −MC > 0, then the free entry equilibrium
number of brokers NFE strictly exceeds the socially optimal number of
brokers, denoted by NSE.
The result that the private free entry equilibrium is always characterized
by excessive entry is consistent with the findings of Mankiw and Whinston
(1986), who demonstrate that, under the same set of assumptions (a)-(c), in
standard oligopoly models there is always excessive entry in the presence of
fixed costs. The intuition is that private brokers do not account for the fact
that they “steal business” from the incumbent brokers. That is, when a new
broker enters, the market expands (assumption (a)) in the sense that more
matches will be established through the brokerage market, but if the market
expansion is smaller than the individual number of matches established by
the incumbent brokers prior to the entry decision of the marginal entrant,
this entrant also steals business from the incumbent brokers (assumption
(b)). Absent of fixed costs, business-stealing has no social cost, i.e. gen-
erated revenues in the market are simply divided among more brokers. In
the presence of fixed costs, however, business-stealing implies that invest-
ments in fixed costs are wasted from a social point of view, given that the
same market outcome could also be established by less brokers and hence
less investments in fixed costs. The presence of fixed costs also implies that
assumption (c) required for the result in proposition 3 to hold - that brokers
16The proof of proposition 3 can be found in appendix A.3.
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charge a strictly positive mark-up over marginal cost - is satisfied.
2.5 Policy implications
The policy implications that follow from the results in propositions 1-3 are
summarized in corollary 1. The first implication directly follows from com-
bining the results in propositions 2 and 3. The second implication follows
from the proof of proposition 3. The third implication follows from maximiz-
ing total social value in expression (IV.19) with respect to M = NB = NS,
while also allowing for the number of brokers that operate in the market to
depend on M through the free entry condition (IV.25), which is equivalent
to maximizing consumer surplus, given by expression (IV.18).
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Corollary 1 (i) The first-best social optimum can be established by
setting the service fees charged by brokers such that the average per-
match revenue equates the social cost to attract buyers and sellers and
by minimizing the number of brokers that operate in the market:
AR = MC + ET and N → 0 (IV.26)
(ii) When a social planner chooses the optimal number of brokers that
operate in the market, while allowing them to privately compete in
pricing their services once they have entered the market, the equilib-
rium number of matches MSE established through the brokerage market
satisfies:
AR = MC + ET +
FC
dM/dN
(IV.27)
where the market expansion effect of the marginal entrant (dM/dN)
follows from differentiating the private first-order condition (IV.20).
(iii) When a social planner sets the service fees to optimize the
number of matches established in the brokerage market, while allowing
brokers to freely enter the market, the equilibrium number of matches
MSM satisfies:
AR→MC such that N → 0 (IV.28)
Corrolary 1 shows the model outcomes when a social planner optimally
regulates the service fees charged by brokers, broker entry or both. Figure
3 illustrates the welfare effects.
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Figure 3: Policy implications
Note: in addition to the assumptions in figure 1, figure 3 assumes for the observed outcome that
FC = 0.01 and N = 15, which implies that broker market power is θ = 0.13. In the social first-
best: AR = SC and N = 1. In the social second-best when the social planner regulates entry: AR =
MC + ET + FC/(dM/dN) where dM/dN follows from the private FOC, imposing Bresnahan (1989)’s
constant conjectural variations model θ = (1 + R)/N . In the social second-best when the social planner
regulates the number of transactions in the brokerage market: AR = AC and N = 1.
As a benchmark, the top left panel of Figure 3 plots a possible observed free
entry equilibrium. In this case, the number of matches MFE is determined
by the point where the average cost curve (AC) crosses the average revenue
curve (AR). Social value generated in the brokerage market is equal to sur-
face A below the AR curve minus surface B below the ET curve, where
the latter captures the social cost of the externalities present in the market.
In the free entry equilibrium brokers earn zero profits, which implies that
all surplus generated in the market is consumer surplus divided among to
buyers and sellers. The remaining three panels in figure 3 illustrate the im-
plications of imposing the different policies described in corollary 1.
Firstly, when a social planner can regulate both brokerage service fees and
market entry of brokers, implication (i) in corollary 1 applies. The planner
equates average per-match revenue earned by brokers to the social cost of
attracting buyers and sellers and minimizes the number of brokers to carry
out the transactions. In the model, no integer constraint is imposed on the
number of brokers and there are no constraints on the number of transac-
tions a single broker can realize, so the socially optimal number of brokers
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approaches zero. Of course, in practice brokers have time constraints and
there is a limit to the number of transactions a single broker can establish
in a given time period. The planner should thus approximate the num-
ber of brokers required to realize the desired number of transactions, while
minimizing the amount of business brokers steal from one another when op-
erating in the market. The top right panel in figure 3 illustrates the social
first-best when a single broker can realize all desired transactions. Social
surplus generated by the brokerage industry is equal to consumer surplus
(surface A minus surface B) plus the profits earned by the brokerage indus-
try (surface C). Total social value is unambiguously higher compared to the
free entry equilibrium, although there might be shift in surplus from buyers
and sellers to the brokers when the average service fee in the social first-best
is higher than in the free entry equilibrium - as it is drawn in figure 3.
Secondly, when a social planner can only influence the entry process of
brokers, but not their pricing behavior once they have entered the mar-
ket, implication (ii) in corollary 1 applies. Expression (IV.27) shows that
the mark-up earned by brokers in this case is higher compared to the so-
cial first-best. The social planner not only internalizes the externalities in-
duced by the participation decision of buyers and sellers (ET ), but also the
fixed costs that brokers incur to operate in the market (FC) divided by the
market expansion effect of the marginal entrant (dM/dN). The additional
mark-up is larger when fixed entry costs are larger and when the market
expansion effect (dM/dN = n + Ndn/dN) relative to the business-stealing
effect (Ndn/dN) is smaller or, in other words, when the social cost induced
by the marginal entrant is higher. Note that to implement this policy, the
planner has to know how the optimal pricing behavior of brokers is affected
by changes in the number of brokers that operate in the market, i.e. how
θ is affected by N . The bottom left panel of figure 3 illustrates the out-
come, imposing Bresnahan (1989)’s constant conjectural variations model:
θ = (1 +R)/N , where R is calculated from the free entry equilibrium and is
assumed to remain constant as the number of brokers changes. The figure
demonstrates that consumer surplus is smaller and profits of the brokerage
industry are larger compared to the social first-best.
Thirdly, implication (iii) in corollary 1 applies when the social planner can
influence the pricing behavior of brokers, but not their entry decision. In this
case, independent of the mark-up chosen by the planner, brokers enter the
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market until they all earn zero profits and hence brokers bring no surplus to
the market. The planner therefore maximizes total consumer surplus, which
is strictly increasing in M , as follows from expression (IV.18). So, it is opti-
mal to set average per-match revenue arbitrarily close to the per-match cost
(AR→MC), which minimizes the number of brokers that enter the market
(N → 0). Again, in practice the social planner should account for the time
constraints of brokers and should target the service fees such that a minimal
number of brokers enter the market to realize the desired transactions. The
bottom right panel of figure 3 illustrates the outcome when the service fees
are set such that a single broker enters the market. The figure demonstrates
there are no broker profits in this case and that more buyer and sellers par-
ticipate in the market compared the social first-best. This comes at the
expense, however, of a higher social cost due to the externalities present in
the market (surface B) and therefore total surplus is smaller compared to
the social first-best.
In general, and not just for the case drawn in Figure 3, interventions (i), (ii)
and (iii) are always (weakly) welfare improving compared to any observed
free entry equilibrium, which can be anywhere on the continuum between
the monopoly and Bertrand outcome, as discussed above. The greatest wel-
fare gain is always established when imposing the social first-best (case (i)).
However, which of the second-best cases (ii) or (iii) generates the largest
welfare gains is ambiguous and depends on the parameters of seller supply,
buyer demand, and on the cost structure of brokers. It is therefore essen-
tially an empirical question. The remainder of this paper empirically applies
the model to the case of the real estate brokerage and further discusses the
practical implications of the theoretical results.
3 Empirical methodology
This section presents a methodology to quantify the parameters of the the-
oretical model.17 It is assumed that the following cross-sectional data are
17As a reminder, the exogenous parameters in the model are the parameters of the
distributions of buyer demand and seller supply (FB(.) and FS(.), respectively), seller
bargaining weight (β), market size (S), broker per-match (MC) and fixed (FC) costs and
the parameter(s) of the underlying model of broker competition that determine broker
market power (θ). The endogenous outcome variables are the number of transactions
that occur in the brokerage market (M) and the number of brokers that operate in the
market (N).
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available for one or multiple local markets in which brokers compete for
transactions (e.g. a city in the case of real estate brokerage) within a given
time frame (e.g. one or multiple years). Firstly, at the market-level: the
number of transactions carried out by the brokerage industry (M) relative
to the potential number of transactions (S); the number of brokers that
operate in the market (N); and some (in)direct measures of broker costs
(MC and FC) - e.g. Hsieh and Moretti (2003) use the wage earned by
employees in other service industries within local markets as a proxy for the
opportunity cost to operate as a real estate broker, but direct cost measures
are preferred. Secondly, at the transaction-level: a representative sample
of brokered transactions, with details on the (average) service fees charged
by the brokers; sales prices and product characteristics of the traded good;
and some measures of buyer and seller characteristics. Finally, it is useful
to observe some broker characteristics or to observe multiple transactions
carried out by the same broker to control for broker heterogeneity, as they
are assumed to be homogeneous in the model.
3.1 Parametric specification of seller supply and buyer
demand
Assume that buyer valuations are uniformly distributed over the interval
[bL,bH ] and that seller reservation prices are uniformly distributed over the
interval [sL,sH ]. The model then implies that buyers with a valuation
in the range [b˜,bH ] participate in the brokerage market, where b˜ is the
valuation of the marginal buyer. Sellers, on the other hand, participate
when their reservation price is in the range [sL,s˜], where s˜ is the reserva-
tion price of the marginal seller. Given that market participants are as-
sumed to be randomly assigned to one another, it follows that the prices
at which the good is sold are distributed by a symmetric triangular dis-
tribution.18 The lowest possible price at which the good is sold occurs
when buyer type b˜ is matched to seller type sL. The sales price is then
equal to p(b˜, sL) = βb˜ + (1 − β)(T + sL)/(1 − t) ≡ pMIN, which is ob-
served with probability zero. Similarly, the highest possible sales price is
p(bH , s˜) = βbH + (1− β)(T + s˜)/(1− t) ≡ pMAX, again observed with prob-
ability zero. The average sales price is the average of the minimum and
18To see this, note from expression (IV.4) that the sales price is a weighted sum of the
buyer valuation and the seller reservation price and it is a familiar statistical property that
any weighted sum of two independent continuous uniform random variables is distributed
by a symmetric triangular distribution (e.g. Grinstead and Snell 1997).
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maximum price: p¯ = (pMIN + pMAX)/2, which is most likely to be observed.
In addition, the market clearing flat fee T and proportional fee t satisfy
expressions (IV.11) and (IV.12), in which the marginal and average buyer
and seller valuations can be written as a function of the fraction of buyers
and sellers that participate in the market and the distributional parameters
of buyer and seller reservation values. Combining expressions (IV.11) and
(IV.12) with those for the minimum and maximum sales prices therefore
allows to solve for the four relevant distributional parameters bL,bH ,sL and
sH as a function of the market clearing service fees (T and t), the fraction of
buyers and sellers that participate in the market (M/S = NB/S = NS/S),
seller bargaining weight (β) and the minimum and maximum sales price
(pMIN and pMAX). By the assumption of linear supply and demand this sys-
tem of equations has an analytical solution.
The average flat and proportional service fee and the fraction of buyers
and sellers that participate in the market are assumed to be observed. So,
it remains to obtain a proxy for seller and buyer bargaining weights and the
minimum and maximum price of properties sold in the brokerage market to
derive the parameters of supply and demand. The main challenge to obtain
a proxy for these measures using transaction data is that the theoretical
model assumes that a homogeneous good is traded in the market, whereas
in practice traded goods are often heterogeneous in many dimensions. In
other words, the model assumes that all dispersion in sales prices, measured
by the difference between pMAX and pMIN, can be attributed to heterogeneity
in buyer and seller characteristics, while in practice a large part of dispersion
in sales prices can also be attributed to differences in the characteristics of
the good - e.g. the size, location and age of a real estate property. Therefore,
we introduce a methodology that allows us to derive an upper and a lower
bound on the dispersion of sales prices that can be attributed to heterogene-
ity in buyer and seller characteristics. To do so, we build on the hedonic
pricing model of Rosen (1974) and the extension of Harding, Rosenthal and
Sirmans (2003) that allows for bargaining among market participants. The
estimated bounds on price dispersion can subsequently be used to obtain
bounds on the range of feasible values for the parameters of supply and
demand.19
19Note that we face a nonstandard identification problem. With data on prices and
quantities of goods sold by firms in standard product markets there are many techniques
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3.2 Estimating residual sales price dispersion
Consider the following imperfectly competitive hedonic pricing model:
pgsb = Xgα
G +Xsα
S +Xbα
B + eg + es + eb (IV.29)
where pgsb denotes the sales price of good g when being sold by seller s to
buyer b. Xg denotes a vector of observable characteristics of the hetero-
geneous good sold in the market and αG is the vector with corresponding
coefficients that can be interpreted as the value a specific characteristic of
the good contributes to the sales price of the good on average. In addition,
as in Harding, Rosenthal and Sirmans (2003), and opposed to the compet-
itive hedonic pricing model of Rosen (1974), it is assumed that not only
the characteristics of the good influence the price at which it is sold, but
also the characteristics of the buyer and seller involved in the transaction.
The intuition is that not all values of the product characteristics (αG) are
always known to all buyers and sellers and these informational imperfections
leave room for bargaining over the sales price. This is typically the case in
markets that are thin because the traded good is very heterogeneous, as in
real estate markets. The vector Xs contains seller characteristics and the
corresponding coefficient vector αS measures how much these characteristics
contribute in determining the sales price. Similarly, the vector Xb with coef-
ficients αB captures how buyer characteristics contribute to the sales price.
The residuals eg, es and eb capture unobserved heterogeneity in product,
seller and buyer characteristics, respectively.
To estimate the upper bound on the dispersion of observed sales prices that
can be attributed to buyer and seller characteristics, the following hedonic
pricing regression can be estimated:
pgsb = Xgα
G + gsb (IV.30)
where the dispersion in the error term gsb is interpreted as the residual
available in the literature to estimate consumer demand and firm market power. See, for
example, Bresnahan (1989), Perloff, Karp and Golan (2007) and Einav and Levin (2010)
for reviews. These techniques do not account, however, for the role of intermediaries. In
the empirical literature on two-sided markets, there are some papers that estimate market
power of platforms in the presence of externalities among different types of consumer
groups (e.g. Rysman 2004; Lee 2013; Jeziorski 2014), but they typically do not allow for
bargaining among matched trading partners. Finally, Bajari and Benkard (2005) propose
a more general methodology than ours to estimate parameters of consumer demand and
seller supply using the hedonic approach, but without intermediaries.
156
Chapter IV
Intermediation in Markets with Buyer and Seller Selection:
Theory and an Application to Real Estate Brokerage
dispersion in sales prices that can be attributed to buyer and seller charac-
teristics and to unobserved heterogeneity in product characteristics. Thus,
if all relevant characteristics of the good that influence the sales price would
be observed, the variance of eg in expression (IV.29) would be zero, and
gsb would solely capture buyer and seller heterogeneity. If not all relevant
product characteristics are observed, the variance of eg is positive, and gsb
overestimates the heterogeneity in sales prices that can be attributed to buy-
ers and sellers. Therefore the dispersion of gsb is interpreted as an upper
bound for the dispersion in sales prices that comes from buyer and seller
heterogeneity. The values of pMIN and pMAX that follow can be obtained
by fitting the symmetric triangular distribution to the distribution of the
residuals around the predicted value of the regression.
To estimate the lower bound we want to estimate how much the terms Xsα
S
and Xbα
B in expression (IV.29) contribute to the variation in sales prices.
If we would estimate equation (IV.29), however, the obtained coefficients
for these terms would likely be biased in the presence of unobserved prod-
uct heterogeneity. This because different buyers and sellers are expected
to differently value product characteristic and hence the component eg in
the error term will be correlated with the regressors in Xs and Xb. More
specifically, when eg = Xsδ
S + Xbδ
B + e′g, where δ
S and δB measure how
much sellers and buyers value the unobserved product characteristics, eg in
expression (IV.29) is clearly correlated with Xs and Xb when δ
S and δB differ
from zero. To solve this, we follow Harding, Rosenthal and Sirmans (2003)
by introducing two symmetry assumptions. Firstly, that the valuation of
identical buyers and sellers for the unobserved product characteristics is the
same, that is δS = δB. Secondly, that the way identical buyers and sellers
can influence the sales price through the bargaining process is the same in
magnitude but opposite. That is, αS = αB, which implies that the amount
by which a certain degree of education, for example, allows a seller to push
up the sales price is the same as it allows a buyer with the same educational
level to push it down. Accounting for this allows us to rewrite equation
(IV.29) as follows:
pgsb = Xgα
G + α(Xs −Xb) + δ(Xs +Xb) + e′g + es + eb (IV.31)
in which the term α(Xs−Xb) estimates how much buyer and seller attributes
contribute to the variation in sales prices through the bargaining process and
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the term δ(Xs + Xb) estimates the valuation of buyers and sellers for un-
observed product characteristics. The values of pMIN and pMAX can now be
obtained by fitting the symmetric triangular distribution to the predicted
values of the term α(Xs −Xb) around the predicted value of the regression.
As a final step, consistent with the assumptions in the empirical specifica-
tion, it is assumed that the Nash bargaining game in the theoretical model is
symmetric. That is, the bargaining weight of both buyers and sellers is one
half: β = 1− β = 0.5. Using the estimated bounds for pMAX and pMIN then
allows us to calculate bounds for the values of the distributional parameters
of the model, as described in the previous subsection. In addition, if either
MC or FC is observed, the other cost measure can be calculated by using
the zero profit condition (IV.25). Then, using MC and the parameters of
seller supply and buyer demand, broker market power (θ) can be calculated
from the private first-order condition (IV.20), which closes the model.
4 Data
4.1 Transaction-level data
The main dataset used for the analysis is a sample of 26,986 residential real
estate properties that were sold in Belgium through one of 97 real estate
agencies of a large franchise system in the period 2005-2014.20 Table 1
provides descriptive statistics on sales prices and service fees charged by
brokers (the latter are only available since 2011).
Table 1: Descriptive statistics sales prices and service fees
Description In model Obs. Mean St. Dev. P5 P95
Sales price (in e) p 26,986 215,279 92,763 90,000 392,500
Flat service fee (in e) T 9,367 2,786 1,844 0 6,050
Proportional service fee t 9,503 0.03 0.01 0 0.042
20The sample is restricted to houses, excluding apartments, for which another 10,666
transactions are observed. The same qualitative results are obtained when only using
apartments in the analysis below, or when using both houses and apartments. Using
both complicates the regression analysis because some observable property characteristics
might affect the price of houses and apartments differently. Therefore, we prefer to exclude
apartments from the sample.
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An average property is sold for e215,579, ranging from e90,000 at the 5th
percentile to e392,500 at the 95th percentile. The average flat fee charged
by brokers is e2,786, ranging from e0 to e6,050 and the average propor-
tional fee is 3%, ranging from 0 to 4.2%. This implies that brokers charge
on average a total service fee of e9,182 or a commission rate of 4.3% for an
average priced property.21
In addition, the dataset contains the initial listing price when properties
were first brought on the market, time-to-sell and a broad range of observ-
able property characteristics, such as size, age and number of bedrooms.
Importantly, the exact location of properties is also observed, which allows
us to construct measures such as the distance to the closest city center, dis-
tance to the capital city (Brussels) or distance to the nearest train station.
For about half of the transactions, the data also contains the previous ad-
dress of the buyer of a property. Observing the previous location of residence
of buyers and sellers allows us to construct indirect measures of buyer and
seller characteristics using publicly available administrative data for local
living areas, for example, on median income, age and educational level of
the population.22
21Note that, especially compared to the US where brokers usually charge a fixed com-
mission rate of 5 or 6% (e.g. Hsieh and Moretti 2003), the service fees in our sample
show strong variation. Furthermore, the service fees are on average lower and brokers use
various pricing strategies - for 8% of the transactions only a flat fee was charged, for 17%
only a proportional fee and for 75% a combination of both. These observations suggest
that price competition among brokers is stronger in the Belgian brokerage industry than
in the US industry. We believe that the crucial institutional difference that makes the
Belgian market more competitive than the US market is that buyers (almost) never hire
a broker in their search for a real estate property and only sellers hire brokers to sell their
properties. This allows brokers to supply their services more independently than in an
MLS system where real estate agents rely heavily on their colleagues to sell properties
and can be penalized when deviating from the conventional commission rate (e.g. Levitt
and Syverson 2008a). The reason for the absence of buyer representation by brokers in
the Belgian market is likely due to the fact that every real estate transaction has to be
approved and concluded by a notary, who supervises that all legal and administrative
requirements are satisfied. Notaries thus essentially take up the role of guiding buyers
through the process of buying a property which is executed by private brokers in the
US. Note that notaries also receive a fee for this service, however, they are not private
entities. Both the number of notaries and the fee they can charge for their service is
highly regulated.
22Table B.1 in the appendix reports the descriptive statistics for the observable prop-
erty characteristics and table B.2 for the proxies of buyer and seller characteristics.
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4.2 Market-level data
The transaction data are complemented with aggregate data on the Belgian
real estate brokerage industry. More specifically, data were collected on total
market size, market share of the brokerage industry, broker entry and broker
costs. Table 2 summarizes the data using 2013 as the reference year.
Table 2: Market-level data
Description In model Mean Range
Market size S 123,652
Market share brokers M/S 0.56
# Brokers N 6,728 4,494 - 8,963
Marginal costs (in e) MC 3,339 983 - 5,696
Fixed costs (in e) FC 60,141 35,882 - 84,389
Firstly, as a measure of market size, the total number of real estate trans-
actions that occurred in Belgium in 2013 is used, calculated from publicly
available administrative data from Statistics Belgium. In total there were
123,652 registered real estate transactions, of which 80,491 were houses and
43,161 apartments. So, the measure of market size consist of all the prop-
erties that were sold through the brokerage industry plus all the properties
that were sold in the outside market (for-sale-by-owner).23
Secondly, a proxy for the fraction of transactions that occurred through
the brokerage industry is obtained from a survey conducted by the Policy
Research Center for Housing. The survey questioned 10,000 households that
were randomly selected from the civil register about their current housing
status. In the period 2009-2013, 710 of these households purchased a real
estate property and 397 of them, or approximately 56%, claim that they
bought the property from a seller that was assisted by a real estate broker.
Thirdly, two measures for the number of brokers that operate in the Bel-
gian real estate market were collected. The first measure comes from data
provided by the professional association of real estate brokers in Belgium
23The measure of market side should be interpreted as a lower bound on the actual
potential market size, given that the measure does not include properties that were put
up for sale, but remained unsold. In addition, it is possible that there were some buyers
and sellers that would have entered the real estate market under different conditions (e.g.
should broker service fees have been lower), but eventually decided not to enter.
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(BIV), which contains the address of all registered members on the 1st of
January 2011, 2012 and 2013. The data show that the number of registered
brokers remains stable over these three years and in 2013 there were 8,963
registered brokers. The advantage of this measure is that registration with
the professional association is mandatory in Belgium, which implies that
all persons who are licensed to broker real estate transactions are included.
The problem, however, is that not all brokers who are included in the list
are necessarily active (full-time), so this number should be interpreted as an
upper bound. As a second measure for the number of brokers active in the
market we collected data from the largest online real estate listing platform
in Belgium (www.immoweb.be). On the 12th of December 2013, 3,303 real
estate agencies had at least one active real estate listing on the website. As-
suming that the number of real estate brokers per agency is similar to that
in the BIV-data (approximately 1.36), there were 4,494 real estate brokers
active on the listing platform. Of course, it is unlikely that every broker in
Belgium had an active listing on that day, so this measure is interpreted as
a lower bound on the number of brokers that operate in the market. The
average of both measures is 6,728.
Finally, data were collected from various sources on the advertisement and
administrative costs to sell a real estate property in Belgium, resulting in
a proxy of e983 for the monetary per-match cost.24 In addition, when as-
suming that brokers can freely enter the market and earn zero profits, the
costs to operate as a broker should also include the income a broker could
earn when practicing a different profession. As a proxy for this opportunity
cost, the average yearly wage of employees working in other service sectors
than real estate brokerage is used, which was equal to e48,525 in 2013, as
reported by the National Bank of Belgium.
Using a measure for the per-match cost MC, the implied fixed cost FC
can be calculated from the zero profit condition (IV.25). The key question,
however, is whether the opportunity cost to operate as a broker should be
included in the measure for marginal costs or for fixed costs. On the one
hand, it can be argued that the opportunity cost reflects the value of time
that brokers invest in selling real estate properties. In this case, the op-
portunity cost (divided by the average number of yearly transactions per
broker) should be included in the measure for MC, which results in a proxy
24See table B.3 in the appendix for details.
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of e5,696 for MC and of e35,882 for FC. The amount of e35,882 then
serves as a proxy for the monetary operating costs that brokers incur on a
yearly basis independent of the number of properties they sell. These might
be costs linked to office space, office supplies, purchasing or leasing a car,
obtaining the broker license, the franchise fee, etc. On the other hand, as
is for example argued by Hsieh and Moretti (2003), when brokers can freely
enter the market, they are likely to waste valuable time and other recourses
while inefficiently competing for transactions, especially when broker com-
mission rates are fixed, as is typically observed in the US. By this logic, in
the extreme case when all broker time is unproductive, the opportunity cost
should be fully included in the measure of fixed costs. When the estimated
monetary per-match cost of e983 is used as a proxy for MC, the implied
fixed cost FC is e84,389. This measure then includes both the opportunity
cost and the other fixed monetary operating costs. It seems reasonable to as-
sume, however, that at least part of the time spent by brokers is productive,
especially in our setting where broker commission rates are not fixed. For
the baseline calibration of the model, the average proxy for MC of e3,339
and for FC of e60,141 is used, which each include half of the opportunity
cost.
5 Model calibration and welfare counterfac-
tuals
Using the data described in the previous section, this section first calibrates
the outcomes of the theoretical model by applying the empirical methodol-
ogy proposed in section 3. Subsequently, different welfare counterfactuals
are constructed and discussed. Finally, sensitivity analysis is provided using
alternative measures for broker costs and the number of brokers who operate
in the market.
5.1 Model calibration
The first step is to obtain values for the parameters of buyer demand (bL, bH)
and seller supply (sL, sH). To do so, remember that an estimate is required
for the dispersion in sales prices that can be attributed to buyer and seller
characteristics. The proposed methodology in the previous section allows to
estimate these bounds. For the upper bound, after estimating the hedonic
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pricing equation (IV.30), the top panel of Figure 4 plots a Kernel density
of the residuals around the predicted value of the regression.25 In addition,
the figure plots the fitted symmetric triangular distribution that minimizes
the distance between the kernel density and the fitted distribution. The
implied minimum sales price (pMIN) is e141,064 and the maximum sales
price (pMAX) is e289,494 around the average of e215,279. So, the spread
in sales prices due to heterogeneity in buyer and seller reservation values is
therefore estimated to be e148,430. For the lower bound, after estimating
equation (IV.31), the bottom panel of Figure 4 plots a kernel density of
the predicted values of the term α(XS − XB) around the predicted value
of the regression and the corresponding fitted triangular distribution.26 The
estimate for the minimum price is e206,807 and for the maximum price
e223,751, implying a spread of e16,944.
Table 3: Estimated supply and demand parameters
Parameter Upper bound Lower bound
bL 61,547 197,729
bH 326,601 227,986
sL 98,081 193,766
sH 355,259 223,124
The implied values for the parameters of supply and demand are reported
in table 3. For the upper bound on sales price dispersion, the valuation of
buyers ranges from e61,547 to e326,601 and the reservation price of sellers
from e98,081 to e355,259. For the lower bound on sales price dispersion,
the spread ranges from e197,729 to e227,986 for buyer valuations and from
e193,766 to e223,124 for seller reservation prices. Note that by construc-
tion dispersion in buyer valuations and seller reservation prices for the upper
bound is larger than for the lower bound, which implies that for the upper
bound buyer demand and seller supply are relatively inelastic with respect
to changes in the broker service fee compared to the lower bound. For the
upper bound the average revenue curve, plotted in Figures 1-3 above, is
therefore relatively inelastic and thus relatively steep. For the lower bound
25The results of estimating regression equation (IV.30) using OLS are reported in the
first column of table C.1 in the appendix.
26The regression results of estimating equation (IV.31) using OLS are reported in the
second column of table C.1 and table C.2 in the appendix.
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the average revenue curve is flatter.27
Also note that the difference between the upper and the lower bound in
the dispersion of sales prices attributable to buyer and seller heterogeneity
is large, e148,430 versus e16,944, respectively. This suggests that in the
estimation for the upper bound there are still many property characteristics
that are unobserved. Similarly, for the lower bound, there are likely many
other unobserved buyer and seller characteristics that influence the sales
price of properties. For the upper bound the spread implies, for example,
that if the average seller would be lucky and be matched with the highest
valuation buyer, the property would sell for e252,386. If unlucky and be-
ing matched to the lowest valuation buyer that participates in the market,
the property would only sell for e178,171. Similarly, for the lower bound
the property of the average seller would sell for a price ranging between
e219,515 and e211,043. Intuitively, the spread of about e8,500 that can be
attributed to “luck” in meeting the best trading partner in the lower bound
perhaps comes closer to reality than the spread of about e74,000 implied by
the upper bound. In what follows, the results are always reported for both
the upper and the lower bound.
As a second step, various outcome variables of the model can be calculated
by combining the obtained values for the parameters of supply and demand
with the market-level data reported in table 2. Table 4 shows the calibrated
values for the outcome variables that determine the optimal private service
fee, as described in proposition 1.
27More specifically, the estimates for the parameters of supply and demand imply that
the elasticity of the average revenue curve at the observed outcome is 0.04 for the upper
bound on price dispersion and 0.37 for the lower bound. This implies that an increase in
the average commission rate from the current 4.3% to 5.3%, for example, decreases the
number of transactions in the brokerage market by 1% for the inelastic and by 9% for the
elastic AR curve, respectively.
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Table 4: Baseline calibration
Variable Inelastic S & D Elastic S & D
AR (in e) 9,182 9,182
MC (in e) 3,339 3,339
MS (in e) 146,224 16,692
ET (in e) 73,112 8,346
θ 0.026 0.233
W (in e) 5,062,680,199 577,929,349
The table shows that the observed total service fee (AR =e9,182) is sig-
nificantly above marginal cost (MC =e3,339). As shown by expression
(IV.20) in proposition 1, in a private market this mark-up is comprised of
the sum of marginal surplus MS and the tax raised to internalize the par-
ticipation externalities of buyers and sellers ET , weighted by the measure
of broker market power θ. For the estimated upper bound of sales price
dispersion, which corresponds to inelastic seller supply and buyer demand,
MS =e146,224 and ET =e73,112 are relatively large compared to when
supply and demand are elastic, MS =e16,692 and ET =e8,346. Given that
expression (IV.20) is assumed to hold as an identity, corresponding broker
market power is relatively small for inelastic compared to elastic supply and
demand (θ = 0.026 and θ = 0.233, respectively). Finally, total social value
generated by the Belgian real estate brokerage industry in 2013 is estimated
to be about 5 billion Euro for the inelastic and 578 million Euro for the
elastic bound on supply and demand.
5.2 Welfare counterfactuals
In this subsection, the observed private market outcomes described in table
4 are compared to those determined by a social planner. The three scenarios
described in corollary 1 are considered and the results are summarized in
table 5.
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Table 5: Welfare counterfactuals
Scenario Variable Inelastic S & D Elastic S & D
Regulate service fee, N = 1 M/S 0.431 0.518
AR 59,634 11,059
p¯ 240,885 216,231
AR/p¯ 0.237 0.051
N 1 1
W ∗ 6,002,970,151 988,995,085
Π 3,001,455,005 494,467,472
CS 3,001,515,146 494,527,613
W ∗/W 1.185 1.711
Regulate entry, flexible service fee M/S 0.427 0.408
AR 61,310 15,996
p¯ 241,736 218,737
AR/p¯ 0.248 0.073
N 517 2.261
W ∗ 5,971,346,023 808,151,940
Π 3,029,111,538 501,952,042
CS 2,942,234,485 306,199,898
WSE/W 1.179 1.398
Regulate service fee, flexible entry M/S 0.575 0.691
AR 3,340 3,340
p¯ 212,314 212,313
AR/p¯ 0.016 0.016
N 1 1
W ∗ 5,335,986,832 879,120,106
Π 0 0
CS 5,335,986,832 879,120,106
WSM/W 1.053 1.521
The top panel of table 5 corresponds with case (i) in corollary 1 and reports
the model outcomes when the social planner chooses the optimal number of
transactions in the brokerage market, while minimizing the number of bro-
kers that operate in the market. The results show that for both measures of
inelastic and elastic supply and demand the planner attracts less buyers and
sellers (a fraction of 0.43 and 0.52, respectively) compared to the observed
private market outcome (where a fraction of 0.56 of the transactions occur in
the brokerage market). This implies that the observed average service fee is
below the socially desired level and the participation externalities of buyers
and sellers are insufficiently internalized. The current commission rate is on
average 4.3% and the optimal counterfactual commission rates are 5.1% for
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elastic and 23.7% for inelastic supply and demand, respectively. Assuming
that all the transactions can be realized by a single broker, imposing the
social first-best would imply a welfare gain ranging from 19% for inelastic
to 71% for elastic supply and demand. Of course, in practice more than
one broker is required to realize the desired number transactions. So, when
appointing a realistic number of brokers the welfare gain would be smaller,
as these brokers have to incur fixed operating costs. In addition, note that
imposing the first-best implies a loss in consumer surplus allocated to buyers
and sellers and the net gain comes from increased broker profits.
The middle panel of table 5 corresponds with case (ii) in corollary 1 and
reports the model outcomes when the social planner determines the number
of brokers that operate in the market, while allowing them to compete in
pricing their services once they have entered the market. To do this, an
assumption has to be made on how broker market power is affected when
the number of brokers in the market changes. More specifically, Bresna-
han (1989)’s constant conjectural variations model is imposed for which
θ = (1 + R)/N where dM/dn = 1 + R. The conjectural variations param-
eter R can be calculated from the estimates of θ for the observed market
outcome, as reported in table 4. In this case, the social planner reduces
broker entry from the current 6,728 to 2,261 for elastic and to 517 for inelas-
tic supply and demand. The corresponding commission rates increase from
the current 4.3% to 7.3% and 25.3% respectively. This regulation entails an
estimated welfare gain between 18% for inelastic and 40% for elastic supply
and demand compared to the observed market outcome. Note that this pol-
icy implies an even larger loss in consumer surplus and a comparable gain
in broker profits compared to the social first-best.
The bottom panel of table 5 corresponds with case (iii) in corollary 1. The
counterfactual is constructed should the service fee be set such that exactly
one broker enters the market. That is, the service fee is equated to the
average cost of a single broker, which implies a commission rate of 1.6%.
In this case, a fraction of 0.58 of the buyers and sellers participate in the
brokerage market for inelastic supply and demand and a fraction of 0.69 for
elastic supply and demand. Given that the counterfactual service fee is now
below the observed service fee, there is a gain in consumer surplus of 5%
to 52%. Broker profits remain zero, as the free entry condition continues to
apply under this scenario.
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Overall, table 5 suggests that the effectiveness of regulating broker entry
or broker service fees crucially depends on how sensitive participation of
buyers and seller is to changes in the service fee. For the inelastic bound,
regulating broker entry is more effective than regulating the service fees,
while the reverse holds for the elastic bound. In addition, when regulating
broker entry, there can be important redistributive effects that shift surplus
from buyers and sellers to brokers, which a social planner might want to
take under consideration. If a regulator can only regulate entry, but never-
theless is only concerned with consumer surplus and not with broker profits,
one possible solution is to sell licenses to brokers - i.e. impose a lump sum
tax to operate as a broker. At a right price, this can induce the optimal
number of brokers to enter the market under the second scenario in table 5,
while broker profits would remain zero. The revenues of this taxation could
then be redistributed to buyers and sellers through other real estate market
policies.
More generally, lump-sum and per-match taxes can be used to achieve the
desired market outcomes. If a regulator can levy both a per-transaction tax
and a lump-sum tax to operate as a real estate agent in the market, it can
always achieve the first-best outcome by combining these two instruments
efficiently. It is important, however, that the regulator takes into account
the strategic interactions among real estate agents when implementing a tax
scheme. In the case of a monopoly or cartel (θ = 1), levying a lump-sum
tax to operate as a broker will reduce the number of brokers in the market
and thus the social waste due to excessive entry, but will have no effect on
the service fees charged by real estate agents. In this case, levying a fixed
tax per-match will also reduce the number of real estate agents that operate
in the market, but will at the same time raise the service fees further above
their socially efficient level.28 The regulator could, however, provide a sub-
sidy to real estate agents to lower the service fees charged to the socially
efficient level and could compensate these costs by levying a lump-sum tax
to operate as a broker to achieve the first-best outcome.
While raising a lump-sum tax to operate as a broker has no effect on the
service fees charged in the case of a monopoly (θ = 1), it may well have
28Recall that the service fees charged under the monopoly outcome are always above
the socially efficient level.
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an effect under other models of imperfect competition. In the case of Bres-
nahan (1989)’s constant conjectural variations model (θ = (1 + R)/N), for
example, raising a lump-sum tax will both decrease the number of real es-
tate agents that operate in the market and raise the service fees charged by
the remaining brokers. In this case raising a per-match tax will have similar
effects. If a regulator can only implement one fiscal instrument, it has to
assess the market situation carefully. Although the effects raising a lump-
sum tax or a per-match tax are similar when the service fees charged by real
estate agents are initially too low, this is not the case when the initial service
fees charged are too high. Raising a lump-sum tax to operate as a broker
will in this case reduce the social loss due to excessive entry, but will at the
same time further raise the service fees further above the socially efficient
fee. A per-match subsidy will in this case lower the service fees charged by
brokers, but also results in more entry of real estate agents. These examples
illustrate that a regulator has to carefully assess the market conditions when
designing and implementing tax schemes.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
As discussed in section 4, some of the parameter values used for the base-
line calibration of the model might suffer from measurement error. This
section discusses the sensitivity of the results with respect to deviations of
the model parameters from their baseline values. To start, remember that
the proxy for marginal costs includes half of the opportunity cost to oper-
ate as a broker, measured by the wage brokers could potentially earn when
working in a different service sector. This implicitly assumes that half of
the effort of brokers goes to productively selling real estate properties and
half is unproductive effort spent on marketing their services and compet-
ing with other brokers for transactions. The middle two columns of table
6 present the model outcomes should all effort be unproductive. In this
case the opportunity cost is fully included in the measure for fixed costs
(e84,389) and only the monetary costs of marketing and selling a real es-
tate property are included in the measure for marginal costs (e983). The
final two columns present the opposite case where all effort is assumed to
be productive (FC =e35,882 and MC =e5,696). The table shows that the
results are robust to alternative specifications of broker costs. The observed
service fee (e9,182) always remains too low compared to the socially optimal
fee, although it comes very close to the social optimum for elastic supply and
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demand and the lower bound on marginal costs. Intuitively, the estimated
welfare gains from all policy interventions are larger for the lower bound on
marginal costs compared to the baseline case and they are smaller for the
upper bound. The only qualitative difference compared to table 5 is that
for the upper bound on marginal costs regulating broker entry is now more
effective than regulating the service fee for both inelastic and elastic supply
and demand.
Table 6: Welfare counterfactuals - sensitivity with respect to MC
MC = 983 MC = 5, 696
scenario variable Inelastic S & D Elastic S & D Inelastic S & D Elastic S & D
Regulate service fee, M/S 0.435 0.557 0.426 0.478
N = 1 AR 57,867 9,292 61,402 12,827
N 1 1 1 1
W ∗ 6,129,218,905 1,145,638,920 5,877,982,929 843,805,245
W ∗/W 1.21 1.982 1.161 1.46
Regulate entry, M/S 0.427 0.399 0.425 0.418
flexible service fee AR 61,064 16,370 62,038 15,521
N 701 2,556 316 1,783
WSE 6,067,995,065 837,666,228 5,866,594,606 766,480,880
WSE/W 1.198 1.449 1.158 1.326
Regulate service fee, M/S 0.58 0.743 0.568 0.637
flexible entry AR 984 984 5,697 5,697
N 1 1 1 1
WSM 5,448,21,335 1,018,364,459 5,224,881,689 750,057,080
WSM/W 1.076 1.762 1.032 1.297
In addition, remember from table 2 that an upper and a lower bound on the
number of brokers active in the market is observed and the average of both
was used for the baseline calibration. Table 7 reports the model outcomes
for the upper and the lower bound. Again, none of these alternative specifi-
cations qualitatively alter the conclusions of the baseline case. Finally, the
robustness of the results was also tested for possible measurement errors in
the parameter values of market size (S), brokerage industry market share
(M/S) and buyer and seller bargaining weight (β). For reasonable deviations
from their baseline values, none of these qualitatively alter the conclusions
of the baseline specification and the results are therefore omitted.
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Table 7: Welfare counterfactuals - sensitivity with respect to N
MC = 983 MC = 5, 696
scenario variable Inelastic S & D Elastic S & D Inelastic S & D Elastic S & D
Regulate service fee, M/S 0.431 0.518 0.431 0.518
N = 1 AR 59,634 11,059 59,634 11,059
N 1 1 1 1
W ∗ 6,002,940,254 988,965,188 6,002,985,148 989,010,082
W ∗/W 1.185 1.711 1.185 1.711
Regulate entry, M/S 0.426 0.407 0.426 0.407
flexible service fee AR 61,352 15,997 61,357 15,996
N 345 1,510 688 3,012
WSE 5,971,346,336 808,151,939 5,971,346,321 808,151,941
WSE/W 1.179 1.398 1.179 1.398
Regulate service fee, M/S 0.574 0.69 0.574 0.69
flexible entry AR 3340 3340 3340 3340
N 1 1 1 1
WSM 5,355,966,901 879,100,175 5,335,996,830 879,130,104
WSM/W 1.053 1.521 1.053 1.521
6 Conclusion
This paper aimed to make two contributions. Firstly, to present a general
model of imperfect competition among intermediaries that operate in one-
to-one matching markets, in which the intermediaries are allowed to freely
enter the market and flexibly compete in pricing their services. The model
showed that some private broker market power is justified from a social
perspective, such that the broker service fee properly internalizes the par-
ticipation externalities of buyers and sellers. In addition, it showed that
generally an excessive number of intermediaries operate in a private market
compared to what is socially desirable. The second contribution is to derive
policy implications from this setting and to quantify the effects of various
counterfactual regulatory interventions using data from the Belgian real es-
tate brokerage industry. The counterfactuals suggest that regulating broker
entry is more effective when seller supply and buyer demand are relatively
insensitive to changes in the service fee charged by brokers. In contrast,
targeting broker service fees is more effective when supply and demand is
elastic. A regulator should be cautious, however, about redistributive effects
that shift surplus from buyers and sellers to brokers when regulating broker
entry, whereas regulating service fees always increases consumer surplus.
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Appendices
A Theory and proofs
A.1 Equivalence different fee structures
In the main text only sellers and not buyers are directly charged for the bro-
kerage service. By the assumption of Nash bargaining, however, the service
fee can partially be passed through to buyers. Because Nash bargaining is
efficient, the model outcomes are independent to whether the service fee is
charged to sellers or buyers. To see this, consider the opposite case than
the one analyzed in the main text where only buyers and not sellers are di-
rectly charged. In this case, the individual transaction valuation of a buyer
type b is equal to b − (1 + t)p − T and of a seller type s is equal to p − s.
Nash bargaining implies that the transaction price when a buyer type b and
a seller type s are matched is p(b, s) = β(b − T )/(1 + t) + (1 − β)s. The
inverse demand equations can then be written as T = (b˜s˜− b¯s¯)/(s˜− s¯) and
1 + t = (b¯ − b˜)/(s˜ − b¯) and the average sales as p¯ = βs˜ + (1 − β)s¯. Com-
bining these expressions yields the following expression for average revenue:
AR ≡ tp¯ + T = β(b¯ − s˜) + (1 − β)(b˜ − s¯), which is identical to expression
(IV.16) in the main text. So, expression (IV.13) for broker profits and ex-
pression (IV.19) for welfare are also identical and all optimal pricing results
carry through independent to which side of the market the service fee is
charged.
A.2 Supply and demand with opportunity costs
Denote the cost of participating in the market while remaining unmatched
as zS for sellers and zB for buyers. Expected seller and buyer utility of
participating through the brokerage market can then be written as:
uS = ((1− t)p(b¯, s)− s− T )mS − zS(1−mS)
uB = (b− p(b, s¯))mB − zB(1−mB)
(IV.32)
When the expected pay-off of participating in the outside market is nor-
malized to zero, sellers participate in the brokerage market when uS ≥
0 ⇔ s ≤ (1 − t)b¯ − T − 1
β
1−mS
mS
zS ≡ s˜, where s˜ denotes the reservation
price of the marginal seller. Similarly, buyers participate when uB ≥ 0 ⇔
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b ≥ T+s¯
1−t − 11−β 1−m
B
mB
zB ≡ b˜, where b˜ denotes the marginal buyer valua-
tion. When all buyers and sellers accept their randomly assigned trading
partner - for which conditions are derived below - the expected buyer valua-
tion b¯ and the expected seller reservation price s¯ are defined by expressions
(IV.7) and (IV.8) in the main text, respectively. Market supply of sellers is
NS = SF S(s˜) and market demand for buyers NB = S(1− FB(b˜)).
To save notation, denote ZS = 1
β
1−mS
mS
zS and ZB = 1
1−β
1−mB
mB
zB, such that
the system of inverse demand equations can be written as:
T =
b˜s˜− b¯s¯+ b˜ZS − tildesZB − ZSZB
b¯− b˜+ ZB
1− t = s˜− s¯+ Z
S
b¯− tildeb+ ZB
(IV.33)
Using that p¯ = βb¯+ (1− β)T+s˜
1−t , broker expected per-match revenue, AR ≡
tp¯+ T , can be written as:
AR = β(b¯− tildes) + (1− β)(b˜− s¯− 1−m
S
mS
zS − 1−m
B
mB
zB (IV.34)
in which b˜ = FB
−1
(1−NB/S) and s˜ = F S−1(NS/S). Using that by broker
symmetry NB = nBN and NS = nSN and that mS = min(nB, nS)/nS and
mB = min(nB, nS)/nB it follows that average per-match revenue is strictly
decreasing in the number of buyers and sellers attracted by each broker:
δAR/δnB < 0 and δAR/δnS < 0. As in the main text, this implies that
broker profits are strictly decreasing in the number of participants on the
long side of the market and the private market outcome is always balanced:
NB = NS = M . So, the expression for average per-match revenue simpli-
fies to expression (IV.16) in the main text and all derived results are robust
to the alternative specification of supply and demand with opportunity costs.
For all sellers and buyers to accept the match with any randomly assigned
trading partner it suffices that the marginal seller accepts the match with
the marginal buyer that participates and vice versa. For this, the following
conditions need to be satisfied:
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β((1− t)b˜− s˜− T ) ≥ −zS∀NS, NB ∈ [0, S]
(1− β)(b˜− T + s˜
1− t ) ≥ −z
B∀NS, NB ∈ [0, S]
(IV.35)
Using the expressions for T and 1 − t and the balanced market conditions,
these conditions simplify to:
β(s˜− s¯) ≤ zS∀M ∈ [0, S]
(1− β)(b¯− tildeb) ≤ zB∀M ∈ [0, S]
(IV.36)
The spreads (s˜ − s¯) and (b¯ − tildeb) are increasing in M , so the conditions
must hold for M = S. The conditions imply that the opportunity costs zS
and zB must be sufficiently large relative to the degree of heterogeneity in
seller and buyer types, respectively. That is, when there is great heterogene-
ity in seller and buyer types, for the marginal seller with the highest possible
reservation price to accept a match with the marginal buyer type with the
lowest valuation and vice versa, the opportunity costs of refusing the match
must be greater compared to when the degree of heterogeneity in buyer and
seller types is small.
A.3 Proof proposition 3
Differentiating expression (IV.19) for total social value, in which NS =
NB = nN , with respect to N yields:
dW/dN = (b˜− s˜−MC)(n+Ndn/dN)− FC (IV.37)
Equating expression (IV.37) to zero, using the expressions for AR (IV.16)
and ET (IV.22), that n+Ndn/dN = dM/dN and rewriting yields expression
(IV.27). Note that dM/dN can be written as a function of M by solving the
private first-order condition (IV.20) for N as a function of M (the solution
is unique by assumption (b)) before differentiating. So, expression (IV.27)
can be written solely as a function of M (independent of N) and hence can
be solved for the equilibrium number of matches MSE at the social optimum.
The excessive entry result follows from adding to and subtracting from ex-
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pression (IV.37) expression (IV.13) for individual broker profits, in which
nS = nB = n and NS = NB = nN , which after rewriting yields:
dW/dN = pi + (AR−MC)Ndn/dN − ET (n+Ndn/dN) (IV.38)
Expression (IV.38) illustrates the distortions that result from free entry in
the private market relative to the social optimum. Under free entry in the
private market individual broker profits equate zero (pi = 0), while entry is
socially optimal when the impact of the marginal entrant on social welfare
is zero (dW/dN = 0). So, expression (IV.38) implies that private entry and
socially optimal entry coincide when the sum of the second and the third
term equals zero. When the sum of these terms is negative, there is excessive
entry. This because dpi/dN < 0, so dW/dN = 0 only holds when the number
of brokers is smaller than under private entry. By assumptions (a)-(c) and
the fact that ET > 0, the last two terms in (IV.38) are strictly negative and
hence the private free entry equilibrium is unambiguously characterized by
excessive entry. QED
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B Descriptive statistics
Table B.1: Descriptive statistics variables used in the regression analysis
Variable Obs. Mean. St. Dev.
List price (in e) 22,339 239,204 100,374
Sales price (in e) 22,395 220,099 91,567
Days-on-market 22,270 113 112
Living surface (in sq. m.) 21,129 180 62.7
Lot size (in sq. m.) 21,952 695 855
Year of construction 22,097 1957 30.7
Terraced 22,395 0.34 0.47
Semi-detached 22,395 0.25 0.43
Detached 22,395 0.40 0.49
Terrace 20,209 0.71 0.45
Elevator 11,737 0.00 0.06
Central heating 22,315 0.71 0.45
Heating material: gas 22,319 0.60 0.48
Heating material: electricity 22,319 0.07 0.26
Condensing boiler 22,216 0.05 0.21
Underfloor heating 22,295 0.03 0.17
Glazing: single 22,337 0.38 0.48
Glazing: double 22,337 0.77 0.42
Glazing: triple 22,337 0.00 0.07
Kitchen: luxuriously finished 22,337 0.06 0.24
Kitchen: dishwasher 22,337 0.30 0.45
State: luxuriously finished 22,316 0.04 0.21
State: ready to move in 22,316 0.60 0.48
State: minor refreshments necessary 22,316 0.19 0.39
Various: fireplace in living 20,194 0.12 0.32
Various: alarm 20,194 0.05 0.22
Environment: residential 20,803 0.14 0.35
Environment: villa district 20,803 0.04 0.19
Dist. center village 22,395 0.98 0.88
Dist. Brussels 22,395 57.8 30.2
Travel time to Brussels (in minutes) 22,395 55.5 19.5
Dist. nearest city 22,395 12.9 7.72
Dist. highway 22,395 5.39 5.22
Dist. train station 22,395 3.82 3.67
Year of sale 22,394 2010 2.71
Note: The sample of brokered real estate transactions contains besides information on prices (sales and
listing price) and liquidity (time-on-market) also a very detailed description of the features of every
property. The characteristics reported do not only describe the size of every dwelling (terraced vs. (semi-
)detached, interior space, lot size, # bedrooms, # garages, # bathrooms), but also provide detailed
information concerning the heating system (type (central heating), material (gas, electricity,), elements
(underfloor heating, accumulators,)), isolation (single vs. double vs. triple glazing), state of the dwelling
(ready to move in, luxuriously finished,), and its environment (residential, villa districts,) and location
(distance to different amenities, major cities). For several rooms, such as the kitchen (well-maintained,
dishwasher, ceramic stove,), bathroom (bath, shower,) and basement (wine cellar,), the realtor registered
the features present.
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Table B.2: Descriptive statistics buyer and seller characteristics
Buyers Sellers
Variable Obs. Mean. St. Dev. Obs. Mean. St. Dev.
Avg. age pop. 9,605 40.99 3.75 22,383 40.97 3.34
% Married 9,602 0.53 0.11 22,378 0.55 0.10
Avg. size household 9,602 2.34 0.31 22,378 2.40 0.25
Med. tax. inc. 9,597 22,053 3,596 22,346 22,908 3,544
% Higher education 9,616 0.28 0.08 22,393 0.28 0.08
% Owners 9,616 0.69 0.17 22,393 0.74 0.14
Note: To construct measures of buyer and seller characteristics administrative data are used at the level
of statistical sectors in Belgium. The 19,781 statistical sectors in Belgium are the lowest territorial level
at which Statistics Belgium gathers information and, on average, have a surface of 1.5km2, and are home
to approximately 550 inhabitants and/or 240 households. Given that we know the exact location of every
dwelling and the previous address for a subsample of buyers, we can spatially join the respective x- and
y-coordinates with the appropriate statistical sectors using the spatial join module in Quantum GIS.
From Statistics Belgium we retrieved yearly data on different demographic variables and taxable incomes
for every statistical sector. We either observed or managed to calculate the average age of the population,
the percentage of reference persons of households who are married, the average size of a household and
the median taxable income for every local living area. From the Census 2011 we furthermore retrieved
the percentage of the population that finished higher education (where higher education is defined as a
university degree or higher) and the percentage of owner-occupied houses in the total housing stock.
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Table B.3: Marginal costs
Note: Table B.3 provides an overview of the monetary costs incurred by real estate agents when selling
a property. Information from www.immoweb.be, the largest online listing service in Belgium, suggests
that a listing costs between e100 and e150. Other online listing platforms in Belgium are usually free
of charge. We assume that other promotional activities, such as a “for sale” sign and advertisement
in local newspapers and so on, cost another e100. Since real estate agents also help sellers gather the
necessary documents these costs are also initially incurred by the real estate agent. From www.okra.be
and www.immoweb.be we learned that these costs are in total between e430 and e1120. Information
from property registers finally contribute another e33. Given all these costs we calculate a monetary
per-match cost of e983 for a representative transaction.
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C Regression results
Table C.1: Regression results
Note: Table C.1 presents the regression results. Whereas most hedonic house price analyses use a
log-transformed dependent variable, house prices are not log-transformed here since the purpose is for
the residuals to capture the price spread (in euros). For some independent variables, such as interior
space and lot size, the regression is therefore augmented with a quadratic term to capture possible
nonlinearities. The first column of table C.1 presents the estimated coefficients for the hedonic pricing
regression (IV.30) without buyer and seller characteristics. Almost all coefficients show the expected
signs and are statistically significant. For example, the sales price of a dwelling is positively related
to its interior space and lot size, but an additional square meter is less valuable for a large dwelling
than for a smaller one. Also observe that (semi-)detached houses are more expensive than terraces
ones. Furthermore, note that all the characteristics that relate to the quality of the property show their
expected signs.29
Following Harding et al. (2003), in the second column of table C.1 buyer and seller characteris-
tics are included in the regression analysis. Harding et al. (2003), however, these variables are not
observed at the individual level. Instead, their local living area counterparts are used as a proxy variable,
as described in table B.2. In addition, table C.2 reports the regression coefficients for the “bargaining
effect” (α) and the “demand effect” (δ) in expression (IV.31). There are significant positive demand
effects from the percentage of people with a college education or higher, the percentage of people that is
married, and the average age of the population. There is a significantly negative demand effects from
the percentage of owners. The only significant bargaining effect comes from the percentage of people
that enjoyed higher education, which suggests that the price of housing is increasing whenever the level
of education of the seller is relatively high compared to that of the buyer.
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Table C.2: Bargaining and demand effects
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Figure C.1: Estimated kernel and fitted triangular densities for Belgium as
a whole
Note: all procedures were carried out in Stata 11.2. For the lower bound we calculated the sum of squared
deviations for all integer values (pMAX − p¯) between the minimum and the maximum of the estimated
residuals. For the upper bound we performed the same procedure but used an interval of 10. For both
the lower and the upper bound, the value of pMAX − p¯ that corresponds with the minimum value of the
sum of squared deviations between the estimated Kernel density and the fitted triangular distribution is
chosen.
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In this dissertation, I have presented four essays on local housing and real es-
tate brokerage markets. As concluding remarks and summaries were already
presented at the end of every chapter, this section contains some more gen-
eral lessons and insights. Although this dissertation contains four chapters
where we attempted to formulate interesting research questions and have
tried to answer them using the appropriate data and techniques, combining
them into a single thesis has also brought up some, which I believe to be,
interesting new ideas for future research. These are loosely discussed in the
next paragraphs.
In the introduction of this thesis we started with the observations of John
Quigley and Duncan Maclennan. Already in 1979 the late housing economist
John Quigley noted that the housing commodity is characterized by a pe-
culiar combination of features that differentiate it from other goods and
markets, such as the (US) equity market, where arbitrage is instantaneous
and search costs are negligible. The inherent spatial fixity, durability and
heterogeneity of the housing commodity has led Duncan Maclennan (1982)
to conclude that “the housing market is really not a single neoclassical ex-
change market, but is rather a set of overlapping submarkets differentiated
by tenure, location, size and quality.” Quigley (2002) also argued that these
characteristics imply that transaction costs are substantial and significant
in housing markets. These transaction costs do not only entail registration-
and notary fees, but also search costs. Due to the heterogeneous nature of
the housing good and spatial fixity, searching is costly both for buyers and
sellers. It is in these types of environments that intermediaries, such as real
estate agents, thrive. In the four essays presented in this dissertation we
focus on the spatial dimension of the housing commodity and the inherent
heterogeneity that characterize it.
In the third chapter of this dissertation we investigated the relationship
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between the housing stock composition at the neighborhood level and hous-
ing prices. While housing economists have unanimously acknowledged that
housing is a heterogeneous good and methods, such as the hedonic pricing
method (Rosen, 1974), have been developed to deal with this inherent het-
erogeneity, this chapter is one of (very) few studies investigating the effect
of neighborhood housing stock composition on housing prices. The large
heterogeneity in both dwellings and neighborhoods are explanations for the
fact that housing markets are frequently characterized as “thin” markets.
Especially in Belgium, where housing is mainly organized on a relatively
small scale, i.e. individuals hire an architect and contractor to construct
their preferred home, dwellings are extremely heterogeneous. This, in turn,
implies that potential buyers/sellers have few reference points and it is not
easy to observe a “market-clearing” price for many properties. This void
is potentially filled by bargaining between buyers and sellers of properties.
While the hedonic pricing model is extremely suitable for the analysis of
housing prices, because of its capability to deal with the inherent heteroge-
neous nature of the housing good, its theoretical foundations do not allow
for any form of bargaining between buyers and sellers. In 2003, Harding
et al. (2003) published a paper in the Review of Economics and Statistics,
where they develop (and apply) a novel identification strategy that can be
used to uncover bargaining effects. While the method developed by Harding
et al. (2003) was merely used as an instrument to quantify the structural
parameters of buyer demand and seller supply in chapter 4, I believe that
the unique nature of the housing commodity suggests a high demand for
econometric models that allow for bargaining between agents.
As bargaining effects are especially likely to be observed in “thin” mar-
kets, it is perhaps also interesting to estimate a similar bargaining model for
different markets and types of properties. In chapter 2, I already established
that housing markets and - construction is organized very differently in the
Netherlands than in Belgium. While housing construction is organized on
a small scale (individuals hire an architect and contractor themselves) in
Belgium and (spatial) planning regulations are loose, housing construction
in the Netherlands is mostly organized on a large scale (a single housing con-
struction project frequently entails hundreds of (highly) similar dwellings)
and spatial planning is (more) strict. Obviously, these differences also result
in a different housing stock. While neighboring dwellings in the Netherlands
frequently look much alike, dwellings in Belgium can differ in many aspects
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from neighboring dwellings. This consequently implies that it might be more
costly for a potential seller in Belgium to search for an appropriate (listing)
price for their property, which leaves room for bargaining. Although the
reasoning presented here is just a hunch, it can be empirically tested when
the appropriate data are available.
While the previous two paragraphs have focused on aspects related to het-
erogeneity, I was also very much interested in the spatial dimension that is
inherent to the housing commodity. Although I started out with an interest
in econometric models that deal with spatial panel data, I personally ex-
perienced the increasing availability of spatial data over the last 4.5 years.
Although one of the first applications of spatial analysis (in epidemiology)
already dates back to the French geographer Charles Picquet (1832), who
wrote the famous “rapport sur la marche et les effets du chole´ra dans Paris
et le de´partement de la Seine”, the analysis of spatial data in (housing)
economics has increased tremendously over the last two decades due to this
increased availability of data and also computational power. In the third
chapter of this dissertation we have shown that geospatial can be used to
create additional variables that can be used in econometric models, such as
the hedonic pricing models. I believe that the increased availability of spatial
and other data, due to advances in ICT, is one of the most important devel-
opments for housing (economists) in recent decades. Although the so-called
”Big Data” provides a whole new array of opportunities for researchers, it
also presents some new challenges such as (lack) of computational power to
analyze all the available data.
As different dwellings are obviously located in different locations with po-
tentially different (neighborhood) characteristics, I welcome the initiatives of
governments and institutions to provide more (spatial) data to researchers.
As locations can also vary in a potentially infinite number of features, it
is clear that there will always be unobserved (spatial) heterogeneity. For-
tunately, econometricians have developed techniques and methods to deal
with (un)observed (spatial) heterogeneity, by allowing for example for (spa-
tially) correlated error terms (e.g. spatial error model (SEM)) or (spatial)
dependent variables (e.g. spatial lag model (SAR)). Ever since the semi-
nal contributions of Paelinck & Klaassen (1979) and Anselin (1988) spatial
econometric models, such as spatial error- and spatial lag models, have trans-
formed from an obscurity to a workhorse of modern (housing) economists.
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While the theoretical foundations of spatial econometric models using cross-
sectional data were already established in the eighties, this field of research
remains highly active. In recent years, authors such as Pesaran (2004, 2007a,
2007b, 2011) and Baltagi (2011) have made important contributions in the
field of econometrics with spatial panel data. In chapter 1 of this disserta-
tion we showed that housing price spillovers between local markets follow
distinct spatial patterns. The results presented furthermore suggested that
the linguistic border in Belgium acts as a “hard” boundary in the peripher-
ally located eastern and western parts of Belgium. While the first chapter
contributes to the expanding literature in this particular field of research,
we believe that these considerations can also be studied using micro-level
data. In chapter 2 we already showed that higher housing prices in one mar-
ket (the Netherlands) potentially spill over to neighboring markets in other
countries. In a similar fashion it is also possible to study the ”border effects”
potentially arising from the linguistic border that splits Belgium into two
distinct linguistic regions.
While the first three chapters of this dissertation focused on local housing
markets, the last chapter investigates the market efficiency in the Belgian
real estate brokerage market. Despite that this chapter is quite different
from the other three chapters presented, it is important to emphasize that
real estate markets and real estate brokerage markets are closely related.
A simple observation that I believe proves this statement is the observation
that housing prices and the number of (active) real estate agents in the mar-
ket are frequently positively correlated. Real estate agents have traditionally
acted as intermediaries between buyers and sellers in real estate markets and
provide promotional services, search for eligible buyers and provide market
information. The rise of modern information and communication technolo-
gies, such as the internet, in recent years will likely also affect (the role
of) real estate agents. As the internet not only provides valuable market
information, but also enables potential sellers to search for eligible buyers
more easily themselves. All in all, the advent of modern ICT has lowered
(monetary) search costs for both sellers and buyers of properties, which has
decreased the information monopoly of real estate agents. It is no wonder
that in recent years researchers (e.g., Bernheim & Meer, 2008; Hendel et al.,
2009) have started investigating whether selling with the help of real estate
agent yields “better” market outcomes, such as a higher sales price (after
commission), probability of sale and/or a shorter time-on-the-market.
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While there is, for now, little evidence that real estate agents achieve better
market outcomes, it might be the case that certain real estate agents “struc-
turally” achieve better market outcomes than others. In the last chapter we
ignored the fact that the market outcomes achieved by real estate agents
are potentially a function of the commission fees charged. As was right-
fully acknowledged by Levitt & Syverson (2008b), the service fees charged
by real estate agents serve as an incentive mechanism. Levitt & Syverson
(2008b) showed that the observed fixed commission rates in the US, do not
adequately incentivize real estate agents. Real estate agents tend to sell
properties of their clients more quickly, and at a lower sales prices, than
the properties they own themselves. This might also help explaining the
results found by Hendel et al. (2009). As variation in commission rates in
Belgium is observed, it is particularly interesting to investigate whether this
variation can help explaining differences in market outcomes. Together with
my highly appreciated co-worker Bert Willekens, I hope to be able to start
digging deeper into these issues in the near future.
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